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I. INTRODUCTION: JUDICIAL DISCRETION, THE CLOSE
CASE, AND RULE 11
HEN I started writing an article about the 1993 amendments to
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Rule 11"),'
it quickly became apparent that in order to do so, I needed to
address the issue of judicial discretion. Rule 11 relies heavily upon the
broad delegation of authority to the courts to exercise discretion in issu-
ing, or refusing to issue, sanctions. While it seemed obvious that it was
impossible to write about procedure without addressing the question of
discretion, this has not been the general perception.
There is a rich genre of legal scholarship that looks at procedure2 and
an equally rich and developing genre of legal scholarship that examines
the question of judicial discretion. 3 But the two seldom intersect. This is
a rich and growing field, yet there is limited cross reference or citation
outside of recognized genres. Writers seemingly talking about the same
thing, or at least different facets of the same phenomenon, appear to ig-
nore, or at least fail to cite to, complementary bodies of research.4 The
major commentators addressing Rule 11 routinely refer to the problem of
judicial discretion, and how it is to be defined and exercised, without ever
citing to the growing body of literature on the subject.5 The reluctance to
examine judicial discretion analytically is more peculiar given its impor-
tance to the procedural enterprise.
Jumping into the Rule 11 debate6 is like leaping headfirst into a juris-
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
2. See infra notes 7-11.
3. See infra notes 12-27.
4. George A. Martinez, Legal Indeterminacy, Judicial Discretion and the Mexican-
American Litigation Experience: 1930-1980, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 555 (1994) (pointing
out the commonality of concerns among such writers).
5. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Comment, Sanctions in the Proposed Amendments
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Questions About Power, 11 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 997 (1983); Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: Where We Are and Where We Are Going, 60
FORDHAM L. REV. 475 (1991).
6. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. This Article addresses the 1993 revisions to Rule 11. Enacted
in 1945, Rule 11 was originally amended in 1983. See COMMUNICATION FROM THE CHIEF
JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES, AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR
THE U.S. DISTRICT COURTS, H.R. Doc. No. 54, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1983); COMMITrEE
ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE 6-10 (June 1981); Thomas E. Patton, New Rules Intended to Streamline
Pretrial Process, LEGAL TIMES, May 16, 1983, at 14. Drafted and adopted pursuant to the
Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1966), the 1983 amendments proposed to remove
the "bad faith" requirement from the rule, impose a clearer requirement for prefiling in-
vestigations, and require attorney certification that the motion or paper is "well grounded
in fact ... is warranted by existing law or a good-faith argument for the extension, modifi-




[Thus] when a new or doubtful case arises to which two different
rules seem, when taken literally, to be equally applicable, it may be,
and often is, the function of jurisprudence to consider the ultimate
effect which would be produced if each rule were applied to an indef-
inite number of similar cases .... 7
In the Rule 11 context, the jurisprudential question has been, and contin-
ues to be, how to define, describe, limit, conceptualize, or regulate the
exercise of the court's power to sanction. This Article will look at the
close case and the differential impact two different "rules" of discretion
can have. One "rule" produces expansive exercise of Rule l's sanction
powers by anticipating competing outcomes in a close case. The other
"rule," however, limits the application of these powers in reference to the
ultimate outcome of the close case by allowing the court to err on the side
of no sanction. This jurisprudential debate is seen throughout the com-
mentary. Some commentators question the utility of Rule 11 in light of
its adverse impact, while others argue that the adverse impact of Rule 11
(its inclusive application and chilling effect, or over-deterrence) is worth
the improvement in the court's functions.8 This Article proposes a solu-
Patton, supra, at 14. As important as the removal of the bad faith element from the rule
was the imposition of the mandatory sanction; if a pleading violates the rule, the court
"shall" impose sanctions. JAMES W. MOORE, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE: 1996 RULES
PAMPHLET PART 111 11.2 (1996) (discussing the advisory committee's note to the 1983
Amendment of Rule 11) [hereinafter Committee's Note]. Two telling points were made in
the Committee's Note. The Committee claimed that the "new language is intended to re-
duce the reluctance of courts to impose sanctions" and acknowledged that the new "stan-
dard is more stringent than the original good-faith formula and thus it is expected that a
greater range of circumstances will trigger its violation." Id. See also Burbank, supra note
5, at 1006 (discussing removal of the bad faith standard as a predicate to sanctions). Bur-
bank questions whether
[T]he Supreme Court [has] the power under the Rules Enabling Act to pro-
mulgate rules that authorize the imposition of sanctions, including reason-
able attorney's fees, on parties or their attorneys for conduct that is negligent
(or, if you like, non-willful, not in bad faith, or whatever similar formulation
is necessary to remove the proposed amendments from any protective um-
brella of section 1927 and inherent power as defined in Roadway Express).
Burbank, supra note 5, at 1006. The 1983 amendments caused a flurry of excitement and
less than 10 years after their enactment another Call for Comment prefatory to amend-
ment was issued. COMMITTEE ON PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFER-
ENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, CALL FOR WRITTEN COMMENTS ON RULE 11 OF THE
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND RELATED RULES (Aug. 1990) [hereinafter
CALL FOR COMMENT]. At the time Rule 11 was undergoing revision, Congress too was
taking legislative action to address the problems of escalating litigation costs, delays in case
resolution, and the overburdening of scarce judicial resources. S. REP. No. 416, 101st
Cong., 2nd Sess. 6 (1990) (discussing the Judicial Improvements Act). This is the context
within which Rule 11 was amended in 1993.
7. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 992 (4th ed. 1968) (defining jurisprudence).
8. See Vairo, supra note 5, at 486 (refuting assumptions about the disruptive impact
of "frivolous litigation" and the role of Rule 11 in deterring marginal or doubtful litiga-
tion). Vairo documents the differential impact of Rule 11 on plaintiffs in civil rights, em-
ployment discrimination, securities fraud, and antitrust litigation; questions whether Rule
11 is worth the cost; and raises again the issue of a "legal conduct-" versus "legal product-"
based approach. Resolution of the "Rule 11 debate implicates the fundamental tenets of
the federal system of civil procedure." Id. But see Martin B. Louis, Intercepting and Dis-
couraging Doubtful Litigation: A Golden Anniversary View of Pleading, Summary Judg-
1997]
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tion to that problem-use of the close case paradigm to define the limits
of the court's discretion and, therefore, power to sanction. In this Article,
the close case is proposed as the articulable outer limit of judicial discre-
tion that most closely approximates the phenomenological experience of
a sitting judge, in particular the dimension of discretion called into play
when a judge is uncertain about an outcome. 9 This Article recommends
use of the close case as an explicit decisional methodology to define the
boundaries of a court's discretion under Rule 11. This methodology has
been tested by the courts and has proven its utility in helping a court
conceptualize its own uncertainty about the likely outcomes of a deci-
sion. 10 Next, this Article proceeds on the basic assumption that if a sit-
ting judge can look at a sanctions case and by calling it a close case
articulate for herself the likelihood that another sitting judge would not
impose sanctions, then, a priori, the claim is not frivolous or at least raises
a sufficient doubt that the frivolity is too uncertain to warrant a
sanction."
Some commentators argue that the problem of discretion and Rule 11
has been rendered moot by the 1993 amendments. In reality, amended
Rule 11 gives the courts virtually absolute discretion "not to sanction.' 12
The important question is how that discretion is to be used. This dimen-
sion of the court's sanction discretion renders the conundrum of the close
case in the Rule 11 context even more problematic than it otherwise
might be. If the court has the absolute discretion not to sanction, why or
when in a close case should a court enter a sanction order? To date, the
close Rule 11 case has been treated as a sanction decision in equipoise-
to sanction or not is equally tolerable. This conundrum, tolerating con-
flicting sanction decisions in a close case, highlights the lack of a Rule 11
jurisprudence' 3 looking at judicial discretion as a significant dimension of
the sanction decision. 14 The close case defines the grey area of judicial
discretion wherein treating inconsistency as the norm reflects a particular
view of the nature of that inconsistency or variability-it is clearly pre-
dictable and tolerable. But why?
Consistency poses its own problems. If a decision is truly discretionary,
the legal determinates of the outcome are balanced and variability in out-
come is predictable. This variability, from the perspective of the legal
ment, and Rule 11 Sanctions Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 67 N.C. L. REV.
1023, 1035 (1989) (looking at Rule 11 as a successful part of the court's efforts to reform
the litigation "interception/discouragement systems" of the Federal Rules). Not only is
Rule 11 worth the cost, Professor Louis argues that the bias in the American system should
shift away from a position which errs "on the side of, or give[s] the benefit of the doubt to,
the party opposing interception," to a system which uses fee shifts more broadly. Louis,
supra, at 1035.
9. See infra notes 238-99 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 239-324.
11. See infra notes 300-24 and accompanying text.
12. Maureen N. Armour, Practice Makes Perfect: Judicial Discretion and the 1993
Amendments to Rule 11, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 677, 772 (1996).
13. See infra notes 95-110 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 68-95 and accompanying text.
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paradigm, reflects the differential impact of factors traditionally viewed
as nonlegal. The problem is that inconsistency in highly discretionary de-
cisions may also reflect the adverse or questionable impact of "tradition-
ally" nonlegal factors or factors subject to question. 15 Discretion is the
aperture that allows us to look at law and legal decision making in a legal
context. It is the theoretical breakpoint between a legal perspective that
assumes an enclosed, explicit, and wholly self-referring legal paradigm,
defined solely by reference to the law and a perspective that acknowl-
edges that all judicial decisions take place within a larger context. 16
This Article, using Rule 11, develops and proposes use of the close case
as an analytic schema to redress the lack of a regulatory bright line be-
tween sanctionable and acceptable (albeit marginal) litigation. Several
important insights developed in the scholarly literature on judicial discre-
tion and decision making are brought to bear upon the question of the
proper scope of the court's discretion under Rule 11 in a close case. 17
The most important is the need to make the judicial decision maker
aware of the discretionary dimensions of the sanction decision and to
force jurists to address that discretion explicitly. The argument that mak-
ing decision makers aware of their discretion can have a positive impact
has been made in other contexts by authors who have attempted to force
the judiciary to explicitly consider alternative decisional methodologies.' 8
The goal of this Article is to begin a dialogue about judicial discretion
between the jurist and the advocate. This legal discourse will hopefully
address the scope and nature of judicial discretion in a more productive
and less reductive manner in the Rule 11 arena than has been the case in
the past.' 9 Note that to use the term discretion to describe the personal
input of decision makers results in a discussion at cross purposes. Some
discuss "discretion as inevitable" while "others think of discretion as de-
rived solely from the absence of 'governing rules.' The problem is com-
plicated, further, by the intrusion of technical references to discretion as
managerial authority. '20 Fletcher's concern is that the "infelicitous con-
sequences of interweaving" different senses of discretion can blur rele-
vant distinctions in a "reductionist" manner wherein "the entire range
and diversity of decisional possibilities is reduced to one repetitive de-
scription."'2' Fletcher identifies a number of different types or dimen-
sions of discretion: "(1) discretion as wisdom; (2) discretion as
15. Armour, supra note 12, at 732-34.
16. Martinez, supra note 4, at 614-18.
17. See infra notes 47-73 and accompanying text.
18. See Martinez, supra note 4, at 611-18. Professor Martinez's analysis takes the con-
cept of discretion, here the dimension of personal input in the resolution of substantive
claims when largely indeterminate "laws" are at issue, and develops an empirical analysis
of a body of case law which illustrates the impact of larger contextual biases-racism--on
seemingly neutral judicial decisions.
19. See George P. Fletcher, Some Unwise Reflections About Discretion, 47 LAW &
CONTEMP. PRois. 269, 277-81 (1984).
20. Id. at 278.
21. Id. at 279.
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managerial authority; (3) discretion as personal input; (4) discretion as
power. '22 Decisions are discretionary also in the sense in which they
could be further constrained,23 or in the sense that the decision maker is
justified in referring to their "discretion" in justifying the decision.24 This
"self-referring appeal to one's own judgment and subjective input in the
decisionmaking process" has limited scope and would not be acceptable
in determining a matter of substantive law,25 but it is usually deemed ap-
propriate in areas involving the court's exercise of managerial or proce-
dural authority.2 6 This problem treats the court's managerial or
procedural discretion as has been addressed elsewhere. 27
A. How DID WE GET HERE?
Originally amended in an era of judicial reform,28 Rule 11 can only be
understood within the context of the following: institutional and profes-
sional critiques aimed at the perceived liberality of the federal proce-
dures,29 the ethical boundaries of the role of attorneys,30 and the
22. Id. at 276.
23. Id. at 282-83.
24. Id. at 283.
25. Id. at 284.
26. Id. at 285.
27. Armour, supra note 12, at 714-15.
28. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Sanctions, Symmetry, and Safe Harbors: Limiting Misap-
plication of Rule 11 by Harmonizing It with Pre- Verdict Dismissal Devices, 60 FORDHAM L.
REV. 257, 262-68 (1991) (describing the procedural reforms of the 1980s as a decade of
"counter revolution" spawned by the profession's increasing belief that existing pretrial
termination procedures were not being effectively used by the courts). While efforts to
amend Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 and thus render it a de facto fee shift were
thwarted, the conservative elements of reform gained ground in Rule 11. Id. at 264-65
n.35.
29. See Robert G. Bone, Mapping the Boundaries of a Dispute: Conceptions of Ideal
Lawsuit Structure from the Field Code to the Federal Rules, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 88 (1989)
(looking at the impetus to "strike a balance between the social interest in predictability and
certainty, on the one hand, and the social interests served by a dynamic legal system and an
individualized approach to justice, on the other" in procedural reform); Louis, supra note
8, at 1052-61 (urging expansion of pretrial interception procedures and the adoption of a
modified English Rule); Melissa L. Nelken, One Step Forward, Tw'o Steps Back: Summary
Judgment After Celotex, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 53 (1988) (questioning changes in summaryjudgment procedures); Stempel, supra note 28; Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Distorted Mirror:
The Supreme Court's Shimmering View of Summary Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the
Adjudication Process, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 98-100 (1988) (describing the impact upon sum-
mary judgment procedures of the impetus to reform characteristics of the 1980s, rendering
it the primary tool for making the system efficient and resulting in judicial reform of sum-
mary judgment standards and procedures).
30. Attorneys' roles are institutionally defined both in terms of their ideal form and
performance. The role of the attorney within the broad representational paradigm is client
centered, the zealous advocate of the profession's code. The role of the attorney as an
officer of the court is institution centered, the gatekeeper and defender of scarce judicial
resources. Attorneys deciding whether to pursue a close case in the face of Rule 11 are
forced into professional schizophrenia: zealous advocates pursue the close case, willingly
challenging the law and valuing the courtroom as the dynamic core of the common law.
The court's officers express concern over the close case and the limits of merit-based litiga-
tion. Will it overburden the courts, and, if not successful, what purpose is served? See
Anthony V. Alfieri, Critical Theories and Legal Ethics: Impoverished Practices, 81 GEO.
L.J. 2567 (1993); Stephen Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REV. 717 (1987)
[Vol. 50
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adversarial paradigm3' pervasive at the time. While Rule 11 is one of
several tools available to the courts to address litigation abuse, 32 the
(discussing the nature of the attorney-client relationship and the value of client autonomy);
Kenneth L. Penegar, The Five Pillars of Professionalism, 49 U. Pir. L. REv. 307 (1988)
(discussing competing views of the representational relationship as reflecting competing
societal norms-individualism, contractual relationships, and adversarialism versus cooper-
ation and communalism); William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice
and Professional Ethics, 29 Wis. L. REV. 30 (1978) [hereinafter Simon, The Idealogy of
Advocacy] (conducting a critical examination of the ideology of advocacy as defining the
ethical boundaries of the representational relationship); William H. Simon, Visions of Prac-
tice in Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REV. 469 (1984).
31. The critique of adversarialism views it as an inherently inefficient way to resolve
disputes-guaranteeing no better outcomes than other less onerous methods-and as a
method which creates incentives to use the courts as a pawn in the litigative struggle. This
critique has given rise not only to judicial reform, but to a paradigm shift which values the
courts for their ability to resolve disputes, via pretrial procedures and settlements, rather
than as principled, adjudicative fora. In this context, dispute resolution is valued and
viewed contextually and particularistically as a way to address the legal, but more impor-
tantly, nonlegal dimensions of the problem, while formal adjudication becomes the court of
last resort. Ironically, Rule 11 addresses the problem of court reform by refusing access to
adjudication, while settlement addresses the problem of court reform by creating incen-
tives to avoid adjudication. See John B. Attanasio, Foreword: Verstehen and Dispute Reso-
lution, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1317 (1992) (discussing the adversarial method of dispute
resolution-each party putting forth their strongest arguments to a neutral judge and jury
to determine who wins-as one among many methods of legal dispute resolution repre-
senting a continuum of formal, principled methods); Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93
YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984) (rejecting settlement as preferable to judgment and looking at /
it as a "highly problematic technique for streamlining dockets ... [and] a capitulation to
the conditions of mass society ... [which] should neither be encouraged nor praised");
Thomas D. Lambros, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: A New Adversarial Model for
a New Era, 50 U. Prrr. L. REv. 789, 794 (1989) (noting the "spirit of judicial management
and control evinced in the 1983 amendments" and expressed further in the Supreme
Court's summary judgment trilogy); Stephen McG. Bundy, The Policy in Favor of Settle-
ment in an Adversary System, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 5 (1992) (Current policies favor settle-
ment largely as a result of critical judgments regarding the adversary system, a system
which traditionally favors strong party control and a "deep distrust of the tribunal's...
competence and neutrality." This challenges the assumptions that underlay the critique of
adversarialism and the favorable treatment of settlements.); Kevin C. McMunigal, The
Costs of Settlement: The Impact of Scarcity of Adjudication on Litigating Lawyers, 37
UCLA L. REv. 833 (1990) (looking at the impact on the overall conceptualization of the
adjudicative system on the lack of trial and fact of settlement); Judith Resnik, The Domain
of Courts, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2219, 2220, 2228 (1989) (Resnik questions whether the
agenda of judicial reform is in fact "fueled solely by a 'neutral' agenda of ... efficiency...
[or] 'economy,"' since it appears to reflect in part a political agenda of exclusion. Resnik's
comments illustrate the point that limiting access to the courts is a way to redistribute
power, or deny power, to certain groups in society-the politicization of rulemaking has
occurred and control of the process rests in the hands of the powerful. One telling com-
ment by Professor Resnik captures the nature of the debate: "I am concerned about the
hostility to and trivialization of individual claims. I have often heard from federal judges
that they don't have the time to spend on a small claim-that it's not 'worth it,' that their
time (and they) are too important .... " If the courts do not exist for individual claims, for
whom do they exist?); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., American Law Institute Study on Paths to a
"Better Way": Litigation, Alternatives, and Accommodation, 1989 DUKE L.J. 824 (1989)
(looking at the "problem" facing the courts, the definition of disputes, the ends sought to
be achieved through dispute resolution, and the impact alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms would have).
32. See WARREN FREEDMAN, FRIVOLOUS LAwsUITS AND FRIVOLOUS DEFENSES: UN-
jusIFiABLE LITIGATION (1987) (focusing on the availability of civil actions to punish such
conduct, including actions for abuse of process, malicious prosecution, legal malpractice,
contempt, and the tort of interference with advantageous relationship); GREGORY P. Jo-
1997]
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others are rooted in the paradigm of judicial restraint and the institu-
tional values that came before the procedural reforms of the 1980s.33 It is
within the arena of Rule 1134 and its companion, the inherent powers
doctrine, that the courts have worked hardest to further their own agenda
for reform.35 This agenda includes an expansive delegation of power to
the courts to manage their dockets, and concomitantly litigation, with lit-
tle appellate review.
As originally enacted in 1945, Rule 11 was limited in scope to require
honesty in fact in the filing of pleadings and a showing of bad faith for its
SEPH, SANCIONS: THE FEDERAL LAW OF LITIGATION ABUSE 2-5 (1994) (covering a range
of procedural and statutory mechanisms which authorize sanctions, including Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 11, 16(f) (pretrial orders), 26(g), and 37 (discovery abuse); Appel-
late Rule 38 and 28 U.S.C. § 1912 (1992) (frivolous appeals); the court's inherent powers
(sanctioning bad faith litigation abuse); and 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1992) (sanctions for vexa-
tiously and unreasonably multiplying litigation)); Gregory P. Joseph, Rule 11 Is only the
Beginning, 74 A.B.A. J. 62, 62 (May 1988) (notes limited scope of Rule 11 and resurgence
of interest in other sanction powers); Paul Reidinger, The Metes and Bounds of Advocacy,
73 A.B.A. J. 66,69 (July 1987); S.D. Shuler, Chambers v. Nasco, Inc.: Moving Beyond Rule
11 into the Uncharted Territory of Courts Inherent Power to Sanction, 66 TUL. L. REV. 591,
596-99 (1991); John W. Wade, On Frivolous Litigation: A Study of Tort Liability and Pro-
cedural Sanctions, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 433, 490 (1986); Carolyn L. Dessin, Note, Civil
Procedure-Federal District Courts Have Inherent Power to Sanction Attorneys for Abuse
of the Judicial Process, 31 ViLE. L. REV. 1073, 1073 (1986); John W. Wright, Note, Taxation:
Frivolous Tax Litigation: Pecuniary Sanctions Against Taxpayers and Their Attorneys, 39
OKLA. L. REV. 156, 164-65 (1986).
33. See Burbank, supra note 5, at 998-1000 (discussing the public policies of judicial
restraint and open court system that underlie the other available sanction provisions).
34. See Carl Tobias, Judicial Discretion and the 1983 Amendments to the Federal Civil
Rules, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 933 (1991).
35. The Supreme Court in two sanctions cases, one involving the inherent powers doc-
trine, Chambers v. Nasco, 501 U.S. 32 (1991), and the other Rule 11, Cooter & Gell v.
Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990), laid the doctrinal groundwork for its reform agenda.
While Nasco addressed the "implied powers" vested in the courts by their very nature and
Cooter & Gell addressed the scope of the trial court's discretion to sanction under Rule 11,
both pursued a common theme: Trial courts are best positioned to regulate the litigation
before them and should be given broad discretion to do so. See Shuler, supra note 32, at
598-602 (touching on the distinction between the court's inherent powers and their powers
under the Rules Enabling Act-one can be regulated by Congress the other can't, thus
reaffirming the court's power to sanction bad faith litigation). It is important to note that
Justice Scalia rejected the imposition of a bad faith limitation on the court's inherent pow-
ers to shift fees and argued that the inherent sanctioning powers should extend to less than
bad faith. Cf Roy D. Simon, Jr., The Riddle of Rule 68,54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 89 n.227(1985) (debating the Supreme Court's power under the Rules Enabling Act to enact a
comprehensive provision such as Rule 68); Jennifer O'Hearne, Comment, Compelled Par-
ticipation in Innovative Pretrial Proceedings, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 290 (1989); David A. Ram-
melt, Note, "Inherent Power" and Rule 16: How Far Can a Federal Court Push the Litigant
Toward Settlement?, 65 IND. L.J. 965 (1990); see infra notes 155-60 and accompanying text
(discussing Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp.).
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application.3 6 Despite some cautionary voices, 37 Rule 11 was amended in
1983, substituting an objective standard of care for the preexisting bad
faith standard.38 The 1983 amendment generated little concern at the
time about the court's ability to move aggressively via its rulemaking
power into the arena of attorney regulation.3 9 Overall, the amended rule
was greeted with enthusiasm as one of the court reforms most likely to
increase judicial efficiency by deterring the filing and pursuit of frivolous
litigation. This justification for Rule 11, however, is routinely cited with-
36. See D. Michael Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and Its Enforcement. Some "Strik-
ing" Problems with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MINN. L. REv. 1, 55-58 (1976)
(cautioning against the use of Rule 11 to sanction "improper espousal of a legal position,"
or imposing such a strict factual threshold as to unduly restrict access to the courts). Risin-
ger found that the subjective standard of the rule, the bad faith requirement, was not itself
a problem. "The problem arises when the finder of fact is not willing to indulge in the
normal process of circumstantial inference concerning the intentional or wilful [sic] nature
of an act." Id. at 60. Risinger questioned the use of objective standards on grounds that
they "take us from the realm of ethical considerations to the realm of negligence." Id.
37. See Burbank, supra note 5, at 1001-09 (criticizing the Advisory Committee's me-
lange of "authority" for the newly amended rule); cf. Neil H. Cogan, The Inherent Power
and Due Process Models in Conflict: Sanctions in the Fifth Circuit, 42 Sw. L.J. 1011 (1989)
(questioning whether the court's imposition of sanctions has been a legitimate use of the
inherent powers doctrine); Donna E. Ostruff, Note, Civil Procedure-The Demise of a
Subjective Bad Faith Standard Under Amended Rule 11-Eastway Construction Corp. v.
City of New York, 762 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985), 59 TEMP. L.Q. 107 (1986).
38. See Melissa L. Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11-Some "Chil-
ling" Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEO. L.J. 1313,
1323-25 (1986) (arguing that an emphasis upon sanctions as punishment heightens the
"chilling" impact of the rule); Morton Stavis, Rule 11: Which is Worse-The Problem or
the Cure?, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 597, 599 (1992) (questioning the assumption that the
prior system of sanction controls was inadequate to control bad faith or abusive litigation);
Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189, 217 (1988) (noting that
many of the sanction cases appear to be "very close" calls on the question of
frivolousness).
39. See Naomi R. Cahn, Inconsistent Stories, 81 GEO. L.J. 2475, 2514-17 (1993) (dis-
cussing lawyer's empathy and ability to appreciate a client's story and the legal system's
problem in recognizing the contextual dimensions of the representational relationship);
Alex Elson & Edwin A. Rothschild, Rule 11: Objectivity and Competence, 123 F.R.D. 361
(1989); Lawrence M. Grosberg, Illusion and Reality in Regulating Lawyer Performance:
Rethinking Rule 11, 32 VILL. L. REv. 575 (1987); Victor H. Kramer, Viewing Rule 11 as a
Tool to Improve Professional Responsibility, 75 MINN. L. REV. 793 (1991); Judith L. Maute,
Sporting Theory of Justice: Taming Adversary Zeal with a Logical Sanctions Doctrine, 20
CONN. L. REv. 7, 28-30 (1987) (critiquing the traditional ethic of adversary zeal, citing Rule
11 as the cornerstone for enforcing acceptable standards of conduct, and arguing that Rule
11 is one of the procedural tools available to the court to regulate the process of adjudica-
tion warranting appellate deference); Richard H. Underwood, Curbing Litigation Abuses:
Judicial Control of Adversary Ethics-The Model Rules of Professional Conduct and Pro-
posed Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure, 56 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 625 (1982);
David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799, 818-19 (1992)
(discussing the contextual differences which relate to the definition of the lawyer's role and
the identity of the client and the regulatory systems available to enforce the related profes-
sional norms); Karen S. Beck, Note, Rule 11 and Its Effect on Attorney/Client Relations, 65
S. CAL. L. REv. 875 (1992).
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out any empirical basis40 in the supporting commentary to the rule.41 Re-
cited with almost mantra-like regularity at the beginning of most Rule 11
articles, the "litigation explosion" has become an article of faith-an un-
questioned assumption underlying Rule 11. Yet, there is a growing con-
sensus among commentators that the assumption is unfounded.
42
Despite its broad based support, there were critics who questioned the
40. There is no data linking the alleged litigation explosion with an increased filing of
frivolous litigation-that is the ultimate "cosmic anecdote" and the driving force behind
Rule 11. In light of the plethora of empirical studies of Rule 11 undertaken to date, it is
ironic that the impetus for procedural reform resulting in the amendment of Rule 11 had
no empirical justification. Reformers relied instead on the anecdotal experience of judges
with individual cases and dockets to support the conclusion that frivolous litigation was
adversely impacting the courts. There is no data indicating that docket congestion and
ligation delays are due in any significant way to frivolous litigation or the "lack of a reason-
able prefiling inquiry." Armour, supra note 12, at 782. Nor is there any empirical baseline
data reflecting statistical profiles of federal dockets which show that cases intercepted prior
to trial, through summary judgement or motions to dismiss, raise legal or factual issues that
could have been resolved prior to filing by more "investigation." It is worth noting that
empiricism is raised defensively at the amendment stage to refute the critiques of Rule 11,
yet it was never raised at the outset of the highly politicized process of judicial reform
culminating in the 1983 amendments to the rules to document the court's need for the
reform. See Herbert Kritzer et al., Rule 11: Moving Beyond the Cosmic Anecdote, 75 JUDI-
CATURE 269, 269 (1992) (asserting the connection between attorney conduct and the "liti-
gation explosion" without referencing an empirical basis for either); cf. Arthur B.
LaFrance, Federal Rule 11 and the Public Interest Litigation, 22 VAL. U. L. REv. 331, 344-
46 (1988) (Rule 11 directly challenged congressional policy favoring open courts and yet it
did so without providing any statistics "substantiating" the problem of frivolous litigation.).
41. See Roger M. Baron, Stepping on Board the Rule 11 Bandwagon, 35 CLav. ST. L.
REv. 249, 259 (1986-87) (arguing that the Rule 11 standards are being uniformly applied
throughout the circuits to deter frivolous litigation); Paul A. Batista, Introductory Re-
marks, 54 FoRDHAM L. REV. 1, 1 (1985) (discussing the use of Rule 11 to sanction "abuse
of the litigation process"); Robert L. Carter, The History and Purposes of Rule 11, 54
FORDHAM L. REV. 4,7 (1985) (concluding that the amended rule "replaces the vague good
faith formula with a reasonableness standard ... a stricter and more precise standard than
good faith"); Edward D. Cavanagh, Developing Standards Under Amended Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 14 HoFsTRA L. REV. 499, 500 (1986) (discussing the dual
purpose of Rule 11: "(1) to deter dilatory or abusive behavior; and (2) to streamline litiga-
tion," and noting that Rule 11 was one of several rules amended in 1983 to address the
problem of docket load, litigation delay, and court costs) (citing Richard L. Marcus, Reduc-
ing Court Costs and Delay: The Potential Impact of the Proposed Amendments to the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, 66 JUDICATURE 363, 364 (1983)); Julian A. Cook, Jr., Rule 11:
A Judicial Approach to an Effective Administration of Justice in the United States Courts, 15
OHio N.U. L. REV. 397, 397 (1988) (examining the "efforts of the federal judiciary to deal
with a burgeoning civil case load" through the mechanism of Rule 11); Howard D.
DuBosar & Ubaldo J. Perez, Jr., Comment, Ask Questions First and Shoot Later: Con-
straining Frivolity in Litigation Under Rule 11, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1267, 1273, 1286-96
(1986) (Rule 11 is being applied consistent with its standards, and continued enforcement
will achieve the purpose of deterring litigation abuse. While noting extensive criticism of
the rule, in particular its inconsistency with the traditional adversarial model, the authors
are sanguine that the costs are warranted and that the rule will give rise to a new adver-
sarial model.); Michael E. Peeples, Note, Litigant Responsibility: Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 11 and Its Application, 27 B.C. L. REV. 385, 403 (1986) (Rule 11 is accomplishing
"the purpose of deterring litigation abuses and streamlining litigation without stifling crea-
tive and zealous advocacy."); Symposium, Amended Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: How Go the Best Laid Plans?, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1985).
42. See Vairo, supra note 5, at 481.
[T]he recent Federal Judicial Center Preliminary Report... suggests that the
problem of frivolous lawsuits is illusory and that Rule 11 may not be the best
deterrent for improper filings. Indeed, approximately three-quarters of the
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rule's use to limit access to the courts,43 its differential application,44 and
the potential use of attorney fee shifts as sanctions in violation of the
American Rule. 45 Proponents of the rule favored giving it more time to
see if the problems would simply work themselves out.46 The rule's crit-
ics favored amendment, 47 including more determinate standards to re-
responding judges thought groundless litigation was either only a small prob-
lem or no problem at all.
Id. (citing E. WIGGINS & T. WILLGING, RULE 11 JUDGE SURVEY AND FIELD STUDY PRE-
LIMINARY REPORTS § 4, at 2 (Federal Judicial Center 1991)). Efforts to develop any base-
line measure of frivolous litigation for purposes of comparison with Rule 11 activity have
uniformly relied on self-reported, rough thumb perceptions of the court's docket. There
has been hard baseline data developed since 1983 with which to evaluate the impact of the
rule. Id.
43. See Edward Greer, Rule 11: Substantive Bias in Formal Uniformity After the
Supreme Court Trilogy, 26 NEW ENG. L. REv. 111, 111-14 (1991); Melissa L. Nelken, Has
the Chancellor Shot Himself in the Foot? Looking for a Middle Ground on Rule 11 Sanc-
tions, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 383, 393 (1990); Donna Marino, Note, Rule 11 and Public Interest
Litigation: The Trend Toward Limiting Access to the Federal Courts, 44 RUTGERS L. REV.
923, 923 (1992); Note, A Petition Clause Analysis of Suits Against the Government: Impli-
cations for Rule 11 Sanctions, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1111, 1121-28 (1993).
44. See, e.g., Nelken, supra note 29, at 53; Carl Tobias, Civil Rights Plaintiffs and the
Proposed Revision of Rule 11, 77 IOWA L. REV. 1775, 1792-93 (1992).
45. See NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE COMMrITEE ON FED-
ERAL COURTS: SANCTIONS AND ATrORNEYS' FEES 25-27 (June 8, 1987) (The sanctions
exception may have swallowed the American Rule. The general sanctions exception to the
American Rule requires "bad faith," something more than mere negligence, frivolousness,
or improvidence. "Rule 11, amended in 1983, goes well beyond the limited 'bad faith'
exception.... Thus fee shifting as a result of a sanction is becoming a common exception to
the American Rule."); E. Richard Larson, The Origins and History of Attorneys' Fees Law,
in COURT AWARDS OF ATTORNEY's FEES: LITIGATING ANTITRUST, CIVIL RIGHTS, PUBLIC
INTEREST, AND SECURITIES CASES, at 29-39 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Hand-
book Series No. 324, 1987); John Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the American Rule on
Attorney Fee Recovery, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9,31-36 (1984); Nelken, supra note 43,
at 401-02 (Most "courts have resisted the argument that a losing paper is necessarily a
sanctionable paper, the ultimate cost-shifting view." Moreover, there is a tension in the
rule between the attorney's conduct and product; unlike traditional fee-shifting statutes,
"Rule 11 focuses on inputs, not outputs, conduct rather than result." Yet many courts rely
upon the filing of an objectively frivolous paper to permit the inference that a reasonable
inquiry was not undertaken.) (citing Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Bank, 880 F.2d 928,
932 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc)); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee
Shifting: A Critical Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651, 651-80 (1982) (discussing the various
rationales for fee shifting); William M. Simmons, The "Equal Access to Justice Act": Pri-
vate Enforcement of Public Contract Law, 12 PUB. CONT. L.J. 284, 304-05 (1982); Joseph C.
Kopec, Note, The Use of Rule 11 Sanctions and Prevailing Party Fee-Shifting Statutes After
Rule 41 (a) (1) (i) Notice Dismissal, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1512, 1512 (1988); Note, Fee Simple:
A Proposal to Adopt a 7wo-Way Fee Shift for Low-Income Litigants, 101 HARV. L. REV.
1231, 1241-50 (1988) (proposing a fee-shifting mechanism that combines both incentive and
deterrent elements); infra notes 263-94 and accompanying text (discussing Pierce v. Under-
wood and the potential overlap between Rule 11 sanctions and attorney fee shifts).
46. See Arthur R. Miller, The New Certification Standard Under Rule 11, 130 F.R.D.
479, 505-06 (1990).
47. See Hon. A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. et al., Bench Bar Proposal to Revise Civil
Procedure Rule 11, 137 F.R.D. 159,162-64 (1991); Kerian Bunch, Taming the Fury: Do the
1991 Proposed Amendments to Rule 11 Go Far Enough?, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 957, 971
(1992) (The rule needs to include a definition of frivolousness that excludes any claim that
"could gather the support of a significant number of competent and well-informed attor-
neys." The rule also needs to shift to a conduct-, not product-based, determination and to
acknowledge that cases will be brought that should not be sanctioned, that is, others would
have done the same thing, despite consensus among practitioners that there was little like-
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duce the perceived variability in the rule's application, stricter appellate
review, and the requirement of a full evidentiary hearing on the record.4
8
The critics won and the rule was amended in 1993 in an effort to address
these concerns.
B. REDEFINING THE QUESTION OF DISCRETION
This Article looks at the issue of discretion to sanction and how it
should be defined, exercised, and supervised. In doing so, this Article
focuses on two dimensions of discretion: (1) its legal infrastructure or
context which defines the substantive limits within which the court's dis-
cretion is exercised;49 and (2) the institutional context and norms that
guide the court's exercise of that discretion.50 The debate over the
proper scope and exercise of the court's discretion to sanction is driven in
large part by conflicting conceptualizations of the court's power and role:
(1) discretion to sanction based on pragmatic considerations or (2) judi-
cial discretion viewed as principled decision making. The former favors
an expansive definition of the court's powers under Rule 11, while the
latter represents a more restrictive traditional or formalistic view of the
legitimate exercise of judicial power and the scope of Rule 11.5 1
These competing views of the court's discretion to sanction reflect a
more fundamental role conflict-a conflict between the paradigms of
principled and pragmatic adjudication that increasingly define the debate
concerning the appropriate role of the judicial system and the courts.52
lihood of success on the merits.); Hon. Sam D. Johnson et al., The Proposed Amendments
to Rule 11: Urgent Problems and Suggested Solutions, 43 BAYLOR L. REV. 647, 675 (1991)
(critiquing Rule 11 as an exception to the American Rule, arguing for limited sanctions,
vigorous appellate review, and a "call for judicial tolerance"); cf. Tobias, supra note 44, at
1792-93.
48. Greer, supra note 43, at 111-14; Hon. Sam D. Johnson et al., The Least Severe
Sanction Adequate: Reversing the Trend in Rule 11 Sanctions, 61 Miss. L.J. 39, 43-54
(1991); Marino, supra note 43, at 983-84; Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 270, 303 (1989) (posing the problem of the
adverse impact of Rule 11 on public interest litigation, particularly in close cases); Carl
Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil Rights Litigation, 37 BuFF. L. REv. 485, 513-26 (1988-1989).
49. See infra notes 66-73 and 279-306 and accompanying text.
50. See Fletcher, supra note 19, at 271-73 (looking at the difference between a judge's
exercise of her managerial discretion, raising case and trial management issues, as distinct
from discretionary decisions involving more traditional adjudicative activity, and noting
that variability in the former is more easily tolerated than in the latter); infra notes 66-73
and 140-84 and accompanying text.
51. See P.S. Atiyah, From Principles to Pragmatism: Changes in the Function of the
Judicial Process and the Law, 65 IOWA L. REv. 1249, 1249-72 (1980).
52. Principled adjudication centers around the paradigm of the judicial application of
law which adheres to a set of norms that value objectivity, impartiality, restraint, and rea-
son. See AHARON BARAK, JUDICIAL DISCRETION 113-91 (Yadin Kaufman trans., 1989)
(setting forth the norms of formal adjudication including objectivity, rationality, self-re-
straint, and awareness of judicial discretion); BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THm NATURE OF
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 98-141 (1921); WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, JUDICIAL PROCESS 112-67
(1991); Carl E. Schneider, Discretion and Rules: A Lawyers View, in THE USES OF DISCRE-
TION 47 (Keith Hawkins ed., 1992) (discussing the normative values imbedded in a system
of justice based on rules fairly applied and the inevitable tension between rules and judicial
discretion); Owen M. Fiss, The Social and Political Foundations of Adjudication, 6 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 121, 121 (1982) (describing adjudication as a process which gives meaning
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Professor Atiyah looks at the shift in the relative importance of different
dimensions of the judicial process, from a system of deterrence or incen-
tive-the "hortatory function" of the courts-to a system focused on the
immediate short term resolution of disputes, and notes the tension be-
tween these dimensions of the judicial system: "It is easy enough to see
the nature of this tension by considering how best the courts would dis-
charge their dispute-settlement function if they could ignore their horta-
tory function entirely, or at least ignore it so far as it concerns the general
public."' 53 If courts could ignore the future impact of their decisions, for
example by avoiding published decisions, and simply fashion a result
based on the single case before them, their work would be much easier.
As Professor Atiyah observed: "For the desire to settle a present dispute
by imposing a decision which does justice in all the circumstances of the
case is often likely to conflict with the desire to encourage or discourage
particular types of behaviour [sic] in the future. '54 The ease with which
pragmatism offers a justification for discretion and variable outcomes is a
theme picked up by Fletcher in his efforts to distinguish procedural and
substantive discretion.55 The goal of principled adjudication is to ensure
maximum control of the decisional process by norms and guides viewed
as external to the decision maker. In this context, the norms of predict-
ability and uniformity become indirect measures reflecting the relative
success of the external legal constraints. These distinct and conflicting
adjudicative roles are aptly described by Professor Atiyah:
A decision on principle is a decision determined by the hortatory
effect which the court wishes its decision to have in the future; a
pragmatic decision is a decision designed to achieve justice in the
particular circumstances of the case, irrespective of the possible im-
pact of the decision in the future.56
Professor Atiyah suggests that the courts are increasingly moving from
principled to pragmatic adjudication in an effort to redefine their role and
address what they see as the modern challenge of judicial administration.
This suggestion is echoed by other commentators as well. 57
and expression to social values and norms that rise to the level of law); Lon L. Fuller, The
Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353,357-81 (1978) (looking at adjudi-
cation as generating binding norms); Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 837, 849-59
(1984) (discussing the procedural norms of the adjudicative process including reallocation
of power, impartiality, visibility, rationality, consistency, and norm enforcement). Prag-
matic adjudication looks at judicial intervention from a more particularistic perspective
which values the individual skills of the jurist in handling the litigation and resolving the
dispute. See supra note 39 and infra notes 140-84 and accompanying text.
53. Atiyah, supra note 51, at 1250.
54. Id.
55. Fletcher, supra note 19.
56. Atiyah, supra note 51, at 1250-51.
57. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 19, at 277 (discussing the growing procedural prag-
matism of the courts); Catharine P. Wells, Situated Decisionmaking, 63 S. CAL. L. REV.
1727, 1728-40 (1990). Professor Wells discusses the growing pragmatic conceptualization of
the role of judges as scholars "recognize[s] that all judges bring their own situated perspec-
tive to the case and do the best they can, under all the circumstances, to reach a fair and
just disposition." Wells, supra, at 1728. Professor Wells offers "two models of normative
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The Rule 11 debate regarding the scope and exercise of the court's sanc-
tion powers cannot be fully understood outside of the context of this in-
stitutional debate. Discretion and variability have no meaning without
this analytic context: Discretion to do what? How much variability is
normal and acceptable? When does a decision exceed that range? 58
Proponents of an expansive application of Rule 11 claim it is needed to
ensure the efficient administration of the system of dispute resolution.
This expansive application is grounded in a firm belief in the practical
skills of the judiciary. Additionally, appellate supervision should be lim-
ited by the pragmatic considerations of time and the utility of investing
institutional resources in the review of such decisions. 59 Critics, on the
other hand, are concerned with the lack of adherence in the structure and
application of the rule to the traditional legal paradigm. The problem
concerns articulating and applying legal standards in a uniform, predict-
able manner. Critics are concerned with the inherent limits of judicial
discretion in a system of "law."'60
decision making:" (1) structured decision making, which relies upon principled analysis to
yield a decision, id. at 1730-33; and (2) contextual decision making, which "treats a case as
an individual set of circumstances that requires resolution upon its own terms," id. at 1734.
Her point is simplicity itself: "[L]egal decision-making has both structured and contextual
elements. The structured elements are highly visible in the simplest reconstructions of
legal method. The contextual elements are less visible but can be seen in the common law
preference for case-by-case adjudication . I..." d. at 1737. Professor Wells argues further
that each model describes "a set of activities that are essential to normative decisionmak-
ing." Id. at 1740 (emphasis removed). Professor Martinez, supra note 4, at 613-15, also
notes that pragmatism is highly contextual and anticipates variable outcomes based on
nonlegal principles. When used to critique judicial action, pragmatism helps identify the
contextual dimensions of judicial discretion and supplies the potential for conscious reform
of the judicial process through principled decision making which articulates the applicable
contextual norms. Id. at 614 (citing Margaret J. Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63
S. CAL. L. REV. 1699, 1722-23 (1990)); Eric Rakowski, Posner's Pragmatism, 104 HARV. L.
REV. 1681, 1689-92 (1991) (reviewing RICHARD POSNER, Tim PROBLEMS OF JURISPRU-
DENCE (1990)) (discussing the problem posed by pragmatism and how the potential forjudicial disagreement should be addressed and arguing that pragmatism does not offer an
answer to the challenge of the hard or close case).
58. Cf Steven D. Smith, The Pursuit of Pragmatism, 100 YALE L.J. 409, 439(1990)(discussing the fact that indeterminacy need not render the legal system illegitimate
if it falls within acceptable bounds and provides for "desirable flexibility within which a
fact-responsive equity has room to operate").
59. See infra part III.
60. See Fletcher, supra note 19, at 279. Fletcher focuses on the distinction between
discretion as "managerial authority" and the discretion involved in "determining the rights
of litigants" as a significant distinction that needs to be made in the jurisprudential debates
about discretion. Id. While both involved "personal input" and "power," two general
characteristics of discretion, to treat these decisions as the same "reflects an unfortunate
tendency toward reductionist thinking." Id. In developing his analytic schema for discre-
tion, Fletcher considers a decision to prosecute not unlike the court's decision to sanction
under Rule 11. The decision to prosecute is similar to a Rule 11 decision because it in-
volves both the exercise of substantive discretion ("an assessment of the rights of the com-
peting parties") and the exercise of managerial discretion (making the decision to pursue
this particular crime to trial). Id. at 280. Fletcher's analysis points to an important dimen-
sion of discretion-the nexus between the discretionary decision and the issue of merits. If
Fletcher is correct, challenging the Advisory Committee's reductionist approach to defin-
ing the scope and proper exercise of judicial discretion in a Rule 11 decision along this
dimension should help define more clearly the true dimensions of that discretion. Is it to
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The complexity of the debate over the proper role of the court and the
proper scope of judicial discretion was raised at the outset of the amend-
ment process, but has been ignored in the basic restructuring of the
rule.61 As a result, the 1993 amendments give courts greater discretion to
impose sanctions, but with fewer guidelines, creating in effect the abso-
lute right not to sanction. 62 While it is true that the threshold issue,
whether or not a claim is legally or factually frivolous, has been linked to
doctrines and procedures aimed at pretrial disposition of the case,63 the
result is to further confuse, not clarify, the distinction between a determi-
nation of "frivolousness" and a decision on the merits.64 These problems
cannot be addressed unless the current reductive treatment of judicial
discretion in the Rule 11 context is rejected in favor of an approach that
addresses the unique dimensions of the court's discretion to impose sanc-
tions under the rule. This includes the potential overlap between the
court's traditional adjudicative decision on the merits and the exercise of
their managerial discretion to oversee the litigation process from its in-
ception through trial.65
II. THE RULE 11 DEBATE CONTINUES: DEFINING THE
SCOPE OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION
Judicial discretion is not one dimensional, and use of the term in a ge-
neric and reductive sense obscures the issues in the debate about the
proper scope of the trial court's discretion to sanction under Rule 11.
Much of the theoretical literature addressing judicial discretion locates
discretion in a decision that is not determined by the external restraint of
the rule of law, that must rely upon the articulation of institutional and
be treated as the exclusive exercise of the court's managerial discretion or does it fall
within, or overlap, the exercise of discretion in a merits-based decision? See infra notes
140-84 and accompanying text.
61. See infra part III (discussing the lack of guidance in the restructuring of the rule).
62. See infra notes 204-20 and accompanying text.
63. The new substantive standards are linked to summary judgments and standards of
"evidence." See Nelken, supra note 43, at 390-91 (commenting on the lack of standards
regarding the interaction of Rule 11 with the "primary methods for pretrial determination
of a case on the merits"); Stempel, supra note 28,,at 262-88 (The movement toward proce-
dural reform in the 1980s was paralleled by judicial development of pretrial disposition
procedures that were increasingly hostile to the preexisting tolerant attitude toward liti-
gants' claims. Stempel argues in favor of an anti-sanctions presumption when a claim has
survived a challenge such as summary judgment. While not an absolute defense to sanc-
tions, this approach would shift the risk of error in the denial of such motions from the
litigant to the courts in most situations.); Beverly Dyer, Note, A Genuine Ground in Sum-
mary Judgment for Rule 11, 99 YALE L.J. 411, 425 (1989) (The "[e]valuation of the merits
of factual and legal issues is not only appropriate under Rule 11-it is a primary concern
and an integral part of the investigation into an attorney's inquiry or purpose." Dyer ar-
gues in favor of a second tier, merits-based jurisprudence linking Rule 11 to the standards
applicable to predetermine the need for trial.).
64. See infra notes 263-74 and accompanying text (discussing Pierce and the link be-
tween Rule 11 and fee shifts that are merits-based).
65. See Fletcher, supra note 19, at 271-73 (discussing the distinction between the
court's exercise of discretion in determining the merits of a claim and the discretion charac-
teristic of its managerial role); infra notes 263-74 (discussing Pierce and link between Rule
11 and merits-based fee shifts).
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judicial norms, and that contemplates alternative outcomes falling within
a range of acceptable variability. Hence the conundrum of the close case.
If there is no single correct answer, warranting appellate intrusion, how
should the court decide between the competing alternatives-to sanction
or not to sanction-if both are acceptable? 66 As the Call for Comment
indicates, attempts to amend Rule 11 and develop legal guidelines that
66. See BARAK, supra note 52, at 113-51; REYNOLDS, supra note 52, at 65-67; Schnei-
der, supra note 52, at 47, 121 ("[D]iscretion [is] the capacity afforded by a structure of legal
rules to choose otherwise." Schneider looks at the question posed by legal philosophers:
"Do judges in some cases have freedom in resolving legal issues to decide them more than
one way, or are judges always legally bound to reach one conclusion rather than any
others?"); George C. Christie, An Essay on Discretion, 1986 DUKE L.J. 747, 747-49 (1986)
(looking at discretionary decisions as those in which variable outcomes are likely, either
because the court can determine its own standards or the appellate court has decided to
treat the decision with a presumption of correctness by adopting the abuse of discretion
standard); Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1082-99 (1975) (arguing
that existing legal materials should be adequate to generate a single correct answer for
every legal issue even in the hard or close case); Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules,
35 U. CHI. L. REv. 14, 22-31 (1967) [hereinafter Dworkin, Rules] (Dworkin discusses how
standards other than legal rules guide judicial decisions. These standards include policies,
"that kind of standard that sets out a goal to be reached" and principles, "a standard that is
to be observed ... because it is a requirement of justice or fairness or some other dimen-
sion of morality." Dworkin responds to the positivist thesis "that when a case is not cov-
ered by a clear rule, a judge must exercise his discretion to decide that case by what
amounts to a fresh piece of legislation" by arguing that principled decision makers rely on
a variety of policies and principles, in addition to formal rules, to reach their decisions.
Dworkin also recognizes that judicial discretion may require deciding between opposing
outcomes.); Hon. Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 754
(1982) (citing Henry Hart & Albert Sacks, The Legal Process 162 (1958) (unpublished
manuscript)) (The abuse of discretion standard is the institutional response to this concep-
tualization of discretion. Discretion is "the power to choose between two or more courses
of action each of which is thought of as permissible."); Kent Greenawalt, Discretion and
Judicial Decision: The Elusive Quest for the Fetters that Bind Judges, 75 COLUM. L. REV.
359, 364-73 (1975) [hereinafter Greenawalt, Discretion] (Greenawalt sees discretion as a
function of the open texture of the law and what remains "after a judge has thoroughly
considered all relevant legal norms." The concern is whether "judges in some cases have
freedom in resolving legal issues to decide them more than one way, or are judges always
legally bound to reach one conclusion rather than any others." Greenawalt notes that a
judge has discretion in the "strong sense" when either of two conflicting decisions would be
deemed legally correct.); Kent Greenawalt, Policy, Rights, and Judicial Decision, 11 GA. L.
REv. 991, 1035-53 (1977) [hereinafter Greenawalt, Policy] (discussing Ronald Dworkin's
"theory of judicial responsibility when difficult legal issues are presented," which attempts
to determine where judges should look for guidance in the hard case when traditional legal
materials fail to generate a single answer); Anthony T. Kronman, The Problem of Judicial
Discretion, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 481, 481-84 (1986) (addressing the issue of legitimacy in
discretionary adjudication when the judge exercises interpretive freedom, the discretion
that is left after all of the rules have been taken into account in deciding a case); Thomas
M. Mengler, The Theory of Discretion in the Federal Rules of Evidence, 74 IOWA L. REV.
413, 425-27 (1989) (looking at discretion as a function of both the range of decisional alter-
natives available to the trial court and the extent to which that decision will be reviewed by
the appellate court-adoption of an abuse of discretion standard for review effectively
granting to the trial court the limited right to be wrong); Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Dis-
cretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 635, 653 (1971) (find-
ing that the appellate standard "abuse of discretion" creates a "limited right to be wrong");
Charles M. Yablon, Justifying the Judge's Hunch: An Essay on Discretion, 41 HASTINGS
L.J. 231, 236 (1990) (examining at the proposition that "in virtually every case the legal
decisionmaker, in the paradigmatic case the trial judge, was free to decide the case in di-
rectly contradictory ways ... and then find adequate grounds for justifying either result").
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can be routinely, uniformly, and predictably applied are of limited utility.
The rule must ultimately rely on the jurists exercising their own discretion
to fill in the gaps when applying the rule. But what guidelines or norms
should guide that process? Where does a jurist look when the law is not
determinative of the outcome? 67
The problem with determining both what judges do and what they
should do when making discretionary decisions has prompted numerous
studies of judicial discretion.68 Some studies focus on the normative and
descriptive theories of adjudication,69 or on the skill dimension of discre-
tionary decisions,70 while others have attempted to link the different
dimensions of judicial discretion to different types of legal decisions.71
Recent commentary has enriched our understanding of discretion and ad-
judication by looking at contextual factors, such as race and gender, and
their impact on substantive decision making and the law.72 Other com-
mentators, however, look at the contextual dimensions associated with
the court's managerial discretion-an institutional context for judicial de-
cision making that is viewed as distinct from the resolution of substantive,
that is, merits-based issues.73 These latter commentators are more con-
cerned with the process of the dispute than its product.
A. AN ANNOTATED ANALYSIS OF THE CALL FOR COMMENT
The following portions of the Call for Comment reveal the expansive
scope of the Advisory Committee's intended review of Rule 11 and the
problem of judicial discretion as expressed at the beginning of the amend-
ment process. Many of the troubling issues raised by the Advisory Com-
mittee regarding the nature and scope of the court's discretion to sanction
remain unresolved.
[I]t has been argued that the rule leaves more discretion with the
district courts than is necessary or desirable, or perhaps tolerable.
At the same time, it has also been proposed that the 1983 amend-
ments were too mandatory in language, that "may" should be substi-
67. The Advisory Committee, despite its expressed concern regarding indeterminacy
in the rule, ultimately resolved that determinate guidelines were not possible and the exer-
cise of judicial discretion was inevitable. See infra notes 74-103 and accompanying text.
68. See supra note 66.
69. See BARAK, supra note 52; Atiyah, supra note 51; Dworkin, Rules, supra note 66.
70. See George C. Christie, Judicial Review of Findings of Fact, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 14,
38-56 (1992) (looking at the dimension of skill as a way to distinguish between questions of
law and questions of fact); Rosenberg, supra note 66, at 662-65 (discussing the trial court's
skill in developing precedent over time); Yablon, supra note 66, at 261-62.
71. See Christie, supra note 70 (discussing the fact-law distinction as a way to charac-
terize the exercise of judicial discretion); Fletcher, supra note 19 (discussing the difference
between merits-based and procedural decisions); Yablon, supra note 66 (discussing the dif-
ferent types of judicial skills called into play in different types of indeterminate decisions).
72. See Martinez, supra note 4 (discussing the impact of race on judicial decision mak-
ing); Wells, supra note 57 (discussing the impact of "external" or contextual norms on
judicial decisions).
73. See Fletcher, supra note 19; Mengler, supra note 66 (discussing the nature of judi-
cial discretion given play in the Federal Rules of Evidence).
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tuted for "shall" in Rule 11.74
The Civil Rules have generally favored judicial discretion as a means to
secure just results and, thus, have avoided procedural rigidity.75 On the
other hand, indeterminacy in the sanctions rules can weaken their instruc-
tive value.76 The conduct of lawyers and litigants is less likely to be influ-
enced by a rule that is unpredictable in application. 77 There may also be
74. CALL FOR COMMENT, supra note 6, at 6. The Committee makes these statements
and then never returns to specifically address this issue again. In looking at the structure
of the new rule, see infra notes 185-203, the question of the court's discretion to determine
if there has been a violation is addressed through the strategy of redrafting the substantive
standards. But there is no effort to describe how this impacts the court's decisional discre-
tion under the old rule, or what dimension of the discretion to determine if a claim is
legally or factually frivolous is to be constrained or freed up by the redrafting. With regard
to the second aspect of the decisional structure, the decision to sanction, the Advisory
Committee Notes state that the decision to sanction is left to the virtually absolute discre-
tion of the trial judge, discretion without recourse to appeal rising to the level of almost
pure prerogative. See infra note 205. While the Notes make reference to factors to be
considered by the courts in reaching this decision, once more there is no attempt to com-
pare and contrast the 1983 and 1993 amendments on this point. See supra note 6. With
regard to the third element of a Rule 11 decision, fashioning a sanction, the rule focuses on
the "deterrent" versus the "compensatory" goals of the rule as the primary standard to be
used in guiding the court's exercise of discretion. Id. The Notes comment on the prior
abuse of the rule, but there is no explicit analysis of the scope of discretion under the 1983
and 1993 rules-other than to say that the revisions expand the "responsibilities of litigants
to the court, while providing greater constraints and flexibility in dealing with infractions of
the rule." FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
75. The Advisory Committee is most guilty of reductive thinking about judicial discre-
tion at this point, equating the scope of the court's procedural pragmatism and managerial
discretion with all decisional discretion. See Fletcher, supra note 19, at 277-81 (discussing
the need to distinguish between discretion as a function of adjudication associated with the
merits of the claim and discretion associated with the court's managerial authority). The
managerial discretion of the courts is given full play in such rules of procedure as Rule 16
regarding pre-trial conferences, see Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV.
376, 405-06 (1982), and cannot be equated to the discretion inherent in a decision to grant
summary judgment or a motion to dismiss, see Fletcher, supra note 19, at 280-81; Yablon,
supra note 66, at 275.
76. The pall of reductive thinking casts its shadow here as well. The issue of indetermi-
nacy, a term that has developed its own meaning and commentary, varies depending upon
the context and the dimension of judicial discretion called into play. See infra note 84(discussing indeterminacy). Thus, indeterminacy in the purely procedural and managerial
context reflects the perception that flexibility in decision making is an institutional neces-
sity and that an effort to more tightly regulate the decision making would be counter-
productive. See Fletcher, supra note 19, at 283-86 (discussing the difference between an
application of substantive law impacting rights and outcomes in litigation, and decisions
essentially managerial in nature); Mengler, supra note 66, at 460-61 (discussing the decision
to inject so much discretion into the structure of the Federal Rules of Evidence). This
sphere of "nonsubstantive" discretionary decisions is distinguishable from the legal or sub-
stantive decisions by virtue of the fact that their indeterminacy does not raise much com-
ment, there is little concern with developing a record, the decision maker's reliance upon
their own judgment-internal reference-is nonproblematic, there is little scope for ap-
peal, and there is little precedential value in light of the idiosyncratic nature of the deci-
sion. See Fletcher, supra note 19, at 283-86; Mengler, supra note 66, at 460-61; Maureen N.
Armour, Public Policy Making and the Courts: Procedural Pragmatism in an Era of Re-
form (Oct. 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author); cf Chambers v. Nasco,
Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991) (discussing the scope of the court's inherent power to manage their
litigation and docket).
77. The lack of influence of an indeterminate rule is exactly the opposite concern of
the commentators and much of the research on Rule 11. The concern is not that indetermi-
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a greater injustice associated with a relatively indeterminate rule that
gives rise to punitive consequences. 78 Indeterminacy can also increase
"occasional" injustice, particularly when sanctions reflect a bad relation-
ship between the court and an attorney or litigant. This potential per-
sonal bias has been addressed in the commentary. 79 Having said this,
however, the Advisory Committee Notes encourage judges to use their
personal knowledge of the attorney in making the determination of
whether or not to sanction.80
Is the existing law of sanctions too determinate or too indeterminate?
Is there data or experience to support either conclusion?81 One measure
nacy renders Rule 11 ineffective, but rather that it renders it too effective by threatening to
over-deter zealous litigation. See Nelken, supra note 38, at 1339-47.
78. It is important to note that the Advisory Committee's Call for Comment treats the
potential misapplication of the rule as an "injustice"-as a result of "over inclusive" or
biased application-that threatens the very legitimacy of the system. Yet the Committee
never specifically addresses or references this improper application as a guide in the re-
drafting of the rule. This is a different perspective from those commentators who argue
that some "misapplication" is simply the price we pay for effective use of the rule. See
Louis, supra note 8, at 1054-56. This perspective also differs from the "empirical" perspec-
tive which attempts to equate "justice" with a quantifiable number of cases deterred, see
infra note 81, balancing "efficiency" and "deterrence" in a seemingly objective or neutral
calculation.
79. See Martinez, supra note 4, at 613 (looking at the dominant mindset of judges and
how that mindset can impact their use of seemingly neutral criteria); Resnik, supra note 75,
at 424-31 (discussing the increasingly personal relationships of lawyers and judges, and the
growing conflict of interest on behalf of a court system "biased" in favor of efficiency and
dispute resolution when confronted with a case they do not like).
80. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note. This practice, what could be
called "going outside the record," poses interesting problems for the advocate since they
are not likely to be accorded an opportunity to cross-examine or challenge the court's
perceptions of them (they can't cross-examine the judge on his opinion based on prior
conduct), yet the court will be given great discretion to make reference to these "facts" in
its opinion. See, e.g., Armour, supra note 76, at 108-09 (discussing Markwell v. County of
Bexar, 878 F.2d 899, 903 (5th Cir. 1989), in which the trial judge was aware of the "back-
ground of [a] long-running dispute" and was justified in considering the motions as
"harassing and unprofessional conduct" filed for an improper purpose).
81. The Advisory Committee called for the production of empirical evidence to ad-
dress the problem of indeterminacy and its "impact"-inconsistency, over-deterrence, or
improper sanctions. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note. It is important to note
that the call for hard data was not requested on the "pragmatic" dimension of Rule 11 and
its goal of court reform. No data was requested on how much "frivolous litigation" had
been deterred, how much docket reduction had occurred, and how the administration of
the courts had improved. Most of the empirical studies of Rule 11 do not purport to mea-
sure increased efficiency or even attempt to measure the direct impact of the measure on
the court's dockets themselves. The assumption that the litigation explosion and the slow-
down of the courts was due to the filing of frivolous litigation has never been empirically
documented, either at the outset of the procedural reforms initiated in 1983 or at this latter
stage. See Vairo, supra note 5, at 481 n.37. In turning to an "empirical model" to evaluate
the rule, the Advisory Committee's sole concern was with the court's role as a principled
decision maker-whether the rule has adversely impacted the filing of cases that fall within
some vaguely defined protected zone of meritless, yet worthwhile, litigation. The call for
data was an attempt to measure empirically the scope of the rule's indeterminacy. The
Advisory Committee conjures up the tool of empiricism to refute, or substantiate, the criti-
ques of indeterminacy, overdeterrence, and illegitimacy "typically fueled by either personal
anecdotal experience with the Rule or by reaction to a few published opinions." Lawrence
C. Marshall et al., The Use and Impact of Rule 11, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 943, 944 (1992) (The
authors critique the applicability of legal analysis to the problem of Rule 11, with its reli-
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of indeterminacy would be a very high degree of difference among the
individual district judges in the frequency of the application of sanc-
tions.82 On the other hand, such differences among individual judges
have been closely observed by many lawyers for many decades, and the
system has accommodated them in large measure. 83
ance on anecdotal data and judicial opinions, in favor of a more traditional public policy or
social science impact analysis which relies upon the development of "systematic empirical
data." Law as public policymaking is clearly the model of these researchers, and public
policymaking, that is, lawmaking, should be based on data.).
The "empirical methodology" of the Rule 11 research which purports to rectify the bias
of "anecdote," personal experience, and over reliance upon individual judicial decisions is
itself experientially-grounded opinion survey research, surveys which pull together the per-
sonal experiences of many people by asking them how they perceive the rule and its impact
on them. See id. at 949-51 (The survey attempted to document through self reporting be-
haviors associated with Rule 11, including personal assessments of whether or not the sub-jects had modified their behavior in response to Rule 11. The survey lacked baseline data
and attempted to measure a "change" in behavior due to Rule 11 by asking attorneys to
report the "impact, if any, of the sanctioning provisions."); see also STEPHEN B. BURBANK,
AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, in RULE 11 IN TRANSITION: THE REPORT OF THE
THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11 (1989) (This
report attempted to develop a descriptive profile of the Rule 11 activity in the Third Cir-
cuit by looking at sanction motions and surveying the judiciary. It also looked at the impact
on attorneys by using attorney surveys or interviews relying on self-reported Rule 11 re-lated behavior.); NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 45 (relying extensively
upon self-reporting of personal opinions regarding the impact and utility of Rule 11);
THOMAS E. WILLGING, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, THE RULE 11 SANCTIONING PROCESS
967 (1988) (The "threat of sanctions has caused lawyers to raise their threshold require-
ments for handling close cases: they now demand a higher probability of success, limiting
access to the courts for more marginal claims." Willging's study used a combined data base
of judicial opinions and interviews, but in measuring the positive impact of Rule 11, he also
relied primarily upon "self-reported" changes in behavior from judges and attorneys.
Willging notes that a "major assumption underlying the adoption of amended Rule 11 is
that there is a vast amount of abusive behavior that would be sanctionable under the rule."
But he notes that a "full study of [such] sanctionable behavior would require expert judg-
ments on a representative sample of lawyer behavior, a massive undertaking." As a result,
"there is no quantitative baseline information documenting the need for Rule 11 sanc-
tions."). The methodological difficulties associated with a study to "quantify" the rule's
actual impact have been prohibitory. Such a study requires empirical analysis of actual
dockets, blind graders looking at suits filed to determine if they are frivolous and blind
graders who would evaluate the pool of suits not filed to determine if the decision not to
pursue the suit was well grounded or reflected a "chill." The method of "opinion survey"
does not directly refute the empirical reality of the "cosmic anecdote," it merely accumu-
lates and statistically refines it. A more interesting observation is the court's use of tradi-
tional opinion survey research methods in the face of a political crisis. How many people
really didn't like Rule 11 and how many really didn't mind?
82. The assumption that inconsistency is the measure of indeterminacy fails to recog-
nize the thrust of Professor Martinez's analysis, Martinez, supra note 4, as well as Rule 11
commentators, see, e.g., Tobias, supra note 34, that consistency in the face of indeterminacy
may reflect, not reasoned legal analysis, but rather potential institutional biases-an insidi-
ous dimension of legal indeterminacy.
83. The Advisory Committee treats "variability" in the same reductive manner they
treat discretion. Variability has its own unique dimensions. See generally Robert S.
Thompson, Legitimate and Illegitimate Decisional Inconsistency: A Comment on
Brilmayer's Wobble, or the Death of Error, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 424 (1986) (discussing cate-
gories of variability ranging from the acceptable to the unacceptable). Certain types of
decisional variability, for example those associated with the determination of "facts," have
long been tolerated. See supra note 55. Variability or inconsistency is narrowly tolerated
for decisions characterized as "legal," see Lea Brilmayer, Wobble or the Death of Error, 59
S. CAL. L. REV. 363 (1986), and the results are still out on the issues characterized as the
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Can the indeterminacy of the rule be diminished? 84 The Committee
application of law to facts by the judge sitting not as a fact finder, but as a legal arbiter. See
Christie, supra note 70; Martin B. Louis, Discretion or Law: Appellate Review of Determi-
nations that Rule 11 Has Been Violated or that Nonmutual Issue Preclusion Will Be Imposed
Offensively, 68 N.C. L. REv. 733 (1990). The Committee fails to clarify where the ques-
tionable variability in the application of the substantive standards of the rule has occurred.
Is it in the determination of the adequacy of a prefiling investigation, the determination
that the claim is legally frivolous, or factually frivolous, or is it in the construction of the
sanctions? We can infer that the prefiling investigation standard posed few problems since
it remains unaltered. The redrafting of the substantive standards would seem to indicate a
problem, yet there is no comment explaining these changes in detail or what dimension of
variability they were intended to address. The reenacted discretion to sanction is virtually
unguided and the discretion to devise sanctions is now limited by the institutional goal of
deterrence. See infra notes 201-10.
84. Indeterminacy is a fact of life. In the sphere of judicial management, indetermi-
nant legal standards have long been tolerated as reflecting the need for institutional flexi-
bility and judicial control. See Fletcher, supra note 19; Mengler, supra note 66; Linda S.
Mullenix, User Friendly Civil Procedure: Pragmatic Proceduralism Slouching away from
Process Theory, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 1023 (1988) (reviewing DAVID CRUMP ET AL.,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CIVIL PROCEDURE (1987)). On the other hand, the problem of
indeterminate substantive standards is precisely what gives rise to doctrinal development
and the dynamic of the common law. See BARAK, supra note 66; Yablon, supra note 66.
Indeterminacy, as a problem, is not merely a drafting issue; it implies inadequate legal
guidance or constraints and stands as a challenge to the legitimacy of the decision making
process. In the Rule 11 arena, the issue of indeterminacy is tied to the issue of fairness and
consistency in the development and application of the rule's standards. See Vairo, supra
note 5 (critiquing the Supreme Court's adoption of the deferential abuse of discretion ap-
pellate standard as giving undue deference to discussions to sanction and thus failing to
address the problem of indeterminacy). The critique of indeterminacy-the development
of scholars "building on the work of legal realists[-] [has] developed an extensive array of
arguments concluding that law is radically indeterminate, incoherent, and contradictory.
Law is indeterminate to the extent that legal questions lack single right answers." Ken
Kress, Legal Indeterminacy, 77 CAL. L. REV. 283, 283 (1989). Kress also argues that "inde-
terminacy is a much less serious defect in the law than it is often thought to be. In particu-
lar . . . moderate indeterminacy does not undermine the law's legitimacy." Id. Cf
Anthony D'Amato, Aspects of Deconstruction: Refuting Indeterminacy with One Bold
Thought, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 113 (1990); Anthony D'Amato, Can Any Legal Theory Con-
strain Any Judicial Decision?, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 513, 514, 531 (1989) ("[L]egal theory is
inherently incapable of identifying which party should win any given case." Outcomes are
a function of the interpretive community within which we live-not the law.); Anthony
D'Amato, Pragmatic Indeterminacy, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 148, 150 (1990) (concluding that
the indeterminacy debate is "the key issue in legal scholarship today" and evidences a
significant "paradigm shift in the way we think about law"); Ken Kress, A Preface to Epis-
temological Indeterminacy, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 134, 146 (1990) ("radical indeterminacy"
jeopardized the "legitimacy of the legal systems"). But see Mark R. Brown & Andrew C.
Greenberg, On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Law: Legal Indeterminacy and the
Implications of Metamathematics, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1439, 1440 (1992); Richard Lempert,
Error Behind the Plate and in the Law, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 407 (1986); Rachel F. Moran,
Reflections on the Enigma of Indeterminacy in Child-Advocacy, 74 CAL. L. REV. 603 (1986)
(discussing judicial strategies in child advocacy settings to deal with indeterminacy, includ-
ing the development of highly fact specific specialized hearings designed to generate a
highly individualized solution); Thomas Ross, Modeling and Formalism in Takings Juris-
prudence, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 372, 375 (1986) (finding that the court's decision mak-
ing model includes both express principles and a "carefully staked out element of
indeterminacy"); Steven D. Smith, The Pursuit of Pragmatism, 100 YALE L.J. 409, 439
(1990) ("To the more pragmatic lawyer or scholar, on the other hand, a certain degree of
indeterminacy does not necessarily threaten the basic legitimacy of the legal system; in-
deed, it may provide desirable flexibility within which a fact-responsive equity has room to
operate." Smith challenges the "association posed between indeterminacy and illegiti-
macy."); Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54
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would welcome suggestions to make the sanctions rules more explicit in
order to enable the judges to be more predictable and even-handed in
their application, if this can be done without causing other perhaps more
arbitrary results. At the same time, the Committee is aware of its own
inherent limitations; the Committee will admit that efforts to be more
explicit than the subject matter of the rule are likely to be
counterproductive. 85
The Call for Comment makes it clear that the Advisory Committee
does not view the judicial discretion in Rule 11 as a mere by-product of
the drafting process, but rather as a favored means to achieve procedural
goals.86 Here, judicial discretion is treated as one of the conceptual build-
ing blocks of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 11. It is not
merely the residue, what's left over after the drafters have done their best
to determine the legal parameters of the decision, the goals to be
achieved, the standards to be applied, and the policies, principles, and
U. CHI. L. REv. 462, 462-63 (1987); Robin L. West, Constitutional Skepticism, 72 B.U. L.
REv. 765, 790 (1992) (arguing that the indeterminacy critique ignores the meaningfulness
of the written law).
The Committee implicitly rejects the argument that if more drafting determinacy is not
possible, perhaps a less inclusive bright line approach to the problem of defining sanction-
able litigation should be adopted. But, they do not make it clear where the guidance will
come from since they also acknowledge that the linguistic indeterminacy of the rule may
simply reflect the regulatory difficulty inherent in identifying and then defining "frivolous"
or "sanctionable" litigation. See infra notes 186-96 (discussing the lack of consensus regard-
ing the "grey area of judicial discretion" created by Rule 11).
85. All the data in the world cannot answer the most difficult Rule 11 question:
"[H]ave the benefits of amended Rule 11 been worth the costs? While the data reported
here provide important information, they do not answer the ultimate normative question
about the value of the Rule." Marshall et al., supra note 81, at 986. How should the courts
value the "chilled case"? Is there a simple quantification formula available-a 20% de-
crease in docket congestion is worth a 10% increase in Rule 11 satellite litigation and the
deterrence of 5 "worthy claims"? Vairo, supra note 5, at 486 (The data do not "help de-
velop criteria for determining whether Rule 11 is worth its costs. The Rule 11 debate
implicates the fundamental tenets of the federal system of civil procedure .... Indeed,
drastic changes in the judicial climate over the last ten years parallel the issues raised by
Rule 11.").
Nor does the Advisory Committee's empiricism address the heuristic bias of the law.
While anecdotal or personal experience and isolated judicial opinions may not be an accu-
rate systemic picture of how Rule 11 is being used throughout the courts, it is the basis for
most lawyer's and judge's judgments. See supra note 6. This empirical and systemic ap-
proach to the analysis of Rule 11 may reflect a level of generality and accuracy regarding
the institutional and social functions of the rule, but it ignores the fact that litigants, law-
yers, and judges do not experience the courts or interact with its lawmaking functions on
that level. It is precisely through the resolution of individual cases that the common law
grows and practitioners interact with the judiciary. Within this institutional paradigm it is
difficult to denigrate or predict the impact one decision or one case might have. The courts
rely upon the accumulation of judicial opinions to discharge one of their key functions-
making the law. To say these opinions statistically distort the reality of what the court does
seems to ignore the reality of how the judicial system functions. See Martinez, supra note 4
(discussing patterns in judicial decisions reflecting racial biases as illustrative of the "inde-
terminacy" and problematic variability in the application of legal standards); Vairo, supra
note 5, at 482-85 (discussing the amendment process of Rule 11 and the statistical profiles
of judicial opinions which document anti-plaintiff patterns in the decision making, particu-
larly civil rights plaintiffs).
86. CALL FOR COMMENT, supra note 6.
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norms used to guide the court's decision. 87 Judicial discretion stands at
the core of the rule, yet the Advisory Committee gives no content to this
discretion other than to point to its existence as necessary and inevita-
ble.88 The Committee's reductive approach to judicial discretion is un-
warranted in the face of a rich legal literature which attempts to address
the problem of discretion from a number of perspectives. But the Com-
mittee's reductivism is so grounded in the theory of procedural pragma-
tism that has colored the judicial reforms of the past fifteen years, that it
is not surprising the Committee's analysis promised so much but deliv-
ered so little.
B. REFORMING THE COURTS: INTERCEPTING DOUBTFUL
LITIGATION-CHANGING JUDICIAL ROLES AND MINDSETS
The 1983 amendments to Rule 11 were treated as a call to sanction and
an express effort to shift the court's discretionary bias from one reluctant
to sanction, grounded in legitimating institutional policies favoring zeal-
ous advocacy and an open court system, as well as professional reluctance
to sanction fellow attorneys,8 9 to one favoring aggressive protection by
the court's of their limited judicial resources.90 The 1993 amendments to
Rule 11 acknowledge the problems inherent in linking a broad mandate
to sanction to "indeterminate" substantive standards,91 but there has
been no backing away from the emphasis on sanctions that characterized
the original movement to reform the rule in 1983.92
The 1983 amendment of Rule 11 represented a significant shift in the
scope of the court's discretion to sanction frivolous litigation by deleting
the bad faith limitation on the court's sanction powers.93 At the time,
87. Discretion as an independent decisional element, one that must be explicitly ad-
dressed by the courts in their decision making, is looked at by few commentators. See
BARAK, supra note 52; Martinez, supra note 4; Yablon, supra note 66.
88. See infra part II.C.
89. The reasons for the lack of sanctions under the original rule are never empirically
established and yet the "reformers" of Rule 11 make several interesting assumptions in
their efforts to "jump start" the sanction effort. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory commit-
tee's note (discussing the lack of sanctions as due to the court's reluctance to sanction
other members of the profession). The Comment cites Risinger, supra note 36, on this
point. It is true Risinger's article poses the problem of the subjective standard of bad faith
as a sanctions roadblock, but it offers no doctrinal or empirical justification for this conclu-
sion. Nor is there any analysis which links the lack of sanction case law under the original
rule to the apparent overlap between the rule and the court's inherent powers to sanction
and the case law generated under those powers. Why use one if the other one will do?
90. Cf WILLGING, supra note 81 (arguing that there is no empirical justification for the
court's assumption that frivolous litigation makes up a substantial portion of their docket
or causes more problems than other litigation).
91. See supra part II.A. (discussing the Call for Comment).
92. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
93. The removal of the bad faith requirement from Rule 11 was commented on briefly
at the time, see Burbank, supra note 5, but has merited little consideration since then. The
bad faith requirement of the court's inherent powers doctrine functions to create a distinc-
tion between a prohibited fee shift under the American Rule and the use of fee shifts as
sanctions. See infra notes 186-228 and accompanying text. There has been no comparable
analysis in the Rule 11 arena exploring the function of a bad faith standard as providing a
regulatory bright line precisely because more determinate substantive standards were not
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there was little written about the potential impact deleting the "bright
line" of bad faith might have on the function the bad faith standard per-
formed in limiting the court's discretion to sanction. 94 There remains lit-
tle explicit jurisprudential or doctrinal development in the Rule 11 arena
to address this shift in emphasis in light of the legal norms and institu-
tional policies which previously acted to restrain the court's sanction
powers. 95 Even commentators favoring the expansive application of Rule
11 are critical of this gap.96 But there has been little effort on the part of
the drafters, commentators, or judiciary to respond to the challenge
posed by the older, more conservative sanction doctrines which operated
to limit the court's discretion to sanction meritless litigation 97 and guide
the exercise of that judicial discretion in a close case. 98
Rather than developing a doctrinally-based justification for the change
in judicial practice which weighs the competing institutional interests at
issue in a sanctions decision-efficient, pragmatic dispute resolution ver-
sus an open court system, principled decision making, and full adjudica-
tion on the merits-there is simply a gap that fails to mention the
"countervailing considerations that formerly commanded the opposite re-
sult" in a sanctions decision.99 As described by one commentator:
This new, more balanced [sanctions] doctrine, however, often
amounts to little more than a set of new, countervailing cliches from
which the judges may pick and choose. Such flexibility, which
amounts to a discretionary license or its functional equivalent, is
sometimes desirable, but here it involves judicial power to resolve
the merits. 100
Historically, interception systems designed to deter or terminate litiga-
tion prior to a full trial on the merits have "err[ed] on the side of, or
give[n] the benefit of the doubt to, the party opposing interception" in
order to avoid their over-inclusive application and the potential erosion
of such institutional values as an open court system, resolution of disputes
through neutral adjudication, and the litigant's right to adversarial
zeal.10 1 Yet there is nothing in the rule or accompanying notes that ad-
feasible. Burbank, supra note 5 (finding that Congress has refused to enact broad fee
shifting provisions and continues to rely upon bad faith as providing a regulatory bright
line to protect against over-inclusive sanctions).
94. See Burbank, supra note 5.
95. See Louis, supra note 8, at 1035 (criticizing the lack of development of a jurispru-
dential basis for expanding the scope of the court's discretion to sanction areas previously
off limits).
96. See id. at 1036.
97. Id. at 1029.
98. Cf id. at 1036 (noting the extent to which countervailing considerations under the
older doctrines disposed the courts to err on the side of no sanctions in a close case).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1051. Professor Louis opines that the over-inclusive application, an inevita-
ble result of removing the bad faith standard from the rule, and the resulting chill, isjustified:
Inevitably some judges will exceed these limits, appeals will become neces-
sary and sometimes fail, injustice will be done, legitimate advocacy will be
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dresses the problem of balancing these competing institutional policies
expressly in a Rule 11 decision. If anything, the assumption is often made
that the balance has been determined and courts, when in doubt, should
err on the side of sanctions. 10 2 The advocates of judicial reform who take
this position argue that the federal courts are being crushed by an on-
slaught of litigation, including doubtful litigation, which warrants the
over-inclusive application of Rule 11: the chilling of bona fide claims is
the price of an effective court system.'0 3 However, if there is to be a shift
chilled and access to the courts will be denied. The question is not whether
such evils will occur but how often. Thus far their incidence has been very
small, small enough to make them, for the time being, an acceptable cost of
eliminating other, greater evils from the system. This is not to deny that access
to the courts and the right to advance factual and legal contentions are fun-
damental goals of our legal system. Without some control on these goals,
however, the system almost failed.
Id. at 1055 (emphasis added). The rule has not been "too successful" and the costs are
justified. Id. at 1056. His real concern is with those cases that are marginal-questionable,
but not sanctionable, under Rule 11. These, he argues, can only be addressed through
substantive reform or the adoption of a merits-based fee shift. Id. at 1059.
102. Id. at 1055. The incidents of injustice, Louis argues, have been small and are an
"acceptable cost of eliminating other, greater evils from the system." Id.
103. See Louis, supra note 8, at 1059-60. These purveyors of the "ideology of crisis"
have little empirical data to support their claims, see WILLGING, supra note 81, yet they are
extremely critical of those who argue Rule 11 overly chills litigation, claiming there is mea-
ger data to support such claims. The proponents of Rule 11 rely upon the anecdotal evi-
dence of sanction "opinions" to allay fears the rule is being misapplied. Louis, supra note
8, at 1055. There is obviously an alternative perspective and commentators have looked
critically at the ideology of court reform to see whether or not the response to the alleged
"crisis" is justified in light of the countervailing values favoring more restrictive sanctions
doctrines. See William P. McLauchlan, Courts and Caseloads, in THE AMERICAN COURTS:
A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 395 (John B. Gates & Charles A. Johnson eds., 1991)(McLauchlan discusses the range of empirical work that has looked at caseload as the
variable of concern and the lack of understanding of what has caused the increase in case
filings leading to larger court caseloads. He points out that not all cases require an equal
amount of court resources and thus pure numbers are distorting-some cases are routinely
handled, while others require more idiosyncratic attention. Thus, even with frivolous liti-
gation, there is nothing to indicate its drain on the court warrants the expenditure of re-
sources under Rule 11. But, bottom line, any such analysis is currently hampered by a lack
of data.); E. Donald Elliott, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. CHI.
L. REV. 306, 322-29 (1986) (Elliot focuses on the gap between the standards for summary
judgment and the "essentially standardless procedures of managerial judging" used to nar-
row the issues prior to trial. The article argues that critiques of managerial judging have
focused on problems of procedural fairness without looking at the quality of substantive
justice that may follow.); Howard H. Hiatt, M.D. et al., A Study of Medical Injury and
Medical Malpractice: An Overview, 321 NEW ENG. J. MED. 480 (1989) (discussing the re-
sults of the Harvard Medical Practice Study, including an analysis of adverse medical
events that lead to claims and suits to see whether the current flow of litigation fairly
reflects the incidence of the problem in the population); Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Ad-
judicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 494, 545-46 (1986) (There are growing
critiques of the adjudicative model and lawyer-based adversarialism as justifications giving
rise to an increasing reluctance to rely upon formal adjudication as the primary means of
dispute resolution and a rethinking of the role of the courts. Professor Resnik expresses
her concern that the shift in focus has resulted in expanded judicial authority with few
constraints and that this undermining of procedural restraint poses its own set of
problems.); Resnik, supra note 75, at 379-431 (There is a movement of the judiciary away
from the neutral arbiter (the triadic role) into that of active case manager, motivated in
part by their concern to husband scarce judicial resources resulting in the broad discretion
exercised by the "managerial judge." However, Resnik argues that current data fails to
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in the balance between the competing institutional norms, policies, princi-
ples, and values brought into play in a Rule 11 sanction decision, a move-
ment in favor of the managerial judge's pragmatic thumb on the sanction
scale, this shift should be articulated and developed as part of the Rule 11
jurisprudence. Waving the wand of discretion over the decision simply
does not suffice.
C. THE ADVISORY COMMrrTEE'S REDUCTIVE VIEW OF JUDICIAL
DISCRETION-IGNORING CONTEXT
Most of the critical commentary on Rule 11 has focused on the prob-
lem of discretion, a problem measured in large part by the lack of predict-
able or uniform results. 104 The Advisory Committee's policy of relying
upon judicial discretion to fine tune and fill in the gaps in the rule makes
sense in the face of the Committee's stated inability to develop a more
precise principled approach to Rule 11.105 But the Committee's adoption
of a drafting strategy that explicitly relies upon judicial discretion as part
of the structure of the rule'0 6 is an intriguing response to the problem in
light of the onslaught of criticism and political pressure to revise the rule
to address the issues of legal indeterminacy, judicial discretion, and deci-
sional variability.
In spite of these criticisms, the Committee is extremely deferential to-
ward the court's exercise of judicial discretion in the sanctions arena,
viewing judicial discretion as the solution to the problems that plague
Rule 11. But the Advisory Committee's approach to the problem of judi-
cial discretion in the Rule 11 context is flawed in one important aspect:
the revisions and commentary to the rule are unfailingly reductive. The
Advisory Committee treats the discretionary component of Rule 11 as
substantiate claims that management efforts have improved efficiency, while eroding tradi-
tional due process safeguards, by creating power without guidelines, erode traditional judi-
cial impartiality both with regard to individual attorneys and the outcomes of any given
case (the court's interest in moving the case off of the docket).); Resnik, supra note 52, at
852-59, 1015-16 (Resnik discusses the values inherent in traditional court procedures, in
particular, rationality and norm enforcement, and consistency and differentiation among
different cases. Judicial reform vesting broad discretionary powers in the trial courts over-
rides these traditional institutional values in favor of efficiency.); Book Note, The Legal
Process: The Politics of Judicial Reform, 81 MICH. L. REV. 774, 774-75 (1983) (Court re-
form is not merely a process of modernization, but involves organizational and procedural
changes that redistribute power within and without the court system. Changes aimed at
restricting access to the courts or undermining the legitimating triad of a neutral judge
applying law to facts and publicly explaining the outcomes in favor of informal dispute
resolution or early interception challenge the ideology of legitimacy which is seen to under-
gird the court system in a democracy.).
104. See supra notes 18-27; infra part IV.B.
105. See supra part II.A.
106. In addition to the discretion built into the rule, the Advisory Committee reaffirms
the applicability of the deferential standard of review, "abuse of discretion," adopted by
the Supreme Court in Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990). See supra
part II.A. This standard broadens the scope of the trial court's exercise of discretion and
its incorporation by reference into the structure of the redrafted rule sends a clear message
to the courts that their discretion, broadly and reductively defined, is subject to few formal
limits. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
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though it were, by its very nature, both a self-implementing and self-limit-
ing dimension of the sanction decision. 10 7 In part, this assumption is cor-
rect, but not to the extent assumed. This is particularly true where, as
107. While Rule 11 sets forth the criteria to guide the court's attempt to determine
when a violation has occurred, and the criteria to be used if a sanction is to be imposed, the
ultimate decision to sanction is in effect "unguided" or unrestrained under the amended
formal structure of the rule. The 1983 amendments provided that the court was mandated
to impose a sanction if a pleading was signed in violation of the rule. The 1983 rule used
the nonpermissive "shall" when defining the court's duty in this regard. The discretionary
code word "may" now appears in a significant amendment to this provision. The 1993
amendments to Rule 11 provide that upon making the determination that there has been a
violation of subsection (b) of Rule 11, "the court may, subject to the conditions stated
below [regarding the nature of the sanction to be imposed], impose an appropriate sanc-
tion." FED. R. Civ. P. 11. There are no guidelines in the rule to address the issue of when
the court should sanction and when it should not-even if there appears to be an obvious
violation of the rule. If, however, the court decides to sanction, there are extensive proce-
dural and substantive guidelines with which it must comply. Id. RULE 11(c)(1)-(3). For
example, the court must prepare a written order describing the "conduct determined to
constitute a violation of this rule and explain the basis for the sanction imposed." Id. RULE
11(c)(3). There is no comparable requirement for a decision not to sanction: no order is
required, effectively negating the creation of a record for appellate review. This is a signifi-
cant about face. Under the 1983 amendments' mandate to sanction, decisions finding no
violation, or no violation sufficient to warrant sanctions, were scrupulously reviewed and
often reversed and remanded on appeal to justify the denial of the sanction. See Knight v.
Sharif, 875 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1989); Corpus Christi Taxpayer's Ass'n v. City of Corpus
Christi, 858 F.2d 973 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1065 (1989); MAUREEN AR-
MOUR, SANCTIONS: RULE 11 AND OTHER POWERS 99, 104-05 (Melissa L. Nelken et al.
eds., 1992) (discussing Fifth Circuit decisions reversing and remanding trial court orders
denying sanctions for more development and justification).
After the 1993 amendments to Rule 11, the trial court retains virtually unlimited discre-
tion to refuse to sanction: There are no specific guidelines for refusal and there is effec-
tively no appeal from a denial of sanctions. But how should this discretion be used given
the context within which the grant of discretion is given and the emphasis upon the aggres-
sive use of Rule 11 as a tool to streamline court administration and dockets and deter the
filing of frivolous litigation? More importantly, how should the permissive "may" be
treated as an express modification of the prior mandatory "shall" with regard to the court's
decision to sanction? See supra note 6 (discussing the Advisory Committee Notes to the
1983 and 1993 amendments to Rule 11 outlining the purpose and use of Rule 11); see also
Jon R. Waltz, Judicial Discretion in the Admission of Evidence Under the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 79 Nw. U. L. REv. 1097, 1099-1105 (1985). Professor Waltz, discussing the con-
cept of "guided and unguided" discretion, makes the telling point that in attempting to
define the scope of judicial discretion, "we should pay attention to context." Id. at 1099.
Noting that "[t]he phrase 'judicial discretion' is used but almost never defined in statutes
and rule codifications," it has become a term used by courts to "shore up verdict-salvaging
opinions, but [without] formulat[ing] a definition, a setting of metes and bounds." Id. at
1101. Waltz is critical of the lack of analysis of this dimension of judicial decision making
and attempts to extricate the commentary from what he sees as a "definitional quagmire"
by offering his analytic categories of "guided" and "unguided" discretion. Id. at 1103. Un-
guided discretion is "unhedged by any formal constraints or guidelines" and the court need
not fear appeal or reversal. Id. "Guided discretion, on the other hand, identifies areas in
which a judge has some flexibility and choice in decisionmaking but is restrained by more
or less specific standards or guidelines to which he visibly must adhere." Id. (emphasis
added). Critical of the abuse of discretion standard, Professor Waltz notes that it does little
more than signal those instances in which the courts appear to conclude that existing guide-
lines were not properly applied or "the decision was plainly against the logic and effect of
the facts before the court." Id. at 1104. Waltz further illustrates that "may" is "the most
common code-verb of discretion." Id. at 1117. Using Waltz's typology-Rule 11 is a mix
of guided and unguided discretion with the decision not to sanction, the exercise of the
discretion expressly granted, virtually unreviewable and thus unguided.
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here, the courts are told to exercise their discretion without undue con-
cern for the limits inherent in the "legal paradigm": variability is ac-
cepted, appellate review is limited, and the court's idiosyncratic
managerial skill and expertise are viewed as the primary normative
guides in determining whether or not to sanction. 108
Numerous commentators' attempts to grapple with judicial discretion
should serve as a warning to anyone undertaking that task. The term
judicial discretion is used in so many different ways by courts and com-
mentators alike that it is easy to understand the attraction of a simple,
reductive approach.' 0 9 The implicit ambiguity in the term discretion, and
the fact that its specific meaning or scope is subject to change depending
upon the context, makes its use subject to confusion." 0 Confusion, how-
ever, is not always inadvertent: "[C]ertain confusions about that concept
[(discretion)], and in particular a failure to discriminate different senses in
which it is used, account for the popularity of the doctrine of discre-
tion.""' While a few commentators have attempted to pull together a
variety of perspectives on the topic of judicial discretion in an attempt at
analytic coherence, 1" 2 the general field is still wide open. This Article
does not to attempt to synthesize or even analyze this body of work, but
rather focuses on what appear to be elements of consistency in the con-
ceptualization of judicial discretion gleaned from a wide variety of writ-
ings. The goal is to use this analytic body of work to address the problem
of defining the scope and limits of judicial discretion in the Rule 11 con-
text. 1 3 Any effort of this type is subject to the criticism of oversimplifica-
108. Armour, supra note 12, at 744-45.
109. For example the term judicial discretion can mean "(1) discretion as wisdom; (2)
discretion as managerial authority; (3) discretion as personal input; (4) discretion as
power." Fletcher, supra note 19, at 276. However, "[ilt would be a mistake to think these
four senses are somehow inherent in the nature of the subject matter. The diverse criteria
for ascribing discretion respond to the diversity of our motivations in adapting the lan-
guage to our purposes." Id. at 277. Thus, we can talk about discretion as "inevitable," we
can talk about discretion as the absence of "governing rules" or we can talk about it as
"managerial authority." Id. at 278. "It is only the breakdown of our capacity to appreciate
distinctions" that results in our inability to understand the different ways in which we are
using the term and its implications. Id. at 279.
110. Dworkin, Rules, supra note 66, at 32-40.
111. Id. at 31.
112. See BARAK, supra note 52; Keith Hawkins, The Use of Legal Discretion: Perspec-
tives from Law and Social Science, in THE USES OF DISCRETION 1, 46 (Keith Hawkins ed.,
1992); Fletcher, supra note 19; Yablon, supra note 66.
113. Historically, the "Legal Realists" were among the first to expressly address the
judge's role in judicial decision making. "Since the Realists, a major project of American
jurisprudential thought has been providing a coherent and accurate account of judicial
decisionmaking that recognizes the discretionary character of the process yet provides a
rational basis for evaluating or justifying decisions." Yablon, supra note 66, at 233.
Yablon's categories for these works include the jurisprudentialists whose concern is ab-
stract and philosophical, the proceduralists who look at discretion from an institutional
context, the formalist or the "indeterminists" who evidence skepticism concerning the util-
ity of rules, and the nihilists. Id.; see also BARAK, supra note 52, at 1. Barak states that
"modem society is founded in essence on a mixture of rules and principles, precedent and
discretion. The central question, of course, addresses the proper balance between the two.
What is the appropriate level of discretion and of rules without discretion?" Id. at 263.
Barak's stated purpose in addressing the issue of judicial discretion was to address the need
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tion or distortion, and it is inevitable that there will be losses in the
nuance and subtlety of the concepts when they are pulled together in this
fashion. But this risk is warranted if the effort to merge the theoretical
perspective on judicial discretion with the practical concerns for its exer-
cise is successful.
As stated above, discretion is often formulated as a range of tolerable,
but variable outcomes. Numerous theorists conceptualize the limits of
that judicial discretion by reference to the restraints imposed by the oper-
ative legal norms:114 "Discretion, like the hole in a doughnut, does not
exist except as an area left open by a surrounding belt of restriction. It is
therefore a relative concept. It always makes sense to ask, 'Discretion
under which standards?' or 'Discretion as to which authority?"'l15
Many theorists look at discretion as what is left after the explicitly ar-
ticulated rules have been applied,1 6 while others look at discretion as
what is left, not only after the "black letter" of the law has been applied,
but also after any other applicable guides or norms as well. 117 For these
latter theorists, discretion lies in large part in the court's ability to pick
and choose the "other" gap-filling norms or to reach a "principled" deci-
sion, one in which all of the applicable legal norms are articulated. 18 Re-
gardless of the view adopted, it is logical to treat this discretion as a
conscious dimension of judicial decision making, just as the courts do
when discussing the close or hard case."19 This is especially true in a con-
text in which the decision is denoted as highly discretionary, as is the case
with Rule 11.
This section looks at the legal guidelines that guide the court's exercise
of discretion, what dimension of the sanction decision they attempt to
control, and what is left to decide when they have been considered or
exhausted. 20 With due deference to the subtleties of numerous writers'
works, it is possible to develop a simplified typology of these guidelines
representing a continuum of judicial discretion.' 21 Three general norma-
of trial judge's to have developed a normative framework for handling the "hard cases."
Id. at ix-xiv.
114. See BARAK, supra note 52; Martinez, supra note 4; Mengler, supra note 66; Rich-
ard Posner, The Meaning of Judicial Self-Restraint, 59 IND. L.J. 1 (1983).
115. Dworkin, Rules, supra note 66, at 32.
116. Id.
117. See Brilmayer, supra note 83; Martinez, supra note 4.
118. See Greenawalt, Discretion, supra note 66.
119. See BARAK, supra note 52, at 113-91 (discussing the hard or close case as a deci-
sional problem).
120. See Burbank, supra note 5 (discussing the lack of uniformity and predictability in
the Rule 11 sanction case law); Louis, supra note 8 (discussing the inability of Rule 11
standards standing alone to generate a predictable sanction decision); William W.
Schwarzer, Rule 11: Entailing a New Era, 28 Loy L.A. L. REV. 7 (1994) (discussing the
lack of consistency in the sanction decisions).
121. Examples of such typologies abound. Cf. KENNETH C. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY
JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INOUIRY 55-64 (1969) (developing a typology of types of discre-
tion reflecting the level of institutional deference they are given); Dworkin, Rules, supra
note 66, at 23-27 (Dworkin attempted to generate a typology of different types of legal
norms: rules, policies, and principles. Rules are legal standards that apply in an "all or
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tive dimensions of such a continuum have been identified, each defined
largely in terms of its context.122 The first dimension defines the tradi-
tional "legal context" of the decision-the legal infrastructure of the rule,
its express doctrinal formulation, and the penumbra of policies, princi-
pals, values, and goals which guide its application. 123 When a judge iden-
tifies a case as a close case, she is explicitly identifying it as a case in
which the legitimate alternatives generated by the legal infrastructure of
the rule represent different outcomes. Deciding between the alternatives
requires the application of norms other than those explicitly incorporated
in the rule.
The second dimension includes the rules, principles, policies, and
norms that help define the parameters of the decision in its institutional
context where a judge applies a rule of law. This dimension includes the
norms that are selected or used to construct the "judicial paradigm," de-
fining how a sitting judge should approach a decision. Once more, a per-
spective that views law as a normative whole, self-defining and self-
refining, but one which at least acknowledges the institutional context.
These norms are not derived from the specific legal policies of the "rule
of law" under consideration. Rather, this dimension of discretion reflects
the explicit and implicit decisional policies of the judiciary that guide the
jurist in selecting among the legal alternatives available. 124 Their signifi-
cance "lies in [the court's] awareness of [their] freedom of choice and the
weighing of normative, institutional and interinstitutional factors in the
selection among the alternatives."'1 25 This institutional context also in-
cludes the institutional guidelines, policies, goals, and values, both sub-
stantive and procedural, that underlie legitimate judicial decision making
and define the larger social role of the courts. 126 Both of these types of
institutional norms reflect the limits inherent in the specialized institu-
tional context within which the legal decision must be made. 127 Balanc-
nothing fashion." Policies represent goals to be reached and principles some requirement
of justice. Dworkin distinguishes these norms in numerous ways; one reflects different
outcomes if there are conflicts. With conflicting rules, one rule is treated as invalid; but
when two principles conflict the court must weigh their relative importance and how they
will be used in guiding the final outcome. In fact, it is the intersection of rules and princi-
ples that yields many of the legal standards the courts deal with on a daily basis. It is the
resolution of their conflict that generates law.); Fletcher, supra note 19, at 271-86 (develop-
ing a typology of discretion ranging from managerial to adjudicative discretion reflecting
the nexus with the merits and invocation of the legal paradigm); Rosenberg, supra note 66,
at 636-50; Yablon, supra note 66, at 261-68 (developing a typology of discretion based on
the judicial skill needed to reach a decision).
122. The role of context in legal decisions is explored throughout the literature. See
Maureen Armour, Nursing Home's Good Faith Duty "To" Care: Redefining a Fragile Rela-
tionship Using the Law of Contract, 39 ST. Louis U. L.J. 217 (1994).
123. See Christie, supra note 66; Dworkin, Rules, supra note 66; Mengler, supra note 66.
124. See BARAK, supra note 52; Schneider, supra note 52; Dworkin, Rules, supra note
66.
125. BARAK, supra note 52.
126. See Atiyah, supra note 51; Martinez, supra note 4; Posner, supra note 114.
127. See supra note 66 (reflecting concerns of the legal realists, institutionalists, and
pragmatists with judicial discretion as an inevitable characteristic of the judicial system
which must be dealt with explicitly).
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ing the competing norms, values, policies, or goals that occupy this
dimension may ultimately require the decision maker to select one goal
over another 128 or to give a particular institutional policy more credence
than other competing policies.129 There is nothing within the legal infra-
structure of the rule which can simply resolve these institutional debates;
they represent the conscious overlay of legal norms to guide and restrain
the adjudicative process.
The third dimension of the sanctions decision includes the extra legal
context, the unarticulated assumptions, values, biases, and norms that in-
evitably impact judicial decisions. 30 In a sense this extra legal dimension
of judicial decisions represents the point at which social, political, per-
sonal, and cultural views impinge upon the judicial process-the apertvre
of judicial discretion. This dimension of judicial discretion is extra legal
in the sense that it is often unarticulated and may include decisional
norms that are not sanctioned or are not acceptable within the traditional
legal paradigm. As our understanding of the adjudicative process ex-
pands, however, so will our definition of what is to be deemed "external"
to that process.' 3' While much of the critical commentary on Rule 11 has
focused on decisional inconsistency as the primary measure of judicial
decision making uncontrolled by legal norms, decisional consistencies
provide equally important insights into the adjudicative process, espe-
cially when they appear to reflect control by "external" norms. 132 In this
context, consistency, while seeming to meet the legal process values of
certainty, predictability, and lack of variability, may in fact reflect control
of the decision by normative biases buried within this dimension of dis-
cretion. 33 This final dimension of the continuum reflects the imbedded-
ness of the courts within a larger social and political milieu and identifies
the potential impact this larger social context has on the adjudicative
process.
There is disagreement among theoreticians as to whether these differ-
ent dimensions of discretion represent a continuum of control emanating
128. For example, efficient dispute resolution over full adjudication.
129. For example, the policy of an open court system versus the policy of sanctioning
frivolous litigation.
130. See Martinez, supra note 4; Margaret J. Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63
S. CAL. L. REV. 1699 (1990).
131. See Armour, supra note 122 (discussing the role of context in legal analysis).
132. See Martinez, supra note 4.
133. Rule 11 decisions, given their discretionary nature, are highly susceptible to these
biases. For example, a particular judge who is personally tired of litigious plaintiffs, or who
finds a particular practitioner offensive, may be inclined to invoke a philosophy of judicial
activism when dealing with Rule 11 cases, thus valuing institutional efficiency over the
more subtle values associated with an open court system. This same judge might apply the
legal standards of Rule 11 in an extremely punitive fashion, interpreting them as expan-
sively as possible to sanction and deter as much potentially meritless litigation as she can.
Another more plaintiff-oriented judge might take a much more narrow approach to sanc-
tions, viewing them as warranted in only a limited set of cases where attorneys can be said
to have behaved egregiously and abused the system by bringing a case that they should
have known lacked merit. See infra notes 162-85 and accompanying text (discussing the
bias and variability inherent in the close sanction case).
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from the center 34 or whether they should be treated as simultaneously
acting upon the decision maker, each having its own unique impact on the
final decision. Some see these dimensions of discretion as representing a
value hierarchy of legal standards or norms, a hierarchy based both on
the specificity of the norm and the amount of control it "should" have
over the outcome. 135 For these theoreticians, the different dimensions ofjudicial discretion represent a series of decisional defaults, and the judge
only moves on to the next more general set of standards when the others
fail to generate a clear decision. That is, norms outside the legal infra-
structure of the rule become relevant only in the hard or close case. 136
Other theoreticians argue that there are in fact few "easy" cases, in which
the facts fit the narrow decisional rule so neatly that no discretion is
needed. 137 Nor do decisions follow a neat continuum or hierarchy of
norms once the decision maker is forced to look beyond black letter
law.138
Regardless of which view is adopted, the result is clear. A Rule 11
determination cannot be derived from the simple application of black let-
ter law to the facts of any given case. All aspects of the sanction decision,
the threshold question of the prefiling investigation, the determination of
the factual and legal sufficiency of the claim, and the decision to sanction,
call into play norms other than those explicitly set forth in the rule. This
Article focuses on the second dimension of legal norms, the institutional
norms. 139
The following section shows that Rule 11 provides no principled way to
decide between the relative weights to be accorded to the competing in-
stitutional norms. Some of these competing norms include: flexibility
and specialized skill application; predictability, objectivity and uniformity
in the application of the rule; efficient dispute resolution; and an open,
accessible court system. How should the courts weigh these competing
norms in reaching sanction decisions?
III. THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT OF DISCRETION: THE
PROBLEM OF PRAGMATISM
The theory of judicial discretion that has shaped Rule 11 is grounded in
the court's procedural pragmatism. This pragmatism has received little
direct comment in the literature on discretion and adjudication simply
134. Cf. John Dickinson, Legal Rules: Their Application and Elaboration, 79 U. PA. L.
REV. 1052, 1085 (1931) (concluding that rules have a "central core of habitually established
content surrounded by a penumbra of doubtful border-line cases"); Dworkin, Rules, supra
note 66, at 22-29 (rules operate mechanistically and only if they do not determine the result
do you turn to policies and principles).
135. See Dworkin, Rules, supra note 66.
136. See Greenawalt, Policy, supra note 66.
137. See BARAK, supra note 52.
138. See, e.g., BARAK, supra note 52; Dworkin, Rules, supra note 66; Mengler, supra
note 66.
139. The first level norms have been discussed at length in the literature, and the larger
contextual norms, while touched on in the literature, are beyond the scope of this Article.
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because few commentators look to the enactment of procedural rules
under the Rules Enabling Act as declarative of a theory of adjudication,
much less a theory that conflicts with traditional adjudicative norms. 140
The court's two adjudicative roles, its managerial and formal adjudicative
roles, are assumed to peacefully coexist, each operative within its appro-
priate sphere. When not addressing the core adjudicative tasks of the
court, the development and interpretation of the operative legal facts,
and the application of the law to those facts, the procedural pragmatism
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure presumes a stance of normative
neutrality in the development of the litigation vis-A-vis the substantive
underlying claim. The court's procedural adjudicative role also assumes
the inevitable, and justified, reliance upon the pragmatic skills of the
judge in making "neutral" procedurally authorized or mandated decisions
that shape the nature of the dispute.14'
Yet these seemingly neutral procedural decision points142 invoke a
complex array of institutional and judicial norms, without which the pro-
cedural mandates could not be met.143 Commentators attempting to de-
velop a theory of adjudication have focused primarily upon the
140. Judicial pragmatism in the procedural arena is based on the assumption that the
court has the innate ability to separate the substance of the claim from the procedural
issues, and that the substantive claims are subject to an accurate and unbiased analysis
using neutral procedural schemes designed to develop the law and the facts, and ultimately
an adjudication of the merits of the claim through pretrial procedures, such as summary
judgment, or at trial. In this context, judicial discretion is a fact of life for the procedural-
ist. See Mullenix, supra note 84. Professor Mullenix discusses the ideology of "progressive
proceduralism," a process and instrumentally oriented conceptualization of procedure that
views it as a value free inquiry, and that appears to have captured the discourse of an
academic discipline with an avowedly practical orientation. Id. at 1028. Procedural prag-
matism focuses on the traditional legal schema of law, fact, and the application of law to
fact in the resolution of the dispute. More importantly, it focuses on the perceived need
and concomitant skill of the court to manage the case development and make these deci-
sions with little oversight on a case-by-case basis. Cf Armour, supra note 76; Atiyah, supra
note 51; Fletcher, supra note 19.
141. The assumption that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are normatively neutral
was derived from the prescriptive mandate that the rules be neutral vis-A-vis the underlying
substantive claims, the principle of transubstantive procedure. See Burbank, supra note 5.
However, the adoption of such a goal cannot eradicate the necessary normative dimen-
sions of the discretion granted to the courts under the rules. When that discretion inter-
sects with or has an impact on the determination of the merits of the claim, the courts are
expected to adhere to the traditional adjudicative model of decision making. But see infra
note 149 (discussing the impact of the court's growing pragmatism on the expanding "man-
agerial" role of the court in deciding summary judgments). However, to the extent the
rules are deemed to address managerial concerns, the discretion granted to the court is
viewed broadly and pragmatically. See Armour, supra note 12.
142. For example, whether there has been adequate disclosure under Rule 26, or
whether a claim under Rule 11 is frivolous, and if it is frivolous, whether it should be
sanctioned.
143. These values are discussed throughout this Article, but it is useful to focus on those
most often relied upon: judicial activism in the aggressive management of the court and
case litigation versus the norm of judicial restraint; predictability and uniformity in the
application of legal standards versus the accepted variability inherent in the court's mana-
gerial decisions; a restrictive view of the court's skills in resolving key legal or factual ques-
tions versus tremendous deference to the court's interpretation and application of
procedural mandates. See supra note 37 and infra notes 145, 161-84.
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traditional and formal adjudicative tasks associated with a merits-based
determination. Yet any theory of adjudication, even one implicit in the
procedural structure of the federal rules, must grapple with the core
problem of adjudication: the descriptive and normative definition of the
limits of the court's discretion.144
Pragmatism, as both a descriptive and normative theory of formal adju-
dication, emphasizes the impact of context and the position of the deci-
sion maker upon their decision. Used in this way, pragmatism has
enriched our understanding of adjudication by looking at the judicial
norms and values developed to fill in the interstices of the substantive
law, both favorably and critically. 145 Yet in the procedural arena, prag-
matism has not yielded similar insights despite the fact that the court's
adherence to a theory of procedural pragmatism has been a driving force
in the redefinition of the dominant institutional role of the courts as pur-
veyors of "efficient dispute resolution" rather than neutral arbiters of the
law. This redefinition of the role of the courts146 is reflected in the court's
response to the normative concerns of adjudication: how are the gaps in
the procedural scheme to be filled?
The answer is that they are to be filled by the court's expertise and
experience in developing and managing litigation.' 47 The court's proce-
dural pragmatism views the sitting jurist as a repository of the skills
needed to implement and enforce the procedural scheme. In this sense,
the limits of the court's managerial discretion are grounded in the very
skills assumed inherent in the judicial actor to meet these adjudicative
goals.' 48 In redefining the role of the courts, commentators and judicial
144. See Michael S. Moore, The Need for a Theory of Legal Theories: Assessing Prag-
matic Instrumentalism, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 988 (1984). "A theory of adjudication answers
the questions of how judges decide cases and how they ought to decide cases." Id. at 1003.
Moore illustrates that any theory of adjudication must contain a "theory of value," since
adjudication can never be value-free. Id. at 990. While Moore focuses on adjudication as a
merits-linked judicial endeavor, his definition of adjudication clearly encompasses any the-
ory, whether normative or descriptive, addressed to substantive or procedural concerns of
judicial decision making.
145. Thus pragmatism has been used to focus on the extra legal dimension of decisions
involving race and gender. See Martinez, supra note 4; Ruth A. Putnam, Justice in Context,
63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1797 (1990); Radin, supra note 130; Marion Smiley, Pragmatism as a
Political Theory, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1843 (1990).
146. See Atiyah, supra note 51 (discussing the shifting role of the courts).
147. Armour, supra note 12.
148. See Armour, supra note 76 (discussing the court's pragmatism and reliance upon
assumptions of judicial competence in developing a theory of adjudication grounded in the
court's managerial discretion). The manuscript develops a model of managerial adjudica-
tion distinct from the traditional adjudicative theories which attempt to describe and direct
the court's merits-based decisions. As described in the manuscript, managerial discretion
is characterized by express delegation to the court to act in areas essential to the court's
operation and the management of the litigation; this delegation is accompanied by few
procedural restraints and the minimal provision of broad, open standards. The delegation
is perceived by the appellate courts to require a policy of "institutional deference" that
reflects, at its core, the perceived lack of any direct nexus between the court's exercise of
its managerial discretion and the determination of the parties' substantive rights. The dele-
gation is further accompanied by an expectation that there will be extreme variability in
outcomes because of the need to address the unique aspects of each case. The delegation
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actors alike increasingly rely upon adjudicative pragmatism as a norma-
tive and descriptive theory of the court's purpose and, in the procedural
arena, as a way to justify their ever-expanding power.149
is grounded in a doctrine of judicial competence and discretion that is peculiarly self-refer-
ring, that is, it values the personal, subjective perspective of the trial court and expects the
judge to refer to those experiences when making a managerial decision. Thus, the court's
exercise of managerial discretion is characterized by a peculiarly "internal point of view"
that does not look for external, objective standards and that often sees courts justifying
their actions based on their discretion. The nexus between judicial discretion and compe-
tence, that is, skill, is discussed by other commentators as well. See Fletcher, supra note 19;
Yablon, supra note 66.
149. A prime example of the impact procedural pragmatism as an adjudicative theory
has had in changing the role of the courts is the change in summary judgment standards
over the past 10 years. In the face of tremendous pressure for judicial reform, grounded in
part in allegations of a litigation explosion and the need to expand pretrial intervention
procedures, the United States Supreme Court decided a series of cases that altered the
nature of the summary judgment procedure by expanding the court's decisional role in
deference to their perceived competence to make certain fact-based decisions and in the
face of an alleged need to encourage pretrial resolution of substantive disputes. See Stem-
pel, supra note 29. Professor Stempel links the change in summary judgment procedures to
court reform and the resulting change in the court's role in deciding summary judgment to
fundamental changes in the assumptions that underpin the theory of adjudication in the
federal rules. Stempel articulates the pragmatic incentives to implement substantial
change in a summary judgment adjudication; the administrative and managerial concerns
that directly conflicted with the preexisting normative bias favoring judicial restraint in
such motions; and the doctrinal expansion of the court's role as a "fact finder" with its
emphasis on the need for and reasonableness of relying upon the court's skill in this arena.
Stempel criticizes this pragmatic restructuring of summary judgment on the grounds that it
departs from the "generally accepted understanding of the proper role of both summary
judgment and directed verdict." Id. at 99. Furthermore, he critiques the expanded fact
finding role of the court on the grounds that the normative dimension of factual determina-
tions is best addressed by a jury, not a judge. Id. at 104, 166. Stempel also criticizes the
Supreme Court's tendency to insulate judicial decisions from appellate review by adopting
a position of extreme deference on questions involving the application of the law to facts.
Stempel questions the court's ability to characterize the analytic core of the adjudicative
decision in a way that insulates judicial intervention, particularly in novel or difficult cases,
from appellate supervision. Id. at 168. Stempel is concerned that enlarging summary judg-
ment in this way, while potentially increasing the efficient operation of the courts in terms
of docket management, encourages courts to exercise their institutional bias and "trim
weak or otherwise disfavored cases from the trial docket. The observed and coming
change in summary judgment jurisprudence bodes ill for certain classes of litigants, persons
interested in the accuracy of judicial decision making, and the system as a whole." Id. at
159. While acknowledging the "realpolitik" of these decisions, Stempel questions whether
the pragmatic justification for expanding the court's role is in fact susceptible to empirical
verification, and whether the claimed increase in efficiency can be quantified and weighed
against the "reduced accuracy and justice to some claimants" threatened by the change in
procedures. Id. at 171. These criticisms parallel those raised in the Rule 11 context and
reflect the same pragmatic bias. See, e.g., Alan R. Kamp, Federal Adjudication of Facts:
The New Regime, 12 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 437 (1989) (critiquing judicially created proce-
dures that seek pretrial adjudication); Brian L. Weakland, Summary Judgment in Federal
Practice: Super Motion v. Classic Model of Epistemic Coherence, 94 DICK. L. REv. 25, 58
(1989) (noting the attraction of summary judgment to trial judges in light of the Supreme
Court's direction to them, not merely to determine if there is a "live, factual dispute that
should be settled at trial," but "to dispose of cases that judges perceive to be one-sided");
Jane L. Dolkart, Summary Judgment in the Federal Courts After the Supreme Court Trilogy,
BARRISTER MAG., Summer 1991, at 48; cf Steven D. Smith, The Pursuit of Pragmatism,
100 YALE L.J. 409,411 (1990) (Smith discusses pragmatism as "forward-looking instrumen-
talism" and as hostile "to abstract theory, formalism, and foundationalism." More impor-
tantly, he characterizes pragmatism as a "kind of exhortation about theorizing; its function
1997]
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These two different perspectives on judicial discretion define the con-
flict inherent in a Rule 11 adjudication: To what extent is a Rule 11 deci-
sion to be guided by a theory of pragmatic adjudication and to what
extent do the decisions appear to be appropriately addressed by the more
traditional model of formal legal adjudication? The tension between ju-
dicial discretion viewed as pragmatic decision making, with its focus on
the context and factual uniqueness of the adjudication, and the more
traditional or formal theories of judicial discretion and adjudication, fo-
cusing on the legal parameters and restraints which operate in the judicial
sphere, drives much of the critical Rule 11 commentary. The challenge
has been to balance or reconcile these competing models of discretion
and adjudication in the drafting and implementation of Rule 11.
Rule 11 aptly illustrates this tension. Commentators advocating proce-
dural pragmatism argue that institutional considerations, such as a litiga-
tion backlog and the filing of frivolous litigation, warrant an aggressive
and inclusive application of Rule 11 despite its chill of legitimate advo-
cacy. 150 This body of commentary acknowledges the pragmatic consider-
ations that drive both the rule and its implementation. They argue that
the rule should be restructured to be consistent with this pragmatic orien-
tation. They also recommend that the rule should not focus on the legal
infrastructure of the underlying claim, the legal and factual core of the
traditional merits-based adjudication, since that is not amenable to reso-
lution by reference to the normative values inherent in procedural prag-
matism.151 According to this body of commentary, the rule, consistent
with the pragmatic considerations that drive it, should deal primarily with
the attorney's prefiling investigation treated as part of the "conduct" of
the litigation, an arena traditionally delegated to the court's managerial
discretion, and avoid consideration of the legal product or the attorney's
legal judgments. 152 This restructuring of the rule would make it consis-
tent with the implicit demarcation between the court's managerial discre-
tion and their exercise of core adjudicative powers.
Another body of critical commentary rejects the proposal that the two
theories of adjudication should be bifurcated in the Rule 11 arena and
argues that the traditional adjudicative values of uniformity, predictabil-
ity, and the development of binding, explanatory precedent are applica-
ble to a Rule 11 adjudication. This critique implicitly brings to bear upon
the question of the proper scope and exercise of judicial discretion under
Rule 11, a theory of adjudication grounded in the formal legal paradigm
and traditional legal values, including judicial restraint, and a view of the
institutional role of the courts distinct from the pragmatists' "realpoli-
is . . . to remind lawyers and judges of what they already believe but often fail to
practice.").
150. Supra notes 89-103 and accompanying text.
151. As discussed above, pragmatism in the procedural arena values efficient dispute
resolution, context driven solutions to legal problems, and reliance upon the experience
and expertise of the court to reach those goals. See supra notes 145-49.
152. See BURBANK, supra note 81; Schwarzer, supra note 120.
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tick" of efficient dispute resolution. 153 This body of commentary views
the overlap between Rule 11 and the merits-based determination to
which it is inextricably linked as generating a decision that cannot be
viewed as fully delegated to the court's managerial discretion.
The conflict between these competing theories of adjudication, prag-
matism, and formalism can be seen most clearly in those instances in
which the courts rely upon essentially pragmatic justifications to defend a
move away from principled decision making. This is seen in both proce-
dural and formal adjudications: in the court's emphasis on the impor-
tance of the personal context of the decision maker in reaching "fact"
sensitive decisions and in the need to defer to the decision maker's spe-
cial expertise, perspective, and experience in reaching decisions. 154
The Supreme Court's adjudicative pragmatism in the procedural arena
is seen most clearly in its reliance upon the importance of individual con-
text and judicial skill in rendering an acceptable Rule 11 decision, a deci-
sion grounded in the trial court's experience and expertise in managing
litigation.' 55 The Supreme Court's willingness to apply this pragmatic ap-
proach to adjudication across the board in a Rule 11 decision, even to
those decisions involving a merits-based inquiry, is indicative of its will-
ingness to consciously reshape the adjudicative role of the courts.156 The
resolution of the conflict between that pragmatism (the need to get these
153. See Fletcher, supra note 19; Nelken, supra note 43; Vairo, supra note 5.
154. See supra notes 74-87 (discussing the Supreme Court's reliance on the doctrine of
judicial competence to support its decision to defer trial court decisions). But see supra
note 55 and accompanying text (discussing the fallacy of the law-fact distinction as
grounded in distinct adjudicative skills). See also supra note 149 (discussing the impact of
pragmatism on the developing jurisprudence of summary judgment in the federal courts).
155. Armour, supra note 12. Contra Rosenberg, supra note 66, at 659-65. Professor
Rosenberg critiques the practice of delegating discretion, either primary or secondary,
without "set[ting] any limits or offer[ing] any indicia for the guidance of either the trial
court's exercise of the discretion or the appellate court's review of it." Rosenberg, supra
note 66, at 659. He points out that appellate review under the "abuse of discretion" stan-
dard fails to fill in the gap-"[i]t is a form of ill-tempered appellate grunting and should be
dispensed with." Id. A trial judge with both types of discretion wields extraordinary
power and should be held accountable. Id. at 665.
To play fair, a trial judge relying upon discretionary power should place on
record the circumstances and factors that were crucial to his determination.
He should spell out his reasons as well as he can so that counsel and the
reviewing court will know and be in a position to evaluate the soundness of
his decision. If the appellate court concludes that he considered inappropri-
ate factors or that the range of his discretionary authority should be partially
fenced by legal bounds, it will be in a position to do this intelligently.
Id. at 665-66. Conferring discretion, be it primary or secondary, is "not a casual matter,
since it insulates judicial rulings from ordinary appellate review." Id. at 667. Guidelines
should be developed as soon as "experience makes these perceptible." Id. "[A]ppellate
courts should not invoke the abracadabra of either 'discretion' or 'abuse of discretion'
[(primary or secondary discretion)] to avoid close analysis of hard problems. They too
should state reasons and offer guidelines whenever they perceive them." Id. Professor
Rosenberg ultimately points to the need to ensure that judges "are aware of their power,
aware of their duties," and acting to ensure that the law is administered fairly. Id.
156. See Atiyah, supra note 51. While Atiyah looks at the changing role of the court as
an institutional process, perusal of the Supreme Court's decision in Cooter & Gell v.
Hartmarx Corp. reveals the Court's pragmatism as a way in which the Court is involved in
actively altering its adjudicative role.
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issues resolved by relying on the judicial actor best situated to solve the
problem) and the call to principle (the need for appellate review to en-
sure uniformity and predictability in the, decisional process) 157 has been
resolved in favor of the former in the Rule 11 context. 158
157. See Atiyah, supra note 51, at 1270-72; cf. Rosenberg, supra note 66. The challenge
of appellate review and the need to ensure uniformity in decision making, balanced with
the need for judicial flexibility and husbanding of scarce resources, is not a problem that
provides easy resolution. Writers in the area have focused on the difficulty of linking dif-
ferent standards of appellate review to simple classification systems, that is, law versus fact
questions, on grounds that any such classification system does not yield uniform results.
The classifications themselves are often difficult to define and apply, and there is no neces-
sary analytic link between the institutional posture, the standard of review, and any given
classification. See, e.g., George C. Christie, Judicial Review of Findings of Fact, 87 Nw. U.
L. REV. 14, 14 (1992) (Christie looks at the controversy surrounding the "permissible scope
of judicial review of findings of fact." He critiques the "questions of fact, questions of law,
and questions of law and fact" paradigm as failing to provide a principled approach to
appellate intrusion in the trial level decisions. He suggests that looking at the analytic
process underlying the decision would be a better basis for classification.); Martin B. Louis,
Allocating Adjudicative Decision Making Authority Between the Trial and Appellate Levels:
A Unified View of the Scope of Review, the Judge/Jury Question, and Procedural Discretion,
64 N.C. L. REV. 993, 993-98, 1038 (1986) [hereinafter Louis, Allocating Adjudicative Deci-
sion Making] (Louis notes that appellate review is usually linked to the "familiar distinc-
tion between fact and law." "[F]act-finding is the special province of the trial level, law
declaration is the special province of the appellate level, and the distinction between fact
and law is the primary means by which the trial and appellate levels divide decisional
power between them." Professor Louis notes that having found historical facts and de-
clared the law, the next step is one of application to determine the ultimate facts. These
ultimate facts do not fit neatly within these categorizations-the courts force them into one
category or the other, sometimes they are treated as essentially "factual" in nature, and
other times essentially "legal." The courts use this method of characterization as a way to
take these "fact" questions away from the fact finders. Professor Louis makes the point
that the appellate court's ability to "classify" questions in this fashion gives them power
over much of the trial court's activities and that there has been a historical shift in favor of
treating these mixed questions as questions of fact to be reviewed deferentially as an insti-
tutional response to the "litigation explosion." Professor Louis further illustrates that in
the procedural arena, mixed questions are called "law" when freely reviewed, and "discre-
tionary" when treated as fact based, without any consistent methodological or doctrinal
basis for the distinctions.); Martin B. Louis, Discretion or Law: Appellate Review of Deter-
minations that Rule 11 Has Been Violated or that Nonmutual Issue Preclusion Will Be Im-
posed Offensively, 68 N.C. L. REV. 733, 745-48 (1990) (Professor Louis critiques efforts to
link the Rule 11 standard of review to distinctions between law based versus fact intensive
decisions, the latter treated as highly discretionary. He also critiques efforts to link the
trial court's discretion to its knowledge of local lawyering practice, and notes that advo-
cates of the broad delegation of discretion under Rule 11 also advocate a "conduct" based
approach rather than the "product" approach currently enshrined in the rule. Yet, Profes-
sor Louis poses the question whether any standard other than deferential review "will be
worth the marginal improvement in the overall quality of rule 11 practice." He questions
whether Rule 11 decisions are as discretionary as touted and points out the weaknesses
inherent in any argument that relies upon the "discretionary" nature of the decisions as
justifying a deferential standard of review-are they really that discretionary and if discre-
tion begets deference wouldn't all types of decisions call for this result?). The point is
simply that the Supreme Court in Cooter & Gell relied, with little analysis, on a distinction
that has been challenged in the commentary. If the "classification" is viewed as an institu-
tional response-the desire to avoid intrusion-it makes sense. As a principled response,
the Court's position is questionable.
158. Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 384; see also supra notes 89-103 (discussing the Supreme
Court's reliance on a doctrinally flawed analysis in justifying its adoption of the abuse of
discretion standard for Rule 11).
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The Supreme Court's pragmatism does not expressly reject principled
decision making, but, as a theory of adjudication, its approach to Rule 11
is to focus the adjudicative process on the body of experience under Rule
11 as it accumulates on a case-by-case basis.159 In this way, the declara-
tive function of the courts is reduced to finding similarities in past experi-
ence; it has lost its hortatory and clarifying dimension. While sometimes
it is "more efficient to draw distinctions after events have occurred than it
is to attempt to do this in advance," the trend in pragmatism toward "in-
dividualized justice ' goes beyond this "marginal adjustment" and reflects
changes of a "more structural character" in the role of the courts.160
159. This approach is questioned by Atiyah, supra note 51, at 1270.
160. Id.; cf. Rosenberg, supra note 66. It is important to note that the "mixed" or "ap-
plication" issues when tied to intervention in the role of the judge or jury sitting as a fact
finder necessitate deference to their fact finding role without any implication of a broad
application of the resulting verdict. Simply stated, a jury verdict has little precedence and
is not treated as "shaping the law." This is not true in other "application" situations in
which the application of law to fact and fact to law are viewed as a comment on the law, its
scope, and application, creating a dialectic in which the law grows or changes shape in its
effort to accommodate and fit paradigmatic fact patterns. See, e.g., Louis, Allocating Adju-
dicative Decision Making, supra note 157, at 996 n.19. For example, a grant of summaryjudgment creates precedent regarding the legal sufficiency of certain types of evidence,
whereas an adverse jury verdict would not. Thus, deference to a trial court's fact findings isjust that, by characterizing them as "factual" in nature they are separated from and treated
as having little impact on the law-there is no dialectic at work-the law is not being
defined or refined in its application. If, however, a decision is used to adapt a particular
fact paradigm as a "comment" on the law, as illustrative of a particular application and
result, and thus the determination of ultimate facts adds to the law and is to be treated as
precedent, the decision should be treated as "legal" in nature and subject to review as a
"declaration of the law." See Christie, supra note 157, at 31-35. Christie questions whether
a distinction based on "norm" elaboration versus mere "norm" application is workable.
He argues that it makes more sense to look at how the question is answered: direct obser-
vation, or reflection and judgment requiring evaluation and characterization. Thus, one
may have a situation in which a certain fact pattern, even if established, is deemed insuffi-
cient as a matter of law to meet the requirements of the legal standard; a fact paradigm
which could or could not meet the legal requirements depending upon the fact finder's
evaluation; and a fact paradigm that must always be treated as meeting the legal require-
ments, that is, there is no discretion for the fact finder to find the fact and not apply the law
in a certain way. Thus, in the Rule 11 context, to the extent that reported decisions are
treated as precedent or commentary on the meaning of the rule, its application and bound-
aries, they are more than mere "fact findings"-they add to the understanding of the rule
and begin to circumscribe its application. How the appellate court reviews a decision
should reflect, at least in part, the institutional role to be played by the decision: if it is to
be used to guide and limit the application of the rule in the future, it should be treated as a
question of law, not merely the trial court's discharge of its fact finding function. Cf
Friendly, supra note 66, at 756-73 (Judge Friendly discusses the institutional reasons for
deference and appellate control of trial court decisions and the resulting variability in the
application of the "abuse of discretion" standard. He goes so far as to support develop-
ment of "broad" and "narrow" "abuse of discretion standards" depending upon the extent
to which law must be applied. He also notes that deference must be tempered with the
need for rule development or in situations in which a settled practice has developed which
needs to be recognized as having placed "a gloss upon the Rule which a judge could no
more disregard than if the words had appeared in the Rule itself."); Ronald M. Levin,
Identifying Questions of Law in Administrative Law, 74 GEO. L.J. 1 (1985); Henry P.
Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229 (1985) (discussing the
Supreme Court's rejection of the clearly erroneous standard of appellate review when
looking at certain trial court findings related to constitutional litigation); Janet S. Thomas,
Comment, Likelihood of Confusion Under the Lanham Act: A Question of Fact, a Ques-
19971
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The challenge of Rule 11 has been to draw a line which separates, or at
least highlights, the decisional arena within which the court is free to ex-
ercise its procedural pragmatism and the point at which the more restric-
tive model of adjudicative formalism should come into play with its
related institutional values of an open, accessible court system. If a line
cannot be drawn, the challenge is to at least acknowledge their overlap
and address what role institutional norms associated with the traditional,
formal adjudicative role of the court should play.
Commentators and judicial actors favoring court reform and judicial
activism take the position that the more restrictive model of traditional
adjudication operates restrictively when the court is exercising its core
adjudicative powers, that is, up until the court has made the merits-based
determination which is the necessary predicate to a sanctions decision.
Others argue that the line between the court's determination on the mer-
its and the court's Rule 11 determination is not that clear because the
sanction determination is inextricably linked to an evaluation of the legal
merits of the claim or work product of the attorney. The overlap between
these two decisional arenas, as well as the concern that pragmatism can-
not justify a complete end run around certain core values of traditional
adjudication (they must coexist), is at the heart of the debate about the
scope of judicial discretion in the Rule 11 arena. There is no simple com-
promise which can accommodate this conflict in the court's institutional
roles in the Rule 11 arena. The normative structures of these distinct
adjudicative theories require different outcomes in close cases.
"[N]o clear factual pattern has emerged to distinguish sanctionable
from nonsanctionable conduct in a close case. ' 161 At times, the primary
indicator of the need for sanctions seems to be the vehemence of the trial
court's expression of disgust or dismay at the counsel's conduct. 162 This
subjective overlay is a point of concern among commentators. 163 Yet, the
court's visceral response seems to be their primary guide to determine
whether sanctions are warranted: if its an easy case, sanctions are war-
tion of Law, or Both?, 73 Ky. L.J. 235 (1984-85) (looking at the problem of characteriza-
tion as impacting the allocation of the decision between judge and jury, as well as how it is
handled on appeal); infra part IV (discussing the impact of nonbinding precedent on the
shape of case law).
161. ARMOUR, supra note 107, at 101 (discussing the Fifth Circuit's Rule 11 decisions).
162. See Spiller v. Ella Smithers Geriatric Ctr., 919 F.2d 339, 346 (5th Cir. 1990) (The
district court criticized counsel for filing a brief that "would shame a first year law student"
and determined sanctions were warranted in light of the "slipshod and unprofessional
work." The Fifth Circuit deferred to the trial court on the issue of the counsel's reasonable
belief regarding the state of the law at the time of the filing.); Jennings v. Joshua Indep.
Sch. Dist., 869 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1989) (The court rejected counsel's argument for a change
in the law on grounds they had found no precedent to support their attack. Unlike Smith
Int'l, which had looked at controlling precedent and given counsel the benefit of the doubt,
in this close case, the court simply deferred to the trial court's analysis.), cert. denied, 496
U.S. 935 (1990); Smith Int'l, Inc. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 844 F.2d 1193, 1199 (5th Cir.
1988) (refusing to sanction where counsel was "mistaken" as to law if the court thought the
mistake reasonable, that is, one they could have made).
163. See BURBANK, supra note 81; Schwarzer, supra note 120.
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ranted;164 if it is hard or close, the sanction decision appears to be deter-
mined by the particular institutional policies the court adopts or
emphasizes. If the court adopts or emphasizes the "pragmatism" of Rule
11, the need to aggressively deter frivolous litigation, sanctions will fol-
low.165 If the court supports the institutional policy of adjudicative re-
straint in the sanctions arena, a policy favoring judicial tolerance and an
open court system, sanctions will rarely follow. 166 Often, in a close case,
the courts appear swayed primarily by subjective factors, including their
willingness to defer to an attorney's good faith mistake or error.167 But
there is no clear analytic or doctrinal link between the facts of these cases
and the decisions of the courts to select or give way to one or the other
competing institutional perspectives. The resulting analysis seems to be
determined more by the outcome, rather than being outcome
164. See MacBride v. Caravelle Broadcast Group Consol., Nos. 89-0008-C, 89-0028-C,
1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19619, at *8-9 (W.D. Va. June 4, 1990) (holding Rule 11 does not
apply in a close case, rather it "applies where the case is black and white, not where it is a
matter of shading and degree").
165. See Anderson v. Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Nos. 91-55733, 91-56329, 1993 U.S.
App. LEXIS 3263, at *14 (9th Cir. Feb. 5, 1993) (The court held that sanctions were war-
ranted in an easy case such as this where the "complaint was factually deficient and legally
meritless. It was the model of a frivolous complaint."); Villa Marina Yacht Sales, Inc. v.
Hatteras Yachts, 762 F. Supp. 1007, 1008 (D.P.R. 1991) (holding, in a close case, that the
appellate court should have deferred to the district court on pragmatic grounds, specifically
their knowledge of "relevant facts that do not appear in the appellate record"), affd, 947
F.2d 529 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 986 (1992); The Curtis Management Group,
Inc. v. Academy of Motion Pictures Arts & Sciences, 717 F. Supp. 1362, 1370 (S.D. Ind.
1989) (holding sanctions were warranted precisely because this was not a close case); Inter-
national Shipping Co. v. Hydra Offshore, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 146, 149 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (The
court focused on Rule 11 as providing a more "expansive standard for the imposition of
sanctions," noting the potential chill if misapplied. The court imposed sanctions with reluc-
tance on the grounds that there was "an egregious example of the violation of the spirit
and letter of Rule 11."), cert. denied sub nom. Golub v. Hydra Offshore, Inc., 493 U.S. 1003
(1989).
166. See Moore v. Pyrotech Corp., No. 90-2178-0, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16583, at *5-6
(D. Kan. Sept. 30, 1992) (denying plaintiff's motion to sanction defendants' motion for new
trial on the grounds it was "a very close case"); South Shore Bank v. Stewart Title Guar.
Co., 688 F. Supp. 803, 806 (D. Mass.) (denying sanctions in a close case in order to avoid
"chilling" zealous advocacy), affd, 867 F.2d 607 (1st Cir. 1988); Skepton v. County of
Bucks, 613 F. Supp. 1013 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (denying sanctions in a close case in deference to
the attorney's efforts to create a novel claim).
167. See Gottlieb v. Westin Hotel Co., No. 91-C-5184, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18410, at
*8 (N.D. II. Dec. 30, 1991) (holding that "[a]lthough this is a close case for purposes of
Rule 11, the court is convinced that the argument was made in good faith based on the
facts"); Flag Fables, Inc. v. Jean Ann's Country Flags & Crafts, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 1007,
1019 (D. Mass. 1990) (denying sanctions in a close case where plaintiff's arguments were
made in good faith); Loyalsock Beverage v. Stroh Brewery Co., No. 89-0435, 1989 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 15891, at *4-8 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 1989) (holding that in a close case the court
should deny sanctions unless it finds the filing of the complaint to be abusive litigation or a
misuse of the court process); Marco Holding Co. v. Lear Siegler, Inc., 606 F. Supp. 204,
211, 215 (N.D. Il. 1985) (Citing the policies in favor of an open court system, the court
held as follows: "[W]e must conclude that, though this is an extremely close case and our
initial inclination is to assess costs and sanctions, defendants' legal theories are not so un-
reasonable nor the deposition testimony so devoid of their interpretation as to justify sanc-
tions under Rule 11." While the defendant's litigation strategy was close to the line, it had
not "clearly transgressed" it.)..
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determinative. 168
The lack of a principled basis to enable courts to determine the relative
weights to be accorded these competing institutional policies and their
related theories of adjudication is addressed in part by the paradigm of
the close case. The courts grappling with Rule 11 sanction decisions have
grabbed onto the close case as one way to draw the line limiting the
court's discretion to sanction and break the normative log jam:
In many respects this is a close case; the record is scant, the dis-
putes are great, the objective evidence is minimal. Rule 11 has no
application in such a case. Sanctions are merited only where a party
has not even a glimmer of succeeding, where it is clear to all that the
actions taken could serve only improper purposes. Rule 11 applies
where the case is black and white, not where it is a matter of shading
and degree. 169
Others use the paradigm of the close case as a way to define the articul-
able outer limits in an inclusive fashion such that close cases can be sanc-
tioned.' 70 The former use is consistent with the method of analysis
proposed in this Article, which favors more traditional adjudicative
norms and emphasizes the inherent limits of the court's pragmatism. The
latter is consistent with the logic of judicial discretion under attack, the
variability inherent in a theory of adjudication grounded in the sitting
jurist's unique experience, expertise, and perspective, and the institu-
tional concern for individualized justice and efficient case disposition.17'
These themes run throughout the Rule 11 analysis: the need for en-
forcement, countered by judicial restraint. 72 However, these policies of-
fer little insight when juxtaposed with the Rule 11 analysis: determining
whether or not the lawyer's position, her belief in the merits of the case
represented by certification, is reasonable under the circumstances. 73 It
168. See Guzzello v. Venteau, 789 F. Supp. 112, 117-18 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (denying a
motion for sanctions following the granting of defendant's motion for summary judgment
after weighing the competing policies, deterrence versus "chill"); Louis, supra note 8; Ter-
restrial Sys., Inc. v. Fenstemaker, 132 F.R.D. 71 (D. Colo. 1990). The Terrestrial court held
that:
In fashioning appropriate sanctions under Rule 11 we remain cognizant of
maintaining the important balance between employing an effective deterrent
to abuse of the litigation process and encouraging zealousness in representa-
tion of the client.
While this is a close case whether sanctions should be imposed, we exercise
our discretion and refrain from imposing sanctions ....
Terrestrial, 132 F.R.D. at 76-77.
169. MacBride, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19619 at *8-9.
170. See Jennings, 869 F.2d at 878-79.
171. See supra notes 66-87; infra notes 192, 220 (discussing the acceptability of variable
outcomes in close cases).
172. See Naked City, Inc. v. Aregood, 117 F.R.D. 634, 636 (N.D. Ind. 1987) (finding the
judge to be a "believer in a policy of judicial restraint with regard to Rule 11 that is per-
haps in contrast with the more activist role that is envisioned" by the circuit).
173. See Larez v. Holcomb, 16 F.3d 1513, 1522 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Golden Eagle
Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1538 (9th Cir. 1986)) (Rule 11 sanctions
should be imposed if, "judged by an objective standard, a reasonable basis for the position
exists in both law and in fact at the time the position is adopted." The Larez court went
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is easy to see how the effort to develop a regulatory bright line is frus-
trated at this point. Courts approaching the problem as one requiring a
careful balance between these two competing policies construe the "rea-
sonableness" requirement more broadly in order to avoid the over-inclu-
sive application of the rule exacerbating its potential to chill advocacy.174
The emphasis in the Golden Eagle analysis is a subtle but telling illustra-
tion of this point: "[The] theme is that the rule discourages wasteful,
costly litigation battles by mandating the imposition of sanctions when a
lawyer's position, after reasonable inquiry, will not support a reasonable
belief that there is a sound basis in law or in fact for the position
taken.' 175 Determining the reasonableness of the attorney's conduct in a
close case is a conundrum and the analytic force of the rule's standards
falls away in the face of a difficult analysis: "There is another risk when
mandatory sanctions ride upon close judicial decisions. The danger of
arbitrariness increases and the probability of uniform enforcement de-
clines."'1 76 The court's analysis in Golden Eagle shows the problem of
imposing upon counsel a role inconsistent with that of an advocate and
requiring of the attorney an objective view of the case law such as a sit-
ting jurist would take. Golden Eagle also demonstrates that it is "not in
the nature of our adversary system to require lawyers to demonstrate to
the court that they have exhausted every theory, both for and against
their client.' 177 Thus, the reasonableness of the attorney's position, eval-
uated in light of institutional policies that value the adversarial paradigm,
is based on the reasonableness of the advocate. The reasonableness of
the attorney's position, evaluated in light of institutional policies that
favor the efficient use of limited judicial resources, is the reasonableness
of the "officer of the court," the jurist's colleague. But as Golden Eagle
indicates, the question is whether a competent advocate "could not have
believed in the merit of the position taken," not whether an "officer of
the court" could.178 But the line is not bright. Courts which focus on the
deterrent function of Rule 11, and which emphasize the "need" for these
controls, construe the "objective" standard of reasonableness to require
the attorney to step outside the role of advocate and pull on the mantle of
further to hold that there is no duty to step into the shoes of opposing counsel to find all
potentially contrary authority or to step into the shoes of the judge to decide whether such
authority is indeed contrary or distinguishable.); Allen v. Local 313 Int'l Bhd., Nos. 92-
35005, 92-35098, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 21176, at *17 (9th Cir. Aug. 13, 1993) (citing
Golden Eagle, 801 F.2d at 1538) (holding that Rule 11 mandates sanctions when "a law-
yer's position, after reasonable inquiry, will not support a reasonable belief that there is a
sound basis in law or in fact for the position taken"); Golden Eagle, 801 F.2d at 1538.
174. Golden Eagle, 801 F.2d at 1536-38.
175. Id. at 1538.
176. Id. at 1541.
177. Id. at 1542.
178. Harlyn Sales Corp. Profit Sharing Plan v. Kemper Fin. Servs., 9 F.3d 1263, 1269
(7th Cir. 1993); cf. Alfieri, supra note 30; Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy, supra note 30;
Underwood, supra note 39.
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judicial objectivity in evaluating their client's claim. 179
It is easy to see how the objective standard of reasonableness, even in
the face of the demise of the good faith defense, requires consideration of
contextual elements in deference to the limits and challenges of a legal
practice. 180 While these contextual elements can be treated as creating a
paradigm case, allowing for "objective analysis," they inevitably blur the
line between objectivity and subjectivity. The more we know about and
understand the representational relationship and appreciate the client's
concerns, the more likely we are to empathize with the advocate and per-
ceive their actions as reasonable under the circumstances. 181 The more
we value that role over the attorney's obligations as an "officer of the
court," the more likely we are to create allowances which favor the adver-
sarial paradigm and an open court system. The less willing we are to
place the representational relationship in its context and the more we
require the attorney to adhere to a narrower paradigm of representation,
the objective application of legal and analytic skills, the more likely we
are to sanction judgments that threaten the managerial paradigm by cre-
ating costly, questionable litigation. 182
179. See Jennings, 869 F.2d at 878 (discussing the narrow approach taken by the trial
court in its analysis).
180. See Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., 836 F.2d 866, 870 (5th Cir. 1988) (discussing the
need to develop a reasonable inquiry standard that looks at the particular circumstances of
the attorney).
181. See Marion Smiley, Pragmatism as a Political Theory, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1843,
1845 (1990). "[Alny construction of context is relative to the social and political norms
that we bring to bear on it-[which] helps us reconstruct the context of inquiry." Id. Pro-
fessor Smiley's point is well taken. In a Rule 11 analysis, how deeply are we willing to
develop context, including the political contexts of the dispute and the institutional context
of the adversarial paradigm and the role of the advocate? If a Rule 11 analysis now treats
context as a one dimensional, technical analysis of "facts" and "law" that are treated as
clear, analytic categories subject to an agreed paradigm of analysis, then the context has
changed. A change in context can impact how the court understands or perceives the rea-
sonableness of the advocate's position. Cf Putnam, supra note 145, at 1807 (noting that
the situation of a judge will effect their perception and legal analysis). In the Rule 11
context, this simple point needs to be made.
182. See Stockier v. City of Detroit, No. 90-1793, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 15502, at *16-
18 (6th Cir. July 8, 1991). The Stockier court denied sanctions in a close case where the
prefiling investigation occurred and "to the best of the signer's knowledge" the complaint
was well grounded in law and fact. Stockier, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 15502 at *16. The
telling point in the Stockier analysis is the court's willingness to look at the context of the
litigation from a very personal point of view: "Rather than resulting from an improper
purpose to harass, we are convinced the appeal was an effort out of frustration with per-
ceived unfairness in the state system to seek protection in the federal courts." Id. at *17.
While the parties had initially been sent to state court, when that process bogged down,
they came back to federal court. The court considered this in its analysis. Similarly, in
Harlyn Sales Corp., 9 F.3d at 1263, the court looked at the advocates' role. "Merely be-
cause plaintiffs' case proved to be weak, plaintiffs' counsel should not be reprimanded for
trying to protect their clients' interests." Id. at 1267. Sanctions were denied, although the
defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss was granted. In analyzing the case, the court
makes reference to the "sanctuary" of a reasonable prefiling investigation which protects
"aggressive advocacy" and "legal evolution." Id. at 1269. Deference to the advocate and
the adversarial paradigm results in a restrained application of the rule to sanction conduct
that amounts to a "callous disregard for governing law or the procedures of the court." Id.,
(quoting Allison v. Dugan, 951 F.2d 828, 834 (7th Cir. 1992)). Clearly something more
than mere negligence is required. Contra Burbank, supra note 5 (discussing the effort of
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The result is the conundrum of the close case: sanctions in furtherance
of the court's managerial goals is justified, as is deference in furtherance
of the court's traditional institutional goals. The shear mass of case law
and commentary is sufficient evidence that courts engaged in Rule 11
sanctions analysis are charting deep and treacherous seas as they attempt
to balance these conflicting outcomes. While our familiarity with the rule
gives rise to a certain level of comfort, it does not address the issue of the
complexity of the analysis and the potential "chill" of its over-inclusive
application. The court's efforts to articulate "bright lines" for themselves
have come to nought, and the Supreme Court's amendment of the rule
merely provides new territory to be explored. How will reasonable attor-
neys evaluate the inferential link between a piece of evidence and the
ultimate fact sought to be proven? 183 How will the complexity of the
"application" question be resolved? Could a reasonable attorney have
reached the same or similar conclusion regarding the merits of the legal
claim? 184 Would a zealous advocate have taken or turned down the case?
And more importantly, how will the court exercise its absolute discretion
not to sanction in light of these competing institutional and adjudicative
norms?
IV. THE CONUNDRUM OF THE CLOSE CASE
The paradigm of the close case is one which tests the workability of a
rule precisely because it is in the close case that the decisional standards,
the rule's explicit provisions, as well as all applicable norms, principles,
and policies, fail to generate a single uniform and predictable outcome. 85
the rule's drafters to regulate attorney negligence via Rule 11); Kramer, supra note 39
(welcoming the rule as a way to regulate attorney conduct).
183. See National Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. National Fed'n of Fed. Employees, 844
F.2d 216, 223-24 (5th Cir. 1988). Here, the court undertook a detailed analysis of the facts
introduced in support of the "malice" allegation in a libel action. The court affirmed the
verdict in favor of the defendant, but engaged in a detailed analysis of the facts to deter-
mine whether the claim was warranted. While it found no evidence of sufficient weight
and clarity to support a finding of malice, the appeals panel did find some "inference" in
the plaintiff's favor on the issue of whether malice was possible. This inference met the
legal requirements of Rule 11 that the suit be well grounded in fact. See Tutton v. Garland
Indep. Sch. Dist., 733 F. Supp. 1113, 1120 (N.D. Tex. 1990) (holding Rule 11 sanctions not
warranted if Title VII plaintiff puts on a prima facie case of discrimination, even if they are
unable to rebut the nondiscriminatory reason put forward by the defendant); Armour,
supra note 76, at 104.
184. See supra notes 162-68 and accompanying text.
185. See Golden Eagle, 809 F.2d at 585; see also, BARAK, supra note 52; Brilmayer,
supra note 83, at 363-75. Professor Brilmayer poses the question, what is legal error, and
sets out a model analysis for determining if such error has occurred. There must be deter-
minacy, "a hypothetical result, determined by the relevant decision making inputs, which is
inconsistent with the actual result"; and fit, "the actual result should have conformed to
that hypothetical result." Brilmayer, supra note 83, at 363. Accepting the proposition that
there can be two right answers for the purposes of her analytic paradigm, the heart of her
analysis is the notion of "wobble," the discrepancy that occurs between a decision and
inputs. Wobble is distinct from error because it does not create the "misleading appear-
ance that there are objectively right answers." Id. at 366. "Wobble is the result of institu-
tional indeterminacy" and can only be observed by posing the "counterfactual assertion-
namely that the result could have been different." Id. 365-66 (emphasis added). The fact
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The close case, the case in which the court must choose between conflict-
ing but legitimate outcomes, is the case, or set of cases, that best ad-
dresses the contours of acceptable variability and "test[s] the workability
of any rule, civil or criminal." 186 Because the close case is a point of
conflict, the close case paradigm provides a useful decisional methodol-
ogy that allows us to explore the dimensions of the court's discretion and
the related dimension of acceptable variability in its Rule 11 decisions.
In the developing jurisprudence of Rule 11, the conundrum of the close
case has yet to be addressed. Why is the most discretion given to the
judge when it is most problematic-in the close case? The paradigm of
the close or hard case as developed in the jurisprudential writings on judi-
cial discretion is used to define the acceptable exercise of that discretion
in terms of a "decisional zone" within which conflicting judicial outcomes
are to be expected and tolerated.18 7 Yet, the close case, as an internally
that there is error or even disagreement about a decision is not evidence of indeterminacy.
Indeterminacy exists when the "result is not a unique function of the relevant inputs" re-
sulting in wobble. Id. at 365-66. Wobble occurs in those decisions in which numerous
factors enter into a decision, factors not controlled by the legal rules or inputs, such as the
personalities and biases of the decision makers. Id. at 367. Wobble occurs because deci-
sion makers have "real choice[s] ... [the] decision process cannot be broken down into
smaller explained elements, either internal or external to the decisionmaker." Id. at 368.
The point is that law tolerates such wobble. "[T]he legal system acts as though unique
right answers do not exist." Id. at 370. But Professor Brilmayer's point is that indetermi-
nacy and wobble are not necessarily proof that a single right answer does not exist. It is an
institutional decision to live with wobble, and thus to create a decisional environment in
which multiple outcomes are tolerated. This is practical, not theoretical, indeterminacy.
Id. at 373-74. Thus, the legal system tolerates numerous decisions, without scrutinizing
their correctness in detail, so long as process values are followed. Id. at 375-78. Professor
Brilmayer makes the point that "a certain amount of wobble is to be expected" and that
this intermediacy is protected for a variety of institutional reasons. Id. at 384. Professor
Brilmayer's use of the analytic concept of wobble highlights the normative issues raised
when legal decision making produces inconsistent results-the normative issues that prac-
tical and theoretical indeterminacy raise in any given legal context. To argue that a deci-
sion is not error, that is, the institution is willing to live with it, does not address the issue of
how practical and theoretical indeterminacy should be addressed by the legal system: prac-
tical indeterminacy defining the difficulty of securing the necessary legal inputs and theo-
retical indeterminacy defining the problem of creating a determinable legal standard. Both
dimensions of indeterminacy exist in the Rule 11 context and both pose problems for judi-
cial decision makers. Dworkin, Rules, supra note 66; Rosenberg, supra note 66; Yablon,
supra note 66. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 83. Thompson makes the point that "deci-
sional inconsistency, while neither abstract error nor necessarily wrong, is also not neces-
sarily always right. There may be decisional inconsistency which carries out goals
normatively established, but there may also be decisional inconsistency which does not."
Id. at 424-25. Thompson's concern is that the adversary system should be "processing in-
formation in a fashion that seeks to minimize the extent of avoidable unacceptable incon-
sistency of decisions." Id. at 425. His analysis points out that inconsistency itself can be
classified in ways that help us understand the problem of indeterminacy. Accordingly,
there is: "(1) inevitable inconsistency; (2) deliberate inconsistency; (3) bias inconsistency;
(4) careless inconsistency; and (5) defective information inconsistency." Id. at 427. Delib-
erate inconsistency reflects the "normative conclusion favoring flexibility" over like treat-
ment or other values favoring finality. Id. See also Robert E. Scott, Error and Rationality
in Individual Decisionmaking: An Essay on the Relationship Between Cognitive Illusions
and the Management of Choices, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 329 (1986) (discussing the problems of
using social science research in analyzing judicial decision making).
186. Golden Eagle, 809 F.2d at 585.
187. See infra part IV.B. (discussing the problem of discretion and the close case).
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derived decisional norm, a useful rule of thumb developed by the judici-
ary to guide their own discretion, is used to note the point at which deci-
sional inconsistency is most likely and most problematic. 188 Stated in
188. In Jennings, 869 F.2d at 870, the court of appeals posed the Rule 11 conundrum.
After allowing the civil rights case challenging the school's use of "sniffer dogs" to go to
trial, the district court directed a verdict on behalf of all defendants, save one, the officer
who won before the jury. Brought by the American Civil Liberties Union as a challenge to
the use of sniffer dogs as an effort to challenge their use as a basis for search warrants, the
district court issued sanctions on the grounds that there had been inadequate prefiling
investigation to sustain the claims of collusive conduct and that the case law in the circuit
was clearly against the plaintiff. In affirming the lower court's decision, the court of ap-
peals stated that:
Although this is a close case with respect to sanctions, and if we had been
sitting as district judges we might have arrived at a different conclusion, given
these circumstances we cannot say that it was an abuse of discretion for the
district court to conclude that the complaint in this case was filed in violation
of Rule 11.
Id. at 879. Thus, reasonable judges might differ regarding the outcome of the case, one
would sanction and one would not. Should sanctions be awarded in such a case? What are
the implications if they are? In Harlyn Sales Corp., 9 F.3d at 1263, a securities fraud action
was dismissed and the defendants moved for Rule 11 sanctions. The motion was denied
and the defendants appealed. In reviewing the decision, the court noted that, based on the
record in the case, the lower court could have decided either way and stated that:
[W]hile sanctions must be applied in certain situations, when the issue is not
free from doubt we should accord great deference to the judgment of the
district court .... We confirm that considerable discretion is placed in the
district court in analyzing the case ... to determine if the requirements of
Rule 11 have been met.
Id. at 1269-70. The district court could have come to a different conclusion and that would
also have been upheld. See, e.g., Shain v. Long, 978 F.2d 850, 855 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding
that a close case requires greater articulation of the reasons for the decision); Ladner v.
Thornton Township, 968 F.2d 1218 (7th Cir. 1992) (concluding that the district court did
not abuse its discretion in denying sanctions and deferring to the district court's findings);
Stockier v. City of Detroit, No. 90-1793, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 15502, at *16 (6th Cir. July
8, 1991) (per curiam), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 983 (1991) (holding that "[a]n abuse of discre-
tion exists when the reviewing court is firmly convinced that a mistake has been made,"
and concluding that "while this is a close case, it was improper to award fees"); Stewart v.
Lone Star Indus., Inc., No. 90-15937, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 16093, at *7 (9th Cir. July 16,
1991) (Kozinsk, J., dissenting) (arguing for caution when there is "an issue as to which
reasonable minds might differ"); Hawaiian Engraving & Mfg., Inc. v. Fujikami, No. 90-
15997, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 26816, at *2 (9th Cir. Nov. 8, 1991) (holding that even
though this was not a close case, "the mere fact that a claim is unsuccessful does not mean
that it is frivolous"); Evenson v. Osmose Wood Preserving Co. of Am., Inc., 899 F.2d 701,
706 (7th Cir. 1990) (Manion, J., dissenting) (citing Moore v. Tandy Corp., 819 F.2d 820, 823
(7th Cir. 1987)) (deferring in a close case "to the district judge's interpretation of the law in
the state in which the judge sits"); United States v. Terzado-Madruga, 897 F.2d 1099, 1119
(11th Cir. 1990) (concluding that the "balance in close cases struck in favor" of admitting
potentially harmful evidence to determine "whether its probative value is outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice"); Markwell v. County of Bexar, 878 F.2d 899, 902 (5th Cir.
1989) ("This circuit is reluctant to visit such a harsh sanction as [dismissal for want of
prosecution] upon a party solely because of the sins of his counsel." Therefore, the court
held it would "particularly examine the record for proof of aggravating factors: (1) that the
plaintiff personally contributed to the delay, (2) that the defendant was prejudiced as a
result of the delay, or (3) that the delay was intentional on the plaintiff's part." The court
then affirmed the district court's imposition of sanctions for filing the Rule 41(b) motion,
and others, as serving no real purpose.); Bass v. Southwestern Bell Tel., Inc., 817 F.2d 44,
47 (8th Cir. 1987) (finding no abuse of discretion for denying Rull 11 sanctions); Golden
Eagle, 809 F.2d at 585 ("[C lose cases exist that test the workability of any rule, civil or
criminal. They are not a reason for repealing the rule. Here, on the [majority's] own ad-
mission, the case was not close."); Independent Prods. Co., Inc., v. Tamor Plastics Corp.,
1997]
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terms of Rule 11, a close case is one in which after careful application of
the rule, its underlying policies, commentary, and "precedent"; 189 one
judge might decide that sanctions are needed, another might not, and
No. 86-0755-MC-A, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17631, at *1 (D. Mass. May 20, 1992) (noting
that the underlying litigation "was a close case" and sanctions are not warranted); Moore v.
Pyrotech Corp., No. 90-2178-0, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16583, at *6 (D. Kan. Sept. 30, 1992)
(finding that "although this is a very close case, the court concludes that the conduct of
defendants and defense counsel did not violate Rule 11"); Gottlieb v. Westin Hotel Co.,
No. 91-C-5184, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18410, at *8 (N.D. I11. Dec. 30, 1991) (holding that
"[ajlthough this is a close case for purposes of Rule 11, the court is convinced that the
argument was made in good faith based on the facts"); Flag Fables, Inc. v. Jean Ann's
Country Flags & Crafts, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 1007, 1018 (D. Mass. 1990) (denying costs be-
cause the underlying litigation is a close case); Greyhound Exhibitgroup, Inc. v. ELUL
Reality Corp., No. CV-88-3039, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10437, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. July 29,
1991) (finding that, in a close case, "sound judicial policy favor[s] resolution of disputes on
the merits"), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1080 (1993); Rush v. McDonald's Corp., 760 F. Supp.
1349, 1353 (S.D. Ind. 1991) (finding "defendants' argument in opposition to granting leave
to amend ... persuasive"), affd, 966 F.2d 1104 (7th Cir. 1992); Villa Marina Yacht Sales,
Inc. v. Hatteras Yachts, 762 F. Supp. 1008 (D.P.R. 1991) (refusing to "weigh the factors
considered by the district court" and deferring to the district court because it "may be
privy to relevant facts that do not appear in the appellate record"); Associated Bicycle
Serv., Inc. v. Commissioner, 128 B.R. 436, 456 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1990) (resolving "the
employer-employee vs. principal-independent contractor issue" in favor "of an employer-
employee relationship in a close case"); Terrestrial Sys., Inc. v. Fenstemaker, 132 F.R.D.
71, 76-77 (D. Colo. 1990) ("In fashioning appropriate sanctions under Rule 11 we remain
cognizant of maintaining the important balance between employing an effective deterrent
to abuse of the litigation process and encouraging zealousness in representation of the
client." The court held that in imposing sanctions in a close case, "we exercise our discre-
tion and refrain from imposing sanctions personally against counsel for plaintiff."); Mac-
Bride v. Caravelle Broadcast Group Consol., Nos. 89-0008-C, 89-0028-C, 1990 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19619, at *8 (W.D. Va. June 4, 1990) (finding Rule 11 sanctions because "this is a
close case; the record is scant, the disputes are great, the objective evidence is minimal");
Wiltfang v. Bonge, No. L88-72 CA5, slip op. at 2 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 20, 1989) (expressing
reservations in "giving plaintiff the benefit of a 'very close case'); South Shore Bank v.
Stewart Title Guar. Co., 688 F. Supp. 803, 806 (D. Mass. 1988) (holding that "[a]lthough
this is a close case, since plaintiff has made a good faith, albeit incorrect, argument as to the
meaning of the endorsement, Rule 11 sanctions are not appropriate"); Skepton v. County
of Bucks, 613 F. Supp. 1013, 1022 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (concluding "that this is not an appropri-
ate case for imposition of Rule 11 sanctions" because "plaintiff's complaint was an attempt,
albeit unsuccessful, to create a novel cause of action"); Marco Holding Co. v. Lear Siegler,
Inc., 606 F. Supp. 204, 211 (N.D. I11. 1985) (concluding that although "this is an extremely
close case and our initial inclination is to assess costs and sanctions, defendants' legal theo-
ries are not so unreasonable nor the deposition testimony so devoid of their interpretation
as to justify sanctions under Rule 11"); Union Carbide Corp. v. American Can Co., 558 F.
Supp. 1154, 1157 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (noting "Seventh Circuit decisions that hold that commer-
cial success and other secondary factors of non-obviousness serve only to tip the scales in
favor of patentability in close cases"); Cannon v. U.S. Acoustics Corp., 398 F. Supp. 209,
224 (N.D. II1. 1975) (concluding "that although the burden of establishing the substantial
relationship is on the party seeking to disqualify the opposing attorney, a close case should
be resolved in the movant's favor").
189. The impact of case law generated under an "abuse of discretion" appellate stan-
dard is discussed at greater length later in the Article. There the question is raised whether
courts should in fact treat decisions "tolerated" under an abuse of discretion standard as
"precedent." If precedent is designed to shape and guide the future application of the rule,
should a decision which is tolerated although explicitly acknowledged to be a close case,
establish binding or guiding precedent? Both district and appellate courts recognize the
close case as one in which alternative outcomes might be institutionally tolerated even
though problematic. If a close sanction case is treated as binding precedent, it ceases to be
treated as a close case. It becomes, instead, a decision which excludes alternative out-
comes. See infra part V.A.
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both decisions would stand up on appeal. Neither would be considered
"4wrong" and, even if directly conflicting, neither reflects an abuse of dis-
cretion.190 So long as these alternative outcomes are equally acceptable,
deference to the close case as a rule of inclusion, defining the parameters
of the court's discretion to sanction, is no problem.
But, if the alternative outcomes are not equally acceptable, deference
to the close case is no longer warranted, and the variability inherent in
the analysis no longer falls within tolerable limits. In this way, the para-
digm of the close case offers a unique set of perspectives on the very
decision that forms the regulatory core of Rule 11. Can the judge articu-
late for herself that the finding of frivolousness is a close case, or that
sanctions are not warranted, because others might disagree with her?' 9 '
The question to be explored in the remainder of this Article is whether
the close case can function as an explicit decisional methodology to help
the courts and practitioners in this regulatory process-a guide for the
exercise of judicial discretion. What the paradigm of the close case high-
lights is the tension inherent in these types of decisions and the signifi-
cance of the conflict between their decisional opposites. In the Rule 11
arena, the close case highlights the conflicting institutional and adjudica-
tive norms brought into play: adjudicative formalism and managerial dis-
cretion, institutional neutrality versus active dispute management.
The close case is useful because it is an expression of the court's discre-
tion which is based on experience, and which can be developed and used
by the courts as an explicit decisional methodology to help them address
the discretionary limits of a Rule 11 adjudication. Much of the debate
over Rule 11 centers around the tension, within the Rule, between the
court's pragmatism and activism, and the concern that traditional legal
values associated with the court's exercise of their traditional adjudicative
discretion are not adhered to, such as objectivity, uniformity, neutrality,
consistency, and predictability.' 92 Currently viewed as defining an inclu-
190. See ARMOUR, supra note 107, at 99, 101-05 (Armour discusses the range of review
under the unitary abuse of discretion standard adopted for Rule 11 and notes that the
appellate courts still must discharge their duty to "scrutinize the objectively ascertainable
facts.., as well as the inferences and legal conclusions drawn from them in order to make
sure the trial court correctly applied the standards of Rule 11." The fact-sensitive inquiry
at the trial level gives rise to an "equally detailed fact-sensitive review of that record by the
appellate court. The policy of judicial deference implicit in the unitary standard is not
always evidence in practice, and no clear factual pattern has emerged to distinguish sanc-
tionable from nonsanctionable conduct in a close case.") (emphasis added).
191. See infra part V.C.
192. As will be seen below, the use of the close case as an explicit decisional methodol-
ogy helps address the lack of consensus in the practice community regarding the definition
of sanctionable litigation that the recent outcry regarding variability, and the lack of varia-
bility, in decisional outcomes leading up to the amendment of the rule reflects. It helps
focus the development of interpretive standards and guidelines for Rule 11, while avoiding
a body of "nonbinding" precedent that has the potential to adversely impact the rule
through the process of synchronization. More importantly, the close case as an adjudica-
tive standard or decisional methodology helps define and develop a buffer zone between
an acceptable sanction decision and an unacceptable fee shift, by forcing the courts to
clearly distinguish between a merits-based adjudication and the procedurally and analyti-
cally linked adjudicative determination that the litigation is legally or factually frivolous
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sive, protected zone for sanction decisions, the Rule 11 close case is pro-
posed as a zone of exclusion; a buffer zone which defines the boundary
between the court's aggressive procedural pragmatism and managerial
discretion, and its more traditional adjudicative role.193
The proposal is simple: to consciously change the way the close case is
used by the courts and in the case law. The goal is to ground the close
case sanction analysis in the traditional adjudicative norm of judicial re-
straint which values predictability, objectivity, and uniformity. Used in
this way, the close case creates the protected zone of tolerated doubtful
litigation, thereby achieving what the restructuring of Rule 11 could
not. 94
and should be sanctioned. It is a way to address the problem of fee awards in close cases
which raise the potential for over-deterrence and the problem of fairness. Finally, the de-
velopment of the close case as an adjudicative guideline incorporates into the court's deci-
sional methodology concerns regarding judicial accountability and the shifting of the risk
of error, or unpredictable outcome variability, in the institutional context of the courts.
Should the courts be allowed to shift this risk wholesale to litigants? The use of the close
case as a decisional guide acknowledges the problem of developing a principled distinction
between tolerable, if not in fact necessary and important litigation, albeit litigation ulti-
mately found to lack merit and warranting sanctions.
193. The "doctrine" or norm of judicial restraint is used by the courts in different sub-
stantive and procedural contexts as the tie breaker, the norm or standard that forces the
court to look at the larger context of the legal decision and its social and institutional
impact. Judicial restraint as an adjudicative norm is critical of judicial discretion and to
that degree conforms to the liberal ideology of the rule of law. See Nicola Lacey, The
Jurisprudence of Discretion: Escaping the Legal Paradigm, in THE USES OF DISCRETION
361 (Keith Hawkins ed., 1992) (discussing the legal paradigm and the liberal ideology of
the rule of law). But, more importantly, the doctrine or norm of judicial restraint implicitly
rejects the tautology of judicial decision making justified on the grounds that it is discre-
tionary. Within the traditional adjudicative model, discretion does not provide sufficient
justification to render a decision "principled" or in conformance with the legal paradigm;
discretion is a red flag, not a green light. See, e.g., United States v. Eufrasio, 935 F.2d 553,
572 (3rd Cir.) (commenting on the need for "judicial self-restraint" when a Rule 403 analy-
sis of a trial court is reviewed on appeal), cert. denied sub nom. Idone v. United States, 502
U.S. 925 (1991); United States v. femble, 933 F.2d 925, 928 (11th Cir.) (citing "the funda-
mental rule of judicial restraint that cautions us not to decide questions of a constitutional
nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case"), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 928
(1991); Sohoppy v. Hodel, 911 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that judicial restraint
favors denying summary judgment and allowing the fact issues to go forward); Muhammad
v. Warden, Baltimore City Jail, 849 F.2d 107, 116 (4th Cir. 1988) (noting the problem that
"judicial restraint and judicial economy are frequently antithetical"); John Havlir & As-
socs., Inc. v. TACOA, Inc., 810 F. Supp. 752, 759 n.4 (N.D. Tex. 1993) (holding that "princi-
ples of judicial restraint counsel the court not to rule more broadly than is warranted");
Searles v. Southwestern Pa. Transp. Auth., Nos. 91-6687, 92-1065, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
9721, at *16 (E.D. Pa. June 19, 1992) ("The doctrine of judicial self restraint requires us to
exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground .... ), affd, 990
F.2d 789 (3d Cir. 1993); Naked City, Inc. v. Aregood, 117 F.R.D. 634, 636 (N.D. Ind. 1987)
("This judge is a believer in a policy of judicial restraint with regard to Rule 11 that is
perhaps in contrast with the more activist role that is envisioned .... "); McCurdy v. Steele,
353 F. Supp. 629, 640 (D. Utah 1973) (holding that judicial restraint called for care in
adjudications involving tribal practices and circumstances and the Indian Civil Rights Act).
194. See BARAK, supra note 52, at 222-33 (After reviewing the fact of judicial discretion
in the adjudicative process, Professor Barak concludes his analysis with an argument not
dissimilar to Professor Posner's: "Every Judge should consciously formulate for himself a
judicial policy for solving the hard cases. This policy involves the basic considerations-
normative, institutional, and interinstitutional-that guide the judge in the exercise of his
discretion." The appropriate exercise of judicial discretion requires the conscious articula-
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tion of that discretion and how the normative choices implicit in adjudication are resolved.
Barak argues that the only proper model of adjudication is the "model of limited judicial
discretion."); John Bell, Discretionary Decision-Making: A Jurisprudential View, in THE
USES OF DISCRETION 89, 97-111 (Keith Hawkins ed., 1992) (Bell discusses the need for a
jurisprudence of discretion more developed than the "hole in the doughnut" conceptual-
ization offered by many of the legal commentators attempting to develop a theory of law.
He argues that discretion is not "peripheral to the operation of law" and once this is recog-
nized "then the interaction between law and other schemes of values becomes of central
importance."); Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Norms and Narratives: Can Judges
Avoid Serious Moral Error?, 69 TEX. L. REv. 1929, 1929-33 (1991) (discussing the fact of
judicial bias, the role personal preferences and values play in adjudication, and the need
for judges to step outside of the confines of their own experience in order to expand their
understanding of the context of the legal issues before them and avoid the error of false
objectivity); Lacey, supra note 193, at 361-62 (Lacey critically examines "the world-view
and concerns with which lawyers and legal theorists typically approach the question of
discretion." Lacey further critiques the assumptions underlying the legal theorists "law-
discretion" dichotomy: assumptions about the existence of distinctly legal methods and
techniques that can be applied to control or limit discretionary power and the unwilling-
ness of lawyers and the courts to recognize the limits of traditional legal methods. Accord-
ing to Lacey, the fact of discretion "should make us not only question the way in which we
define 'law,' 'legal contexts' and 'legally relevant' issues, but also reflect on the general
appropriateness of legal method and on whether 'legal' controls are always effective in
'legally relevant' areas." Discretion is more complex and cannot simply be understood as
the gap or play in the normative structure of the law or rules; it is the point of intersection
between the legal paradigm and the world.); Posner, supra note 114, at 5-8, 10, 19 (Posner
discusses the role of judicial activism and judicial restraint as norms that help define the
proper limits of adjudication. After noting the "formalist fallacy," he addresses the limits
of the legal model of principled decision making: the judge's obligation to be aware of and
articulate the norms and values they bring to bear in resolving issues when the law does not
yield a determinate outcome. Posner attempts to address the issue of what considerations
are acceptable when the legal materials give way by focusing on the judicial norm and
adjudicative value of "bias"-the assumption that decisions reflecting the personal prefer-
ences of the court or other values viewed as "extraneous" or excluded from the judicial
process should not figure in the decision and can be controlled. Posner argues that the
principled decision must not only state all grounds for the decision, but it should be consis-
tent. Yet, to argue in favor of principled decision making still leaves unresolved the under-
lying issue. What personal values, norms, or preferences of the jurist should be brought to
bear to fill the formalist gap and how does the court make those decisions on a principled
basis? Posner then attempts to develop principled definitions for self-restraint to guide the
courts. Judicial self-restraint is offered as a norm that highlights the court's potential exer-
cise of power and focuses on the personal element of adjudication-making it explicit.); see
also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Gary Peller, The New Public Law Movement: Moderation
as a Postmodern Cultural Form, 89 MICH. L. REV. 707 (1991); James A. Gardner, The
Ambiguity of Legal Dreams: A Communitarian Defense of Judicial Restraint?, 71 N.C. L.
REv. 805 (1993) (discussing traditional adjudicative norms favoring judicial restraint in the
resolution of disputes about the law as favoring an open, diverse system of law more in
keeping with the diversity of today's society than the image of the law as a unitary, mono-
lithic, value-free compendium of rules and standards); Martin Redish, The Federal Courts,
Judicial Restraint, and the Importance of Analyzing Legal Doctrines, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
1378 (1985) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND RE-
FORM (1985)). Concern that the unarticulated normative biases of the judiciary adversely
impact legal decision making runs throughout the commentary on adjudication. See, e.g.,
Archibald Cox, The Role of the Supreme Court. Judicial Activism or Self-Restraint?, 47
MD. L. REV. 118 (1987); Harry T. Edwards, The Judicial Function and the Elusive Goal of
Principled Decisionmaking, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 837 (1991); Robert L. Glicksman, A Retreat
from Judicial Activism: The Seventh Circuit and the Environment, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
209 (1987); Michael Herz, Choosing Between Normative and Descriptive Versions of the
Judicial Role, 75 MARO. L. REV. 725 (1992); William W. Justice, The 7wo Faces of Judicial
Activism, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1992); Gilbert S. Merritt, Judges on Judging: The
Decision Making Process in Federal Courts of Appeals, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1385 (1990);
Martha Minow, Stripped Down Like a Runner or Enriched by Experience: Bias and Impar-
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A. MERGING THE LOGIC OF DISCRETION AND THE DECISION
MAKER'S PERSPECTIVE
If discretion in a close case can be defined as the articulation of accept-
able alternatives or range of possibilities, then a choice from within that
zone can be viewed as a consciously self-limiting decision. Such a decision
defines the zone of possibilities by posing alternative or opposite out-
comes as their primary decisional guidelines. 195 Approaching discretion
from this perspective focuses on discretion as a range of conscious judicial
action and on the close case as a decisional guideline defining the zone of
those possibilities. This approach facilitates the merging of the logic of
discretion with the decision maker's perspective in order to create a deci-
sional methodology that is grounded in the reality of adjudication.
B. THE ZONE OF POSSIBILITIES
One theoretical model for generating the scope of lawful alternatives
within the "zone of possibilities" parallels the explicit criteria used by
many judges in deciding Rule 11 cases. This model proposes, as lawful
possibilities, those alternatives that would be acceptable to knowledgea-
ble lawyers comprising the relevant legal or interpretative community.' 96
While no more precise than some other formulations, this articulation of
the close case, and the scope of judicial discretion, is intuitively appealing
in the Rule 11 context, given the mandate to the trial courts to develop
and enforce acceptable practice norms regarding the handling of marginal
litigation within an adversarial system:
The legal community is the professional outlook of the collectivity of
lawyers in a particular state. An option is lawful if the legal commu-
nity views it as such and if the legal community's reaction to the
choice of this option is not one of shock and mistrust. An option is
unlawful if the legal community sees it as unlawful and considers it
impossible that a knowledgeable lawyer would choose this option. A
lawyer who chooses this option would thereby be "uprooting the
written word, in effect calling the day night and the night day."'197
This formulation of the scope of discretion and acceptable alternatives is
particularly apt in the Rule 11 context because it focuses on the tension
between internalized or self-referring judicial standards for frivolous liti-
gation and the need to develop externalized or objective standards under
the rule that avoid an overly idiosyncratic approach by the judiciary to
legal practice.' 98
tiality of Judges and Jurors, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1201 (1992); David E. Van Zandt, An
Alternative Theory of Practical Reason in Judicial Decisions, 65 TUL. L. REV. 775 (1991);
Patricia A. Cain, Comment, Good and Bad Bias; A Comment on Feminist Theory and
Judging, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1945 (1988).
195. Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 194; cf. BARAK, supra note 52, at 9.
196. BARAK, supra note 52, at 10-11. See supra notes 162-85 and accompanying text.
197. BARAK, supra note 52, at 11 (quoting Cheshin, J. in H.C. 1/50 Grosman v. The
Military Prosecutor, 4 P.D. 63, 70 (citations omitted)).
198. In developing the norms of practice applicable in her court, can the trial judge
adopt as idiosyncratic a view of Rule 11 as she does of Rule 16? Can she treat each Rule
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This approach to defining the zone of possibilities helps define the grey
area of the close case as those sanction cases where reasonable, knowl-
edgeable lawyers, as members of the interpretive community, could disa-
gree. The scope of the disagreement is crucial. On the one hand, the
interpretive community might disagree about the application of the sub-
stantive standards under the rule.199 The interpretive community might
think that sanctions are not warranted in the close case because they
would be tantamount to a substantive fee shift and would violate the
prohibitions of the American Rule. The interpretive community might
not think sanctions were warranted because they were of the opinion that
this is the type of marginal litigation which an open court system should
tolerate and that should not be sacrificed to the institutional goals of effi-
cient resource utilization. Finally, the interpretive community might disa-
gree because they think the decision reflects too narrow or idiosyncratic a
model for acceptable advocacy on the part of the judge.
The theoretical "interpretive community" that has been transformed
into a conscious reference point to be used by the judge in reaching a
decision in a close case is not meant to be merely a reification of the
actual practice community within which the judge finds herself. The ob-
jective of adopting the interpretive community as a decisional guideline
in any case, including a Rule 11 decision, is to make the judge aware that
he is not merely to give play to his own subjective perceptions in making
his decision, but rather "give expression to what appears to him to be the
basic conception(s)" 2°° concerning acceptable professional practices and
judgments.201 The "interpretive community" forces the trial judge to
look beyond her own idiosyncratic world view (in Rule 11 a view of mini-
mally competent "good lawyering") to the interpretive and professional
community as an external, objective standard, and not merely the "reifi-
cation" of the local bar's practice. Used in this way, the "interpretive
community" offers a means and method to merge the logic of discretion
with the decision maker's perspective, a perspective that is more consis-
tent with the realities of adjudication.
The accepted "logic of discretion" holds that, so long as the alternatives
between which the court must select fall within the range of acceptable
options (the interpretive community would accept either of them), "it is
the judicial decision itself that will determine the lawfulness of these pos-
sibilities. '20 2 This paradigm of judicial discretion identifies the tension
within the range of options, the conundrum of the close case that allows
judges to disagree, and in the case of Rule 11, to pick opposite alterna-
11 case differently, giving full sway to their peculiar facts with the great deference given to
her evaluation of the acceptable practice?
199. They might think the prefiling investigation was adequate under the circumstances;
they might find the purpose behind the filing lawful; they might not agree with the court's
characterization of the legal or factual merits of the claim; or they might find the case an
appropriate test case or piece of reform litigation.
200. BARAK, supra note 52, at 12.
201. Id. at 12.
202. I& at 11.
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tives, without reversal. It is this logic of discretion which tolerates con-
flicting outcomes in similar cases. 20 3 But the logic of discretion is at odds
with the decision maker's perspective. The close case is not the easy case,
one which the court can treat with confidence as a correct decision re-
gardless of the outcome. In the close case, the court faces the challenge
of developing a principled basis for purposes of distinguishing and ulti-
mately selecting between conflicting results. From the decision maker's
perspective, this is the ultimate challenge of adjudication-weighing and
selecting between alternative, competing outcomes.
1. The Decision Maker's Perspective
The close case is a way to conceptualize this phenomenological dimen-
sion of discretion, the "sense that people have of their freedom to act.''2°4
The theoretical definition of discretion as a quality of rules, the primary
concern of the theoreticians, merges with this phenomenological aspect
of discretion, the primary concern of the decision maker,205 in the articu-
lation of the close case and the zone of possibilities.20 6 Attempts to de-
velop a single model or theory of discretion which treats judicial
discretion as an essentially one dimensional by-product of all judicial de-
cisions 20 7 blurs important distinctions between different types of judicial
decisions and how judges respond: decisions on the merits of the litiga-
tion versus decisions concerning the management of the litigation, deci-
sions concerning discovery versus decisions concerning evidentiary
203. See supra note 66 (discussing the definition of the scope of discretion).
204. Hawkins, supra note 112, at 121 (distinguishing between discretion as a "quality of
rules" or as a "quality of behavior" distinct from this "phenomenological aspect").
205. There is a substantial body of commentary which discusses the need for further
commentary and development of explicit judicial policies to guide jurists. See Jack M.
Beermann, "Bad" Judicial Activism and Liberal Federal-Courts Doctrine: A Comment on
Professor Doemberg and Professor Redish, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1053 (1990); Frank
H. Easterbrook, Stability and Reliability in Judicial Decisions, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 422
(1988); James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Reliance on Public Policy: An Empirical Analysis
of Products Liability Decisions, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1570 (1991); Duncan Kennedy,
Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC.
518 (1986); Alex Kozinski, What I Ate for Breakfast and Other Mysteries of Judicial Deci-
sion Making, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 993 (1993); Lempert, supra note 84; Joel Levin, The
Concept of the Judicial Decision, 33 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 208 (1983); Willy E. Rice,
Judicial Bias, the Insurance Industry and Consumer Protection: An Empirical Analysis of
State Supreme Court's Bad-Faith, Breach-of-Contract, Breach-of-Covenant-of-Good-Faith
and Excess-Judgment Decisions, 1900-1991, 41 CAmH. U. L. REV. 325 (1992); Jeffrey E.
Stake, Status and Incentive Aspects of Judicial Decisions, 79 GEO. L.J. 1447 (1991); Scott C.
Idleman, Note, The Role of Religious Values in Judicial Decision Making, 68 IND. L.J. 433
(1993); see also supra note 194.
206. Every judge should consciously formulate for himself a judicial policy for solving
the hard cases. This policy involves the basic considerations (normative, institutional, and
inter-institutional) that guide the judge in the exercise of his discretion. This policy is the
sum of the judge's conceptions of how he will exercise his discretion in the hard cases.
These are the basic standards for the use of judicial discretion within the range of reasona-
bleness. Judicial policy, therefore, is an organized, conscious notion of how to handle the
difficulties of the hard cases, or what Justice Wilkon called "judicial planning," a con-
sciously articulated process of planning for the future development of the law. BARAK,
supra note 52, at 222.
207. Fletcher, supra note 19, at 274.
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questions, decisions concerning the legal merits of a claim versus deci-
sions concerning the factual merits of a claim, and the different aspects of
judicial discretion they invoke in the mind of the decision maker.208 The
issue is not merely that much of the theoretical writings fail to address
these differences in discretion, but that they fail to address the fact that
discretion is an independent and conscious dimension of judicial decisions
which must be addressed by the decision maker who views discretion dif-
ferently in different contexts.20 9
These distinct dimensions of discretion are not simply the mental con-
structs of the theorists and commentators, reified analytic categories with-
out any parallel in the real world. These differences in judicial discretion
are recognized and discussed "[w]ithin the language of the law."'210 For
example, many of the types of decisions and issues treated generally by
commentators or theorists concerned with judicial discretion are never
explicitly denominated as discretionary either by the judge rendering the
decision, the court reviewing the decision, or those institutional actors
justifying or analyzing the decision. 211 The judicial perspective is clearly
much more limited than the theorist's perspective when it comes to talk-
ing about judicial discretion.
Jurists simply do not treat all indeterminate decisions the same, even
though all indeterminate decisions are discretionary as that term is used
in its broadest, most reductive sense. But by looking at "what the deci-
sionmakers perceive themselves to be doing"212 and at "how judges...
justify their decisions despite the absence of knowable right answers," 213
it is possible to develop an understanding of this conscious dimension of
discretion and the articulable norms that guide its exercise. This ap-
proach, adopting the perspective of the decision maker when facing an
indeterminate, and therefore discretionary, decision, is useful for three
reasons: (1) it avoids the narrow internal perspective of the jurispruden-
tial based theorists who divorce the "decisionmaker from any social or
institutional structure," thereby ignoring the context for the discretionary
decisions;214 (2) it examines the decision maker's view of the decision
before her, providing both an empirical and jurisprudential perspective
on the process of rendering indeterminate decisions;215 and (3) it pro-
vides a means of distinguishing between different types of discretionary
decisions.216 If, at their core, as some commentators argue, all discretion-
ary judicial decisions look alike, why are they to be treated any differently
by the trial or appellate courts? And yet they are.217
208. Id.; see Yablon, supra note 66.
209. See BARAK, supra note 52; Armour, supra note 76; Hawkins, supra note 112.
210. Fletcher, supra note 19, at 271.
211. Id.
212. Yablon, supra note 66, at 258.
213. Id. at 259.
214. Id. at 255.
215. Id. at 255-56.
216. Id. at 254.
217. Id. at 270.
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The conscious perception of the discretionary nature of the decision on
the part of the decision maker and how that perception affects her deci-
sion making is crucial to an understanding of judicial discretion. The fact
that "decisionmakers respond differently when an action is described as
'substantive' or 'procedural,"' 218 legal or discretionary, or managerial or
merits-based is evidence that the "rhetorical strategy" of labeling the in-
determinate dimension of the decision in this manner "bring[s] about
changed attitudes on the part of judges. '2 19 This phenomenological di-
mension of discretion, the judicial decision maker's perception of discre-
tion, and the fact that different decisions call for different types of
discretion, should not be ignored in the Rule 11 context. What does it
mean to the judicial decision maker when the decision before the judge is
explicitly denominated discretionary, as is Rule 11?220 What does it
mean to the decision maker when a decision is defined as falling within
the court's pragmatic discretion and outside of its traditional adjudicative
role as it is with Rule 11?
2. The Jurist's Perspective
The utility of the close case as a paradigm or schema used by the courts
to define the dimensions of judicial discretion is seen throughout legal
literature. The close case provides a perspective on the exercise of judi-
cial discretion in the context of "equitable injunctions,"2 1 the award of
attorney fees,22 2 and the evaluation of key evidence in a trademark
218. Id. at 246; Fletcher, supra note 19 (discussing the distinction between the court's
pragmatically conceived procedural discretion and its formal adjudicative discretion).
219. Yablon, supra note 66, at 246.
220. As discussed at length above, the problem of discretion inherent in applying the
substantive standards of the rule evoked the response of more precise drafting. See supra
note 6 (discussing the 1983 and 1993 Advisory Committee Notes). The problem of when to
sanction was left to the court's discretion with simply a nonbinding illustrative listing of
potential factors to guide the court. See supra note 6. Procedural requirements are more
clearly spelled out, in the hope that an emphasis upon "process values" will help address
the problem of discretion. Finally, the discretion to structure sanctions is limited by the
single principle of deterrence. See supra note 6. Ironically, the most discretionary aspect
of the new rule, the discretion not to sanction, did not even exist in this or a similar form in
the old rule. Can you guess where future variability will originate?
221. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Equitable Discretion, Legal Duties, and Environmental
Injunctions, 45 U. Prrr. L. Rnv. 513 (1984). "The traditional approach would be to rely on
a presumption in favor of equitable discretion. Nevertheless, in the environmental context,
arguments for a presumption against equitable discretion seem stronger. Three reasons
exist for deciding close cases in favor of nondiscretionary enforcement." Id. at 542 (cita-
tions omitted).
222. Janice Toran, Settlement, Sanctions, and Attorney Fees: Comparing English Pay-
ment into Court and Proposed Rule 68, 35 AM. U. L. REv. 301 (1986).
Despite this potential unfairness, courts do not give special treatment to
close cases.... There is apparently no flexibility within the English system to
alleviate the harsh penalty that a plaintiff may pay in a close case .... A
recent proposal would have given the court broad discretion in dealing with
the awarding of costs, aimed in part at dealing with the problem of unduly
penalizing the successful plaintiff in a close case. The committee reviewing
the proposal rejected this idea, fearing that this broad discretion would pro-
duce a lack of uniformity, thus creating as many problems as it had set out to
solve.
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case.223 Legal scholars recognize that it is precisely in a close case that
personal views of the decision maker may sway the most.224 Because of
the problems inherent in the resolution of close cases, varying degrees of
scrutiny are applied in the appellate context. Some commentators argue
that it is in close cases that the appellate court needs the most room to
maneuver, 225 while others argue that strict appellate review of close cases
will prove disruptive to the adjudicative process. 226
The close case, a useful analytic paradigm in a variety of substantive
contexts, has enabled the courts to address the problem of developing a
coherent decisional theory to guide judicial interpretation 227 and the ap-
plication of indeterminate legal standards. 228 Much can be learned from
writers who have addressed the problem of the close case in contexts not
unlike Rule 11. For example, in analyzing the boundaries of contempt in
an effort to distinguish between acceptable advocacy and obstruction of
justice, the problem of the close case is paramount: "[B]ecause the con-
cept of obstruction of justice is so amorphous, and the need for vigorous
advocacy in different circumstances so varied, there is an unavoidable ar-
bitrariness to individual decisions in close cases." 229 Other writers have
looked at areas within which the expansive exercise of judicial discretion
is the norm, focusing on the presumptions and assumptions which guide
Id. at 324 (citations omitted). See also Claire E. Winold, Institutionalizing an Experiment:
The Extension of the Equal Access to Justice Act-Questions Resolved, Questions Remain-
ing, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 925 (1987). "In awarding fees under the new Act, courts will
continue to exercise considerable discretion in interpreting its open-ended provisions. It is
important that the Act's original intent be carefully considered in close cases." Id. at 947.
223. Wayne F. Osoba, Note, The Legislative Response to Anti-Monopoly: A Missed
Opportunity to Clarify the Genericness Doctrine, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 197, 203-07 (1985)
(arguing that in a close case the courts should be given more discretion to evaluate eviden-
tiary sources and other uses of the disputed trademark).
224. Laura B. Chisoim, Exempt Organization Advocacy: Matching the Rules to the Ra-
tionales, 63 IND. L.J. 201, 244 (1987-88) (finding that, in close cases, I.R.S. officials may be
swayed instinctively to be lenient in taxing political activities depending upon their own
political views).
225. Steven E. Zipperstein, Certain Uncertainty: Appellate Review and the Sentencing
Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 621, 635 (1992) (arguing that an appellate abuse of discre-
tion standard allows the appellate courts some flexibility on appeal to deal with a close
case).
226. Louis, supra note 157, at 1032 (arguing that allowing an appellate court "[firee
review of ultimate facts in effect permits an appellate court to seize for itself the power to
decide the merits in close cases").
227. David R. Keyser, State Constitutions and Theories of Judicial Review: Some Varia-
tions on a Theme, 63 TEx. L. REV. 1051, 1076 (1985) ("[T]he search for a coherent theory is
ultimately futile if one believes that no theory, however seemingly complete, in fact can
eliminate the exercise of discretion in particular cases. No matter what single theory we
give allegiance to, the application of that theory simply will not decide close cases predict-
ably and without the exercise of judgment.").
228. Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Practical Reason and the First Amendment,
34 UCLA L. REv. 1615, 1654-55 (1987) ("Even in close cases, moreover, some objective
standards of evaluation are available. In our view, then, 'the tyranny of the judiciary' is
neither inherent in all exercises of judicial review nor beyond evaluation in individual
cases.").
229. Louis S. Raveson, Advocacy and Contempt-Part Two: Charting the Boundaries of




decisions in a close case.230 For example, in the evidentiary arena, the
articulated policies of the Federal Rules of Evidence favor admissibility,
and this overarching policy tips the balance in the close case when, some
commentators argue, the prejudicial impact of the evidence needs to be
more carefully considered.231 What all of these writers focus on is the
utility of the paradigm of the close case as a way to identify difficult judi-
cial decisions. Furthermore, close cases are precisely those cases in which
final outcomes are not predictable, judicial bias has the most play, and
the risk of error, which is not remedied through appellate review, is
greatest. 232
The result is that in some legal contexts, the conundrum of the close
case is addressed through the development of judicial policies which ex-
pressly weigh the decision in favor of either the over- or under-inclusive
application of the rule of law as a way to insure consistency in its applica-
tion by addressing the potential normative conflicts head on.233 In effect,
these decisional policies reflect the court's recognition that the routine
over-inclusive, under-inclusive, or variable application of the law in these
close cases reflects a dimension of discretion that may not be properly
vested with the trial court and that will ultimately have an adverse impact
on the development and application of the substantive law.234 Examples
230. See, e.g., D. Craig Lewis, Proof and Prejudice: A Constitutional Challenge to the
Treatment of Prejudicial Evidence in Federal Criminal Cases, 64 WASH. L. REV. 289, 348
(1989).
231. Id. "A balancing test weighted in favor of the admissibility of such evidence in
close cases will encourage these errors; indeed, it can be expected to most strongly en-
courage error in those cases where the price of error is most likely to be the conviction of
an innocent." Id. Lewis critiques this error on the grounds that the defendant should not
bear the risk of a mistake of this type, which is what happens when decisions such as this
are scrutinized under the forgiving appellate standards applicable to evidentiary questions.
232. Herbert Hovenkamp, Positivism in Law and Economics, 78 CAL. L. REV. 815
(1990). "Prediction may be possible in 'easy' cases that clearly fall within the rule estab-
lished by an earlier, authoritative statute or case. In difficult cases, however, the judge has
discretion, and the final outcome is indeterminate." Id. at 819.
233. James E. Hooper, Note, Bright Lines, Dark Deeds: Counting Convictions Under
the Armed Career Criminal Act, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1951, 1977 (1991) ("Judge Becker cor-
rectly implied that some measure of discretion ('the stuff of judging') must operate in close
cases to avoid over- and underinclusive results. He left unanswered the question of appro-
priate boundaries for that discretion .... ").
234. While there is a growing comfort with the idea that trial judges inevitably legislate
when they must make indeterminate or difficult decisions, these decisions are still viewed
as constrained by the law as applied to a particular case. So long as the legislating is linked
to the factual dimensions of the case and does not purport to "change the law," these
decisions fall within the acceptable "legal paradigm." See BARAK, supra note 52 (discuss-
ing judicial lawmaking); Christie, supra note 66 (favoring changes in the law as a result of
express interpretation rather than patterns of variability reflecting ad hoc decisions).
There is always the need within Rule 11 to balance the goal of deterrence with the value of
an open court system, both sides of the proposition acknowledging that a single bright line
cannot be drafted. If the courts consistently err on the side of sanctions, they have made a
legislative decision that is different from merely applying the rules in a complex fact situa-
tion. In this same context, the "mindset" of aggressive enforcement of Rule 11 is likely to
give rise to its over-inclusive application for precisely this reason. The result is not a fact
based variability, but a decisional policy that has broad implications for the development
and interpretation of the rule. Alternatively, ad hoc decisional patterns inevitably give rise
to substantive limits that are equally troublesome. See infra part V.C. The point is simple:
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of these types of weighing policies abound, from the denial of plan bene-
fits in an ERISA case,235 to the admission of evidence at trial,236 to the
imposition of sanctions under the 1983 amendments to Rule 11.237 These
decisional policies, developed as a useful rule of thumb for resolving con-
flicts between the policies, goals, or values inherent in the particular rule
or rules, reflect efforts by the judiciary to produce uniform or predictable
results more in line with the overarching policies of the law than simply
the logic of discretion. And they all represent efforts to grapple with the
substantive impact of the close case on the development of the law. What
these efforts reflect is the reality of adjudication, in that a close case, once
decided, casts its vote in favor of one alternative over the other, regard-
less of the logical equipoise deemed to exist at the inception of the
decision.
3. The Practitioner's Perspective-The Intuitive Appeal of the
Paradigm of the Close Case
The other significant decision maker involved in a Rule 11 analysis is
the legal practitioner. The close case offers a useful paradigm for the
practitioner facing the threat of potential Rule 11 sanctions. As a practi-
tioner, I became interested in the problem of defining the nature and
scope of judicial discretion in a close case when confronting the practical
problem of distinguishing between an acceptable piece of doubtful litiga-
tion and a frivolous lawsuit.238 As a practicing attorney, the question of
variability and flexibility at the margins does not persist in the face of judicial intervention.
Patterns begin to solidify with important consequences for the substantive dimension of
the law.
235. Bradley R. Duncan, Note, Judicial Review of Fiduciary Claim Denials Under ER-
ISA: An Alternative to the Arbitrary and Capricious Test, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 986 (1986).
"Broadly speaking, a fiduciary may exercise his discretion to deny a benefit claim in two
ways. The first and most obvious way is by interpreting plan eligibility requirements in
close cases so as to exclude a claimant from receiving his benefits." Id. at 990.
236. See Mengler, supra note 66.
237. Perhaps erroneously, many judges faced with a close decision often relied upon the
statements in the 1983 Advisory Committee's Notes encouraging more aggressive sanc-
tions as a statement of policy favoring sanctions. As a result, we would predict courts
erring on the side of sanctions in a close case generating a pattern of precedent that would
inherently undervalue the institutional policies of an open system, destroying the limits
such a policy poses. See Louis, supra note 8.
238. In 1989, a sanction decision was issued which caught the attention of numerous
practitioners in the area in which I work. What concerned many of us at the time was that
we would probably all have taken the case if asked to do so by the A.C.L.U. The Fifth
Circuit decided the case, in Jennings v. Joshua Independent School District, in which sanc-
tions imposed against an attorney acting on behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union
in a lawsuit challenging the circuit's sniffer dog laws was upheld on appeal (although re-
versed and remanded for recalculation). Jennings v. Joshua Indep. Sch. Dist., 869 F.2d 870
(5th Cir. 1990). The sanction was based on the district court's determination that the
"facts" in the case could never state a cause of action under existing law and the litigants
knew this at the outset. The issue in the case was the use of sniffer dogs to establish prob-
able cause for a search warrant and forcible entry when the defendant school district,
which had contracted with a private firm for the use of the dogs, was informed by the firm
that the dogs would "over alert," that is, alert to a variety of substances that were not
illegal to possess. Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit at 6-8, Jennings v. Joshua Indep. Sch. Dist., 869 F.2d 870 (5th Cir.) (No. 88-
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whether to pursue a close case, or any case in which there are compelling
reasons to bring the litigation and yet experience tells you that you might
not be successful in the trial court, poses a number of difficult judg-
ments.239 Attorneys and judges, "[w]hen faced with data and the need to
make judgments derived from that data, [like] all humans may be charac-
1089), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 935 (1990) (on file with author) [hereinafter Petition for Writ
of Certiorari]. Such an alert occurred, the school district called the police, and at the behest
of the school's officials a search warrant was secured and a search conducted. Suit was
brought on behalf of Petitioner Jennings and his minor child claiming the school district
had "caused" the unconstitutional search. Id at 8-9. The district court directed verdicts at
trial on the ground that the school district had not been the "legal cause" of the police
search. Id. at 10. Neither the district court nor the court of appeals ever expressly ad-
dressed the issue of law reform. Quite the contrary, the district court seemed to find the
fact that the case was a "set up" designed to challenge existing laws providing additional
evidence warranting sanctions. On appeal, the circuit court upheld the sanction decision
despite its own perception that this was a "close case." Jennings, 869 F.2d at 879. On
appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the A.C.L.U. and Petitioner Jennings once
more made it clear that the very doctrines that operated to legally insulate the school
district from the consequences of its actions in securing sniffer dogs that over alert, in
requiring the police to be called upon the occurrence of such an alert, and seeking the
issuance of a search warrant based on such an alert, were at issue in the case. Petition for
Writ of Certiorari, supra, at 11.
In addition, the petitioners challenged the circuit's use of the abuse of discretion stan-
dard for appellate review of the legal merit of the litigant's claims. Petitioners argued that
given the circuit's characterization of the legal question of merit which underlay the district
court's opinion as a close question, application of a standard of de novo review would have
led to a different result in the case. Id. at 19-25. While this argument in favor of bifurcated
appellate standards has been rejected by the Supreme Court, its persistence reflected the
perception that a Rule 11 decision involved two distinct types of decisions. A decision
addressing the merits of the claim to determine whether or not it is frivolous should be
treated as any other substantive, legal, merits-based decision. The other decisions, whether
a determination of the facts underlying the allegations concerning the inadequacy of the
prefiling investigation or the decisions regarding the type of sanction to be imposed, should
be treated as falling within the court's managerial discretion and reviewed under the abuse
of discretion standard.
239. See Maureen N. Armour, Litigating the Close Case: The Ethical and Procedural
Challenges, CLE presentation for Southwest Law Journal Air Law Symposium (on file with
the author) (discussing the attorney's procedural and ethical obligations when filing litiga-
tion and the problem of pursuing the close case); cf. Donald N. Bersoff, Judicial Deference
to Nonlegal Decisionmakers: Imposing Simplistic Solutions on Problems of Cognitive Com-
plexity in Mental Disability Law, 46 SMU L. REV. 329, 337 (1992) (Bersoff discusses the
contribution of cognitive psychology to the understanding of human decision making, in
particular the "barriers to accurate judgment that negatively impinge upon the reliability
and validity of human decisionmaking generally." He cites and discusses a variety of psy-
chological and legal literature which looks at the problems inherent in legal decision mak-
ing, particularly the problem of predicting legal outcomes.). See generally Paul Slovic et
al., Facts Versus Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCER-
TAINTY: HEURISTIC AND BIASES 463 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982); Atmos Tversky
& Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristic and Biases, in JUDGMENT
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTIC AND BIASES 3 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982)(discussing the way in which individuals use a variety of heuristic principals to help themjudge the likelihood of an event occurring). Interestingly enough the issue of prediction
and judgment has also been addressed by mathematicians and scientists who express con-
cern that "lay" individuals do not understand the laws of probability and tend to predict,
that is, form inferences about the likely occurrences of future events, based on erroneous
information. The development of a legal judgment regarding the likelihood of success of a
claim, its ability to survive challenges to its legal and factual merits, and the likelihood that
the fact finder, be it judge or jury, will be persuaded by the inferential structure con-
structed by the attorney is an exceedingly complex piece of reasoning. See RICHARD Nis-
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terized as 'intuitive scientists.' Information is processed through beliefs,
theories, propositions, and schemas. These knowledge structures enable
us to label and categorize objects rapidly and, in most cases, correctly." 240
Acting as an "intuitive scientist," it seemed to me, as a practicing attor-
ney, that if I could articulate the balance of the factors considered in de-
ciding whether a case had sufficient merit to warrant suit as a "close call"
or a "close case," not necessarily equal or balanced, then the "possibility"
or even "probability" of failure should not be determinative of the legal
and ethical decision to file the litigation.241 It also seemed that the same
conceptual framework should apply to the sitting jurist.
However, as the appellate case law developed in the Rule 11 arena,
and the appellate courts began deferring to trial courts on close cases for
purposes of Rule 11 sanctions, it appeared that the institutional balance
had shifted in a way that undermined the adjudicative role of the courts
and lawyers in a Rule 11 decision. While I understood the institutional
logic of the Supreme Court in wanting to conserve scarce judicial re-
sources and not "reinvestigate" a close sanction decision, preferring in-
stead to defer to the skill of the trial judge,242 it seemed that even posing
the issue as one involving a close case raised questions about the legiti-
macy of the sanction itself.243 If practitioners and jurists could agree that
the sanctions call was "close," either because it was a close call on the
BETT & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL
JUDGMENT 274-80 (1980).
240. Bersoff, supra note 239, at 338 (citations omitted). Some of the traditional analytic
schemes used by lawyers, such as the tripartite division of legal analysis into: (1) an analy-
sis of the law; (2) a determination of the facts; and (3) the application of the law to those
facts, have been criticized recently. See supra part III (challenging the analytic categories
of "law-fact" and the appellate jurisprudence which relies on these categories); supra notes
52-73 and accompanying text (discussing Yablon's challenge to the one dimensionality of
the schema-"judicial discretion"-by pointing out the different "skill" dimensions of the
judge involved in different types of "discretionary" decisions).
241. The close case is used in this Article as a "schema" developed by attorneys and
judges to reflect the problem of certainty or predictability regarding legal outcomes. See
supra parts IV.B.3 & V.A. (discussing how trial courts use the close case as a way to articu-
late the conscious dimensions of their discretion). The problem of "predicting" legal out-
comes with any level of certainty or the ability to "quantify" poses one of the most difficult
aspects of an attorney's legal judgment. Cf. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, LEGAL EDU-
CATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM, REPORT OF
THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP 135-221
(1992); ROBERT M. BASTRESS & JOSEPH D. HARBAUGH, INTERVIEWING, COUNSELING
AND NEGOTIATING: SKILLS FOR EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION 235-37 (1990); DAVID A.
BINDER & PAUL BERGMAN, FACT INVESTIGATION: FROM HYPOTHESIS TO PROOF 162-89
(1984) (discussing the challenge in developing the legal theory of the case, both its legal
and factual basis); KENNY F. HEGLAND, TRIAL AND PRACTICE SKILLS 27 (1994) (discussing
the need to bring creativity to the process of case development); RICHARD K. NEUMANN,
JR., LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL WRITING: STRUCTURE, STRATEGY AND STYLE § 5.2
(1994) (discussing the need for creativity in developing the legal and factual theories of a
case in order to discharge the obligation of thorough and zealous representation).
242. See infra notes 275-78 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Cooter & Gel).
243. See supra notes 238-57 (posing the alternative as a way to articulate the sanctions
analysis-would another jurist or practitioner disagree with me about the sanctionability of
this litigation, and consistent with the "reasonable attorney" approach of the case law,
while more explicitly focusing on the conundrum of the close case).
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adequacy of the prefiling inquiry and analysis, on the merits whether fac-
tual or legal, on the purpose in bringing the litigation, or on the need to
sanction for deterrent purposes, there should not be sanctions.244
When viewed from this perspective, the close case seemed to capture a
dimension of uncertainty in the decision to sanction which should be re-
solved in favor of the litigant. The logic of discretion, accepting compet-
ing alternatives that fall within the zone of possibilities, appeared in this
context to be the illogic of discretion: accepting a sanction decision in a
close case even if the decision not to sanction would have been
acceptable.
If, as proposed, the decisional alternatives in a close case can be con-
sciously posed as opposites, what norms should determine the final deci-
sion, the selection of one or the other? The paradigm of the close case
offers a way, albeit a somewhat intuitive way, to articulate the conflict in
institutional and adjudicative norms that come into play at this point:
norms seeking to justify the expansive application of the court's sanction
powers on pragmatic grounds and norms seeking to ensure adherence to
the traditional adjudicative values of the legal paradigm. Use of the close
case as a decisional methodology mandates articulation of the judicial de-
cision making, particularly the normative considerations limiting inter-
ception and those warranting aggressive sanctions. In this way, the close
case by rendering conscious the adjudicative and institutional norms at
play in a sanction decision will help fill in the gap in the jurisprudence of
Rule 11.245
V. THE "ILL" LOGIC OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION-
SANCTIONING THE CLOSE CASE UNDER RULE 11
Without a bright line to guide the courts, what results in a close Rule 11
sanctions case is a head-on collision between the institutional and judicial
norms discussed above. The court's pragmatism, the institutional and ju-
dicial norms of efficient dispute resolution, litigation management, and
specialized judicial competence are currently critical of adversarialism
and seek to restrict marginal litigation through the expansive use of judi-
cial sanctions. The court's traditional role, grounded in the institutional
norm of an open accessible court system and the judicial norm of re-
straint, favors adjudication, the legal model of dispute resolution, and
views adversarialism as essential to that legal process.
How should the balance be struck in a close case? The 1983 amend-
ments to Rule 11, in particular the exhortation in the Advisory Commit-
tee Note to the federal judiciary to use sanctions more aggressively,
244. See infra notes 258-78 and accompanying text (if the Rule 11 standards are linked
to objectively identified and developed standards of "practice," then the relevant proactive
community's perception of the reasonableness of the litigation should form the basis of the
sanctions analysis).
245. See Louis, supra note 8 (discussing the need for a Rule 11 jurisprudence that




coupled with the stated goal of procedural reform to improve the effi-
ciency of the courts, has routinely been cited to tip the balance, in many
cases, in favor of sanctions. 246 But the continued pressure of a judge's
thumb on the sanction scale is no longer defensible. The sanctions pen-
dulum is swinging back 247 and the problems outlined in the Advisory
Committee's Call for Comment, the structure of the 1993 revisions to
Rule 11, and the supporting Advisory Committee Note indicate a move
away from an aggressive sanctioning policy, appended to indeterminate
legal standards. This shift in perspective should help guide the future en-
forcement of the rule, but it does not necessarily solve the problem of the
close case.
As developed in this Article, the close case defines the grey area of the
court's discretion to sanction under Rule 11, and in a Rule 11 close case,
the court should err on the side of no sanction. The broad rhetorical use
of the term in federal case law in general is at least some evidence that
the formulation of the close case has intuitive appeal to the judiciary as a
way to express their awareness that they are working at the margins of
their discretion and, regardless of what they decide, they can consciously
pose the opposite as an acceptable alternative. In a Rule 11 case where
this level of uncertainty can be articulated and disagreement within the
interpretive community predicted or projected-if the trial judge can
consciously articulate the proposition that some portion of the profes-
sional interpretive community would disagree with the decision to sanc-
tion-it cannot be said that the lawyer has violated the acceptable norms
of practice in a manner warranting sanctions.248
It is not hard to see how tolerance of conflicting outcomes in close
cases, a position that has characterized the case law to date, has given rise
to an inconsistent body of precedent depending on the institutional and
judicial norms given play in the Rule 11 decision. A sitting judge taking a
pragmatic approach might look at the question of whether the attorney
had reasonably believed a claim was warranted by the law, or a nonfrivo-
lous argument for its change, more restrictively than a judge applying the
competing norms of a court system open to a wide range of adversarial
conduct and creative, albeit marginal, adjudication. 249 The first judge's
reliance on her special competence and expertise in the field of litigation
management might make her more inclined to pursue an aggressive sanc-
tion policy while the latter judge's seeming reluctance to sanction can as
easily be viewed as the appropriate application of the norms of judicial
246. See supra notes 74-98 (discussing Cooter & Gell and the need to amend the rule to
avoid its over-inclusive application).
247. See Louis, supra note 8 (discussing Resnik, the growing critique of the judicial
reforms of the 1980s, and the swing of the pendulum away from managerial concerns and
back to more traditional adjudicative concerns).
248. If some portion of the relevant interpretive community can be said to support the
attorney, which is exactly what is being said when a case is characterized as a close case,
there should not be any sanctions.
249. See supra notes 173-82 and accompanying text (discussing the court's application
of the reasonable attorney standard in a close case).
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restraint. The first judge might find the impact of any given piece of
doubtful litigation on the courts more onerous than the latter, since the
latter does not view the social impact of the litigation within as narrow an
institutional context. The first judge might determine that more punitive
sanctions are needed to deter such conduct on the part of this litigant
(and others similarly situated) than the latter judge who views the utiliza-
tion of court resources in this type of adjudication as less deleterious to
the overall functioning of the courts.
In this context, it is very difficult to weigh these competing norms with-
out weighing the relative "value" of the litigation,250 which is precisely
why jurists resort to simplistic exhortations of one or the other of the
institutional norms to justify their decision. It is also the reason why com-
mentators routinely point to the potential patterns of bias that permeate
the Rule 11 case law when arguing in favor of a more restrictive jurispru-
dence to guide its application. Using the close case as a decisional touch-
stone in the Rule 11 sanctions arena helps resolve these problems by
posing the norms of judicial restraint as the adjudicative and institutional
norms likely to generate the most consistent results when coupled with
the "logic of discretion," and the norms that should guide the sanction
decision.251 Used in this way, the close case helps avoid the precarious
task of valuing particular types of litigation as a way to decide between
competing outcomes. This is already a problem of some dimension in the
Rule 11 arena.252 Finally, the close case approach addresses both the "il-
logic" of a sanction in a close case and the problems associated with that
illogic: the problematic relationship between sanctions and the theory of
deterrence in the close case; the problem of synchronization-decisional
inconsistency generating restrictive precedent in the sanctions arena; and
the problem of accountability and allocating the risk of error.
A. VARIABILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY-USING THE CLOSE CASE TO
REALLOCATE THE RISK OF TOLERABLE ERROR
How do theories of judicial discretion allocate the risk of variability? 253
And who should bear the risk of variability in a close case, a case in which
a "no sanction decision" would have been as acceptable as the decision to
sanction? The variability in decisional outputs that prompted the revision
of Rule 11 would appear to have exceeded the predictable and acceptable
"wobble" that reflects the inevitable give and take of the adjudicative
250. See supra notes 89 and 93 (discussing the empirical bias of Rule 11).
251. See supra note 193 (discussing the norm of judicial restraint).
252. See Tobias, supra note 44 (discussing the differential impact of Rule 11 on civil
rights plaintiffs reflecting an implicit devaluation of such litigation).
253. This issue is seldom raised because of the trap of tautology: a legitimate exercise
of discretion generates acceptable variability. There is no error and therefore no risk of
error associated with variability that needs to be allocated. See supra note 239 (discussing
the reductivism of this analysis of variability).
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process. 254 The concern of the commentators, profession, and Advisory
Committee with the lack of uniformity and predictability in the Rule 11
case law was concern generated by a level of decisional inconsistency
255
that was perceived as unacceptable or problematic because it fell outside
of the "zone of possibilities" tolerable within the legal paradigm. 256 Un-
acceptable decisional inconsistency may have varied causes and may re-
quire different strategies, but on this point the Advisory Committee lets
us down.257 In its commentary on the revisions to the rule, the Advisory
Committee treats "variability" as reductively as it treats discretion. There
is no effort to give it substantive content, or even through the use of ex-
amples to define its unacceptable parameters. While the Committee talks
about variability, it never identifies the cases that should not have been
sanctioned or those that should have. On the one hand, it views the vari-
ability in Rule 11 decisions as problematic, but on the other hand, it ap-
pears willing to live with that variability to the extent it cannot be
eradicated.
Efforts to eradicate inconsistency in the application of a rule of law
require careful analysis of patterns and cases in order to identify both the
dimensions and the causes of the unacceptable variability. The Commit-
tee's reductive analysis of discretion, indeterminacy, and variability un-
dermines any such effort.258 There is acceptable and unacceptable
variability, but the Committee never attempts to distinguish between the
two in the Rule 11 context; it certainly provides no decisional guidelines
on this point.259 Instead the Advisory Committee in its Note merely reaf-
firms the broad delegation of discretion under Rule 11, citing Cooter &
Gell as on point. 260 Unfortunately, the Cooter Court's adoption of the
unitary abuse of discretion standard as the appellate standard for all as-
pects of the Rule 11 decision, accepts variability in outcomes, including
competing sanction decisions, defines variability widely to include a lim-
254. See Brilmayer, supra note 83, at 373-75 (identifying the acceptable wobble or vari-
ability in judicial decisions that is not seen as undermining the legitimacy of the "rule of
law").
255. See supra note 6 (discussing the Call for Comment and the Advisory Committee's
expressed, albeit unarticulated, concern about variability); cf Thompson, supra note 83, at
425 (describing Brilmayer's wobble as defining decisional inconsistency in an overly reduc-
tive manner and thereby failing to distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable
variability).
256. See Brilmayer, supra note 83, at 375 (arguing that the institutional legitimacy of the
courts rests on the perception that cases are decided according to legal principles not per-
sonal biases or preferences).
257. See Thompson, supra note 83, at 427-30. Thompson discusses the distinctions be-
tween "inevitable inconsistency" and "bias inconsistency." He argues that the first cate-
gory is not to be equated with judicial error while the latter is unacceptable, that is, error, if
avoidable.
258. See supra part II.A. (discussing the Call for Comment).
259. See Thompson, supra note 83, at 427 (discussing variability that is inherent in the
process and variability that is unacceptable).
260. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
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ited right to be wrong,261 and then shifts the risk of conflicting outcomes
in close cases to the sanctioned litigant. It is the sanctioned party who
bears the risk of what the institution has decided is a "tolerable level of
error.
262
In Pierce v. Underwood,263 a case relied upon extensively by the
Supreme Court in the Cooter & Gell decision, the Court looked at the
question of this risk from an institutional perspective. Was it legitimate
for the Court to impose this risk of error upon the Government, the party
targeted by the disputed fee shift?264 The Court was concerned that
adopting an abuse of discretion standard as the standard for appellate
review for an attorney fee shift under the Equal Access to Justice Act
(EAJA) would have an adverse impact on the litigants, both the private
plaintiff and the governmental defendant.265 The Pierce Court's evalua-
tion of this risk included express consideration of the fact that use of the
abuse of discretion standard creates an institutionally protected zone
within which the exercise of the trial court's discretion is not closely scru-
tinized.266 The Supreme Court acknowledged in Pierce that this lack of
appellate review in the award of attorney's fees under the EAJA impacts
the perceived risk of litigation.267 It was therefore crucial to the Supreme
Court's analysis that the creation of this risk had been expressly ad-
dressed by Congress in the legislative process leading up to the adoption
of the statutory fee shift. From the Court's perspective, Congress's ex-
press consideration of this shift in the risk of error to the government
defendant was an essential analytic predicate to their adoption of the
"abuse of discretion" standard for appellate review. Under the EAJA,
Congress shifted the risk of error, the problem of variability, and the po-
tential over-inclusive application of the fee shift to itself, the government,
and so long as this was done explicitly, the Court had no problem adopt-
ing the abuse of discretion standard for appellate review. 268 The Cooter
261. See Rosenberg, supra note 66, at 655 (discussing the fact that the abuse of discre-
tion standard tolerates even more variability, and an increased margin of error, than that
tolerated under general theories of discretion).
262. Rosenberg, supra note 66, at 661-65 (questioning whether the abuse of discretion
standard creates a zone of institutionally acceptable error thereby making a "wrong" ruling
unassailable); cf Thompson, supra note 83, at 425 (discussing the problem of reductive
analysis in the treatment of variability).
263. 487 U.S. 552 (1988).
264. Id. at 560-68.
265. Id. at 563.
266. Id. at 561-63.
267. Id. at 563.
268. Discretion is neither license nor prerogative; the legitimate exercise of institutional
power through judicial discretion cannot exist without accountability. A major attribute of
judicial accountability lies, not in the existence of standards that can be applied to the trial
court's decision, but in their enforceability. See Christie, supra note 66, at 753. Accounta-
bility mandates that the judge's decision "must be made on the basis of a circumscribed set
of criteria" and she can be criticized for how she uses or fails to use the "range of criteria
that are available to the decision maker for the making of his choices." Id. Without these
constraints, judicial decision making is not an exercise of discretion, but rather an exercise
of license, prerogative, or legislative action. The institutional tension inherent in the re-
quirement of accountability, the "urge to expand the scope of discretion" countering the
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Court's reliance upon Pierce in adopting the abuse of discretion standard
in Rule 11 cases is an example of the Court's reductive use of the concept
of judicial discretion. It is also an example of the Court's misplaced reli-
ance upon the institutional "logic of discretion" on pragmatic grounds-if
the decision could go either way, either should be acceptable at the appel-
late level-without considering its substantive impact.
The fee shifting statute of the EAJA is a merger of both incentive and
deterrent fee shifts and is clearly distinguishable from the typical Rule 11
fee shift which is designed primarily as a deterrent provision. The EAJA
authorizes plaintiffs to recover their fees in successful litigation against
the federal government (an incentive fee shift) only if the government's
position is not well founded (the deterrent dimension of the fee shift).
The EAJA standard is less generous than the typical incentive fee shift.
Winning the litigation is not enough to justify awarding the plaintiff fees,
and, in this respect, the EAJA protects the governmental defendant by
refusing to impose upon it the duty to pay attorneys, linked simply to a
loss on the merits. The government's obligation to pay is structured along
the lines of a deterrent fee shift. The duty to pay the successful litigant is
linked to a finding that the government posed a questionable defense, a
standard less forgiving than the typical "frivolous litigation" standard
used in most deterrent fee shifting statutes, but more protective than a
pure merits-based fee shift.269 If the fee shift in the EAJA is viewed as an
incentive fee shift, shifting fees to the litigant to encourage the bringing of
litigation, Congress's ability to limit a plaintiff's recovery is not problem-
atic. If viewed as a deterrent fee shift statute, Congress's ability to apply
an enhanced deterrence standard to itself as the defendant and sole
source of attorney's fees is also unquestioned. 270
The only decisions with a punitive or "chilling" effect under the EAJA
are those awarding fees against the government itself; a denial of fees
simply leaves the plaintiff in the position they would have been under the
American Rule. The Court's concern in Pierce was shifting a higher risk
of sanctions to the government, and thereby "chilling" their advocacy,
because of the expansive range of variability tolerable within the appel-
late "abuse of discretion" standard. Even after acknowledging Con-
gress's ability to voluntarily assume this risk of variability and the
potential over-inclusive application of the fee shift, the Pierce Court
found comfort in what they perceived to be the limited risk of substantial
sanctions associated with such awards. 271 Looking at the available data
they determined that most such fee shifts were relatively small and thus
did not pose a substantial risk to the government.
"urge to narrow the scope of discretion," leads to a requirement of reviewability, albeit
limited. Id. at 754-71.
269. See supra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing fee shifts).
270. See Burbank, supra note 5, at 1003-05 (discussing Congress's power to enact a
broad range of fee shifting statutes).
271. Pierce, 487 U.S. at 563 (finding the amount of potential liability was clearly a con-
sideration "militating against the use of" the abuse of discretion standard).
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In the Rule 11 arena, the same risk of error exists and there is the same
problematic lack of accountability. In these circumstances, should the
courts be able to allocate this risk against private litigants in the same way
Congress allocated it against itself? Rule 11 sanction decisions do not fit
the Pierce analysis and the only justification offered by the Supreme
Court in lieu of Pierce is the pragmatic one of relying upon the "logic of
discretion." The Supreme Court, in Cooter & Gell, argued that the per-
ceived marginal utility of appellate intervention in generating a "better"
or "correct" Rule 11 decision is not viewed as worth the institutional
costs of time, effort, and resources.272 However, unlike Pierce, many of
the fee sanctions awarded under Rule 11 are substantial and thus judicial
errors, mistakes, or disagreements about the sanctionability of the con-
duct cannot be dismissed as de minimis. More importantly, Rule 11 er-
rors in the award of attorney's fees are punitive in nature with potentially
broad impact over and above the fee itself.273 Rule 11 is not a substan-
tive fee provision and does not represent enactment of formal legislative
policy in which the adverse or "chilling" impact of bad or overly broad
sanction decisions was addressed via the political process. 274 It is a crea-
ture of the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court's treatment of Rule 11 is at odds with its own anal-
ysis of substantive fee shifting in Pierce. In Cooter & Gell,275 the
Supreme Court cited Pierce as controlling authority for the application of
an "abuse of discretion" standard in Rule 11 sanction cases, yet the
Cooter Court ignored the Pierce Court's analysis of the problem of ac-
countability and risk allocation it had deemed central to the resolution of
the fee shifting problem in that case.276 The substantive risks created by a
deferential appellate standard were acknowledged by the Cooter Court.
Such a standard impacts the application of the fee shift leading to its
overly broad, or narrow, interpretation and application. But the Cooter
Court ignored the Pierce Court's critical concern: reconciling judicial dis-
cretion and principled decision making by defining the scope of variabil-
ity tolerable within the traditional legal paradigm. The Pierce court
acknowledged that the appellate abuse of discretion standard removes
the restraint of review and anticipates a wider range of decisions than
might otherwise be tolerable.277 That was a concern.
The Cooter Court's decision contrasts sharply with Pierce on this point.
Rather than viewing the "discretionary" play in the rule as necessitating
judicial oversight to ensure adherence to the traditional norms of adjudi-
cation, Cooter treated the broad delegation of discretion to the trial court
272. See supra notes 156-59 and accompanying text (discussing Cooter & Gell).
273. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (discussing the "chilling" impact of Rule
11 sanctions).
274. See Burbank, supra note 5.
275. See supra notes 153-59 and accompanying text.
276. Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 403.
277. See Rosenberg, supra note 66, at 661 (discussing the creation of a category of pro-




under Rule 11 as requiring appellate deference to the "real politick" of
Rule 11, the trial court's pragmatic adjudication of the sanction decision.
The Supreme Court's pragmatism is no where more obvious than on this
point when it argues that the trial court's special competence should be
given full play in working out the parameters of Rule 11.278
The Cooter Court's analysis of the trade-off between the marginal util-
ity in terms of more consistent, predictable, and uniform Rule 11 deci-
sions, to be gained by the institution from policing judicial error in this
regulatory grey area and the costs associated with that appellate review,
assumes the answer to the question-who should bear the risk of judicial
variability and error? In such a contest between the individual litigant
and the institution, the litigant loses. However, as discussed above, the
"illogic" of discretion in the sanctions context argues for just the opposite
result. Why aren't the parameters of the rule to be worked out via a pol-
icy of deference, crafting boundaries only when it is clear that the stan-
dards of Rule 11 have been violated? There should only be sanctions
when there is no close case, when the opposite cannot be fairly posed as
an alternative outcome with adherents within the interpretive commu-
nity. The close case helps reallocate the risk of variability and lack of
accountability in Rule 11, putting it where it belongs, with the courts not
the litigants.
B. THE THEORY OF DETERRENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF SANCTIONS
IN A CLOSE CASE
The "problem of fee awards in close cases" 279 has been addressed in
other contexts. Such awards have a potential over-deterrent impact in a
system in which predictable outcomes do not abound; an impact which
undermines the institutional value of access to the courts.280 Such awards
also raise a question of the fairness implicit in shifting the cost of litiga-
tion in a close case to the losing litigant. 281
278. Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 401-05 (discussing the trial court's competence to han-
dle these matters on a case-by-case basis); see Armour, supra note 12, at 730 nn.261-336.
279. Rowe, supra note 45, at 667; see also Toran, supra note 222, at 324 (Toran discusses
the potential unfairness of mandatory attorney fee payments in close cases: "There is ap-
parently no flexibility within the English system to alleviate the harsh penalty that a plain-
tiff may pay in a close case ...." To leave the issue to the court's discretion does not solve
the problem because of the potential threat of lack of uniformity in decisions.); Claire E.
Winold, Institutionalizing an Experiment. The Extension of the Equal Access to Justice
Act-Questions Resolved, Questions Remaining, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. Rv. 925 (1987). Wi-
nold notes that "[i]t is important that the Act's original intent be carefully considered in.
close cases. Courts deciding whether to award fees to litigants who prevail against the
government should consider the original purposes of EAJA: to counterbalance conditions
tending to deter private citizens from challenging unjustified governmental actions." Wi-
nold, supra, at 947. The only solution is to not award fees in a close case; that is the result
consistent overall with the structure of the fee shift.
280. See Rowe, supra note 45, at 669-71.
281. Rationales supporting fee shifts include: (1) the fairness argument which favors
indemnification of the injured winner, the fee shift as ensuring full compensation for the
winner's legal injury; (2) punitive fee shifts which punish conduct in the transaction giving
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The rationale of deterrence justifying fee shifts is undermined in the
context of cases where the outcomes are not uniformly predictable, par-
ticularly the problematic close or hard case.282 If the "system's substan-
tive law, procedural practices, and judicial staffing" make litigation
results "generally rather predictable," then fee shifts can be justified on
grounds that the loser "probably should have known better and should
not have imposed on others the costs" of the litigation. 283 But that is not
the case in the current federal system284 where a major defect is the lack
of procedures which allow for early identification and resolution of merit-
less claims. 285 The question has been raised numerous times: if the court
cannot determine the merits of a case without a full trial or the substan-
tial investment of resources via pretrial procedures, should it really be
allowed to penalize the litigant on grounds they should have had the fore-
sight to predict the legal outcomes with a sufficient degree of certainty
that they would have advised their client not to pursue judicial relief? 286
Even then, how can it be clearly said that the case has no other institu-
tional value, justifying the transactional costs to the institution and to the
litigants, with reference to the larger political or social context within
which such litigation occurs? 287
The limited deterrent rationale for Rule 11 fee shifts represents a sig-
nificant change in perspective and warrants a rethinking of the impact of
sanctions in a close case. This rationale carries great weight in a context in
which social policies and institutional norms disfavor litigation as a means
of resolving disputes or of addressing legal issues. Yet less than fifteen
years ago commentary on this point rejected the deterrent justification
rise to the litigation or in the conduct of the litigation itself; and (3) incentive fee shifts
both to encourage suits and to equalize litigation power. See id. at 653-66.
282. Id. at 655-56.
283. Id. at 655.
284. Id. at 655-56.
285. See Louis, supra note 8 (discussing the need to chill some dimension of advocacy);
cf WILLOING, supra note 81, at 1060-61 (discussing the fact that attorneys are raising their
threshold requirements for close cases).
286. Amended Rule 11 attempts to link a sanction decision to the interception system,
noting that failing to survive a summary judgment raises questions about the claim and
surviving summary judgment raises a protective shield. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory
committee's note. Contra supra notes 140-83 and accompanying text (discussing the role of
the advocate and their perspective on close cases).
287. There is very little within the Rule 11 commentary which looks at the social cost
dimension of litigation in a positive light. While it is generally conceded that transaction
costs associated with litigation are high, merely complaining about those costs fails to ad-
dress the value of litigation within both the legal and political systems-developing the law
and legitimating the judicial process. The point has been made that this bias reflects an
increasingly narrow, privatistic view of litigation as merely the inefficient resolution of pri-
vate disputes, a sign of irrational or dysfunctional behavior, and ignores the social and
political function of litigation and the court system. The assumption that such cost-benefit
analysis is essentially amoral, carrying within it its own normative justification, simply ig-
nores the inherent tension within the judicial system between these two competing views.
See Louis, supra note 83; Resnik, supra note 103. The discussion between Louis and Res-
nik surrounds the historical swings within the federal system, some favoring limiting access
and others more access, the dynamic reflecting the constant adjustment in the tension be-
tween these two institutional core values.
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for fee shifting as inapplicable to the American context: "[I]f litigation is
somewhat frowned upon, then [a fee shift] seems desirable. American
attitudes, however, tend to regard litigation as everyone's right and to
emphasize the importance of not excessively hindering access to
justice." 288
The Rule 11 sanction, justified as a deterrent to frivolous litigation, not
on grounds of compensation or equitable fairness, fits within this general
punitive rationale for fee shifts.289 In this context, it is not litigation per
se which is viewed as undesirable, but certain misconduct associated with
that litigation.290 The fee shift may be aimed at either, or both, deterring
the aggravated misconduct in the future and compensating the party for
the "pecuniary loss in the form of undeserved legal expenses" in the pres-
ent.29 1 But it is difficult to make the misconduct argument and avoid the
over-deterrence argument in a close case. In these cases, Rule 11 context
cases in which the sanction decision could have gone either way, the call
is so close that the deterrence argument simply does not apply:
Presumably, we often do not want to deter good-faith pressing of
tenable but not clear-cut claims and defenses, especially those turn-
ing on unresolved points of law or, in many instances, genuinely con-
troverted factual disputes. No blame attaches to such litigation, and
it does not call for strong deterrence. Any fee shifting against an
unsuccessful party in such a situation should rest on grounds other
than punishment or deterrence of litigation.292
The problem in the Rule 11 context is that the link between the underly-
ing rationale for a fee shift or sanctions policy and the scope of judicial
discretion in the close case is ignored. 293
Only if a fee shifting rationale focuses on the party who may be re-
quired to pay fees, such as administering punishment for unjustifi-
able bringing of or resistance to litigation, should there be discomfort
in shifting fees generally in close cases. In such a case, these kinds of
rationales do not apply: the defendant acted reasonably and, given
the closeness of the case, represents neither a desirable target for
deterrence nor one likely to be deterred. Consequently, if such
288. Rowe, supra note 45, at 656 (citations omitted).
289. Id. at 660-61.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 660. The most obvious point to be made is that there is no necessary rela-
tionship between the need for and formulation of a sanction and tying that sanction to
attorney's fees. Id. This problem arose in the Rule 11 context and was debated throughout
the commentary. What should be the standard for the sanction, compensation or deter-
rence? The revised rule clearly lands on the side of deterrence, rejecting the argument
outright that Rule 11 has any role in compensating litigants for the cost of the litigation. It
is inevitable, however, that the sanction will be tied to fees since it is in situations involving
misconduct that the rationale of punishment and the rationale of making a party whole
coincide. Id. at 660-61. Even then, the amount of the adversary's legal fee incurred as a
direct result of the misconduct will not provide a measure calculated in terms of maximum
deterrence or punishment, assuming the costs of the frivolous litigation extend beyond the
parameters of the individual case. Id. at 661.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 670.
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loser-focused rationales are the basis for a fee shifting policy, close
cases would be appropriate ones for denial of fee awards. 294
The solution, as proposed by Professor Rowe, is to avoid attorney fee
shifts, even in the guise of sanctions, in the close case as an appropriate
exercise of the discretionary norm of judicial restraint and deference to
the norms of an open, accessible judicial system.295
C. DECISIONAL INCONSISTENCY, SYNCHRONIZATION, AND THE
PROBLEM OF PRECEDENT
Using the close case as a potential bright line for affirmatively deter-
mining the scope of Rule 11 will assist the routine and necessary develop-
ment of appellate case law interpreting the rule. To date, the close case
has been used as an analytical or rhetorical device of the appellate courts
to describe cases in which the trial court decision could have gone either
way. The appellate court might disagree with the direction selected by
the trial judge, but in this case they would not reverse, preferring to defer
to the lower court's judicial competence. This is the logical structure of
appellate decisions routinely rendered under the abuse of discretion stan-
dard of appellate review, the applicable standard in all Rule 11 cases.
The limited utility of such appellate case law is obvious. A close case,
although not reversible, does not represent a fixed limit on the trial
court's exercise of its discretion in the future; it merely defines the trial
court's decision as falling within the range of permissible decisions. The
Rule 11 case law is full of examples of close cases, usually decisions to
sanction, with which the appellate court may have disagreed, but which it
refused to treat as a mistake or reversible error because of judicial defer-
ence.296 A close case affirmed under the abuse of discretion standard
merely tells the next trial court that this particular decision falls within
the range of decisions available in a similar case. It does not, however,
direct or otherwise limit the future decision, even if that decision is to
select the opposite result in a similar case.
A case reversed under the abuse of discretion standard has the oppo-
site import. It represents the appellate court's attempt to carve out or
render off-limits a decision that was viewed by the trial court as falling
within the range of acceptable alternatives, the scope of the court's dis-
cretion. This type of appellate decision is expressly intended to guide and
limit future trial court decisions when similar facts and circumstances
arise. Yet affirmances and reversals under the abuse of discretion meld
294. Id. at 671. Furthermore, Rowe argues:
Limiting punitive or deterrent fee shifting to clear-cut cases eases another
aspect of the close-case problem-the nagging feeling that we may com-
pound injustice to the loser because of the significant chance that the court
was wrong on the merits of the case. To the extent that shifting takes place
only in cases involving abuse, the likelihood of its being associated with judi-
cial error declines sharply.
Id n.97 (citations omitted).
295. See supra notes 239-49 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 162-85 and accompanying text.
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into a single amorphous mass of case law, not readily distinguished or
distinguishable on this point.
The arguments favoring a deferential attitude toward the trial court's
decision to sanction or not to sanction reflect pragmatic institutional con-
cerns. The expressed concern is that any further investment of judicial
resources in the form of an extensive appellate review process cannot
produce a better answer. The result could not be better because it is the
trial court that is in the best position to develop legal standards on a case-
by-case basis, giving content to seemingly indeterminate rules. Further-
more, it is the trial court's hands on perspective, its special competence in
dealing with the day to day practice of law, which guides the development
of this jurisprudence and provides a better institutional perspective on
the problem of frivolous litigation. The Supreme Court's derogation of
the adjudicative competence of the appellate courts as compared to the
trial courts is at the heart of the Cooter & Gell decision; their forced reli-
ance on the written record, their enforced distance from the practice of
law, and their lack of any special expertise warranting intervention. 297 As
between the trial and appellate courts, said the Supreme Court, it makes
sense to defer to the trial court's determinations.
The Supreme Court's pragmatic policy of appellate deference, defer-
ring to the special competence of the trial court, poses a direct challenge
to the traditional adjudicative paradigm. On the other hand, deference
warranted solely on grounds of resource allocation or efficiency accepts
the hypothesis that conflicting outcomes in similar cases do not constitute
legal error, or at least fall within an acceptable range of legal variability.
The Supreme Court could make a comparable decision, but why invest
judicial resources to do so? Appellate deference to competing outcomes
also rejects the proposition that there is one correct legal answer to the
posed sanction problem.298
As usually understood, error requires two things. First, there must
be a hypothetical result, determined by the relevant decision making
inputs, which is inconsistent with the actual result. This is the re-
quirement of determinacy. Second, it must be the case that the ac-
tual result should have conformed to that hypothetical result. This is
the requirement of direction of fit.
Both of these characteristics present problems for legal systems.
The difficulty with determinacy concerns whether there are pre-ex-
isting right answers to legal problems. The difficulty with the second
concerns the coercive effect of the decision that is actually made. In
both cases, however-for determinacy and direction of fit-the pri-
mary source of the problem is the legal system's devout respect for
process values, or at least for rationalizations based upon process
297. 496 U.S. at 401-05.
298. See Brilmayer, supra note 83; Lempert, supra note 84; Scott, supra note 185;
Thompson, supra note 83; Victor J. Gold, Comment, Jury Wobble: Judicial Tolerance of




The problem in the Rule 11 context is to reconcile the reality of error.
Decisions are reversed based on findings that the trial courts have abused
their discretion, with the over-arching legal premise that different results
can be tolerated based on the same set of facts without either implicating
the other as an error.300 This latter concept has been developed in the
theoretical literature on indeterminacy301 and in the judicially con-
structed appellate theory of deference in a close case. Both the theoreti-
cian and the pragmatist recognize that the reality of the "give and take"
of the law is "wobble," the acceptability of different outcomes, none of
which are treated as legal error.30 2 The problem is that the theory of
judicial discretion tied to this conception of legal indeterminacy and ac-
ceptable variability in legal outcomes must generate results that fall
within an acceptable range if it is not to undermine the legitimacy of the
judicial system. An overly reductive view of variability, or legal wobble,
fails to acknowledge that some measure or dimension of variability is not
tolerable and fails to provide any guidance in determining when it occurs
or what it looks like. It is important to keep in mind that the judicial
system produces two distinct products. To the extent the system is
designed to generate a decision in a given case resolving a particular dis-
pute, variability in outcomes raises questions of fairness in terms of the
perceived rights of parties to be treated the same as others. To the extent
the system is designed to generate law in the form of precedent according
to which individuals can order their future conduct, variability will ulti-
mately result in the over-inclusive application of the rule of law or its
more punitive interpretation gaining sway. For example, in a Rule 11
context, consider two similar cases decided by different judges with differ-
ent outcomes; one results in sanctions, the other doesn't, and both are
affirmed on appeal under the abuse of discretion standard. Neither case
should be treated as anything other than affirming the court's discretion
to act as they did, and a third judge facing the problem is free to decide
either way. However, the deterrent impact of the sanction case poses a
serious threat, since in the sanction case law, it will be the adverse sanc-
tions cases that begin to define the boundaries of Rule 11 and guide a
litigant's behavior. Thus, the two cases are not treated equally in the real
world of practice, although the logic of the close case and theory of "ap-
pellate deference" argues that they should be.30 3
299. Brilmayer, supra note 83, at 363.
300. Id.
301. See supra part II.A.
302. "Wobble" is a term developed and used by Professor Brilmayer to reflect the fact
of institutional indeterminacy and "means that the result is not a unique function of the
relevant inputs." Brilmayer, supra note 83, at 365-66. Wobble is used to describe these
differences without relying upon the notion of error, that is, objectively right and wrong
answers. Id.
303. Brilmayer discusses this concept in the context of talking about decisions that are
applied to give rise to consistency, and yet the original decision is not a determinate result
of the decisional process. Id. at 373. The point is that decision makers respond differently
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Evaluating precedent of this type is problematic. One of the problems,
of course, is to determine whether or not the differences in outcomes of
seemingly similar cases reflect patterns and the evaluation of inputs dif-
ferently, some that should be considered but are ignored, or others that
are considered but should be ignored as a basis for judicial decision mak-
ing.3°4 The impact of indeterminacy in legal rules is to render increas-
ingly important the context of the case, with its unique set of facts and
circumstances. For example, when the legal standard is "reasonableness"
as in Rule 11's "reasonable" prefiling inquiry requirement, the courts are
free to look at a range of facts and circumstances that define what the
attorney did and why. It is very difficult to derive patterns and precedent
from these types of fact-based inquiries. Distinguishing between cases be-
comes the norm of legal analysis as the courts attempt to clear ground to
develop another case-specific solution. Indeterminate standards thus cre-
ate a legal context in which it is hard to say the court has erred in deter-
mining what the law is; the standard is "reasonableness under the
circumstances," and yet it is equally difficult to say prior case law repre-
sents binding precedent unless there is a case so "on point" as to ac-
knowledge no material factual distinctions. But this practical
indeterminacy, while reflecting a certain degree of acceptable give and
take in the institutional decision making, eventually begins to give rise to
theoretical determinacy in the form of increasing synchronicity in deci-
sions, which reflects the inevitable intra-institutional force of
precedent.30 5
It is difficult to conceive of jurists ignoring decisions on the grounds
that they merely survived the abuse of discretion standard on review-
they could have come out differently, they are fact sensitive in nature,
and, thus, they warrant no precedential consideration. In this context, the
logic of discretion, which argues for maintaining flexibility within the nor-
mative middle ground defined by the "zone of possibilities," will inevita-
bly give way to "precedent" regardless of the case's logical structure or
intended impact. Yet the patterns that slowly emerge from this process
reflect deference to the case-specific skills of the trial judge, not legal
analysis or even the attempt by the appellate court to cull out acceptable
patterns from the data of extant case law.
to different problems, nothing more insightful than a statement that courts are human too.
Id. The fact of diversity in the decision making is not itself proof that error does not exist
or that there is not a correct decision, it merely reflects what Brilmayer calls "practical
indeterminacy." Id. at 374.
304. See generally Martinez, supra note 4 (discussing racial bias).
305. Brilmayer discusses the concept of synchronicity and the process whereby indeter-
minate decisions give rise to controlling precedent. Brilmayer, supra note 83, at 374-75.
Professor Brilmayer points out that there is an inevitable institutional move toward the use
of "pre-existing legal principles" and the reliance upon prior decisions in the search for
consistency that undermines the hands-off attitude of the appellate courts. Id. at 375. Is it
better then to simply rely upon patterns of decisions to emerge over time regardless of
their analytic underpinnings, or is it better to consciously construct case law with an eye to
the traditional legal paradigm?
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The seemingly value-neutral perspective of the court's procedural prag-
matism may in fact reflect normative biases left unchallenged in the adju-
dicative process, biases against certain types of litigants or litigation or
simply biases favoring the pragmatic role of the courts and the aggressive
use of sanctions as a managerial tool. The result is the ultimate victory of
pragmatism: the increasing reliance upon the ex ante function of adjudi-
cation and a moving away from the norm of principled decision
making.306
Rethinking the application of the logic of the close case as a conceptual
tool at the trial and appellate level can address some of these problems.
As proposed, a court looking at a close case should err on the side of no
sanction as a way to ensure the fair and consistent application of the logic
of discretion, as a way of recognizing the inequitable result of sanctions in
a close case, and as a recommitment to the hortatory or forward-looking
view of the law, which requires its principled development as a guide to
future conduct. Treating the close case as the easy case, the one that re-
quires less effort, not more, is a misperception of the problem it poses.
The close case is not the easy case, it is the hard case, the case that tests
the rule of law, and it should be treated -as such throughout Rule 11
jurisprudence.
VI. CONCLUSION: THE ADJUDICATIVE NORM OF
CONSCIOUS DECISION MAKING-ADDRESSING THE
PROBLEMS OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION
The adjudicative norm of conscious decision making is offered as a way
to resolve the conundrum of sanctions in a close case, and the close case
is offered as a way to define the proper scope and application of judicial
discretion in the Rule 11 context. As has been seen, judicial discretion as
an inherently self-limiting theory of the court's role in implementing the
law emphasizes the need for reasonableness in adjudication as a process
involving the "conscious intellectual struggle among several lawful pos-
sibilities, with the judge applying objective standards. '' 30 7 Thus, fairness
and objectivity as judicial norms applicable in the context of the Rule 11
close case require the judge to note expressly the points of consensus and
disagreement within the interpretive community when considering the lit-
306. See Atiyah, supra note 51 (discussing the increasing reliance on the ex ante func-
tion of adjudication-looking back at decisions as the data base from which to craft the
law-rather than adhering to the traditional adjudicative paradigm).
307. Judicial discretion is never absolute; there are limits on the explicit procedures that
must be followed as well as the less explicit procedures; the process must be impartial, each
party must be treated equally, each should have the opportunity to air their arguments, the
decision "must be based on the evidence that comes before" him through this process, his
decision must be reasoned and he should explain and justify his decision. Issues of civility
and propriety also add to the court's burdens. The court must act with propriety and even-
handedness. What is important is not merely to be fair, but to appear fair-"justice must
appear to have been done." BARAK, supra note 52, at 25-26.
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igation at issue.308 In the Rule 11 context, a close case is a case without a
sufficient degree of certainty, agreement, or consensus to mandate a sanc-
tion. It is not an easy case, and a portion of the relevant interpretive
community could disagree with the sanction decision.3 9
As developed in this Article, the close case thus embodies jurist's expe-
rience of their own discretion as consciously self-limiting and limited.
The legal discourse of judges grappling with the problem of defining the
limits of their discretion, in particular the outer limits of the range of
acceptable judicial decisions, routinely focuses on the close case. In this
discourse, the close case is a useful way of identifying the point at which
the core meaning of the law310 ceases to provide a regulatory bright line
and the court must decide between relatively equal alternatives, each sup-
ported by and supporting different aspects of the policies, goals, princi-
pals, and values that structure the rule and define the institutional
context. The Rule 11 commentary and case law is replete with references
to what can be called the easy case, cases categorized as falling within the
core meaning of the rule, and its analytic counterpart, the close case,
cases that fall within the grey area of the court's discretion.
Numerous Rule 11 commentators take great comfort in the fact that,
from their perspective, the major Rule 11 cases have been easy cases.311
The easy case in judicial parlance is a case with a high degree of consen-
sus, and probable certainty, regarding the outcome. The case really has
"only one lawful solution, '312 and to select any other result, to exercise
the court's discretion in any other way, would offend the legal commu-
nity, or at least result in reversal. 313 It can be argued that it is these easy
sanction cases that should form the boundaries of the rule and the court's
discretion to sanction. 314
308. See supra notes 162-85 and accompanying text (discussing the analysis of the rea-
sonable attorney standard under Rule 11).
309. The close case is one way to articulate the problem of certainty in legal decision
making-how does a judge decide she has reached the right or best decision? See supra
part V.
310. See supra part V.
311. The Supreme Court has not had to confront the challenge of a close case, or at
least it has not yet recognized one.
312. BARAK, supra note 52, at 37. Intermediate cases differ from easy cases only in the
sense that "both sides appear to have legitimate legal arguments" to support their posi-
tions, an appearance that disappears after some analysis is done. Id. at 39. The interpre-
tive community agrees that, in these cases, there is sufficient consensus among the parties
involved to say that there is only one lawful alternative.
313. Id. at 38. The best exemplar of the fact that "discretion" must inhere in the legal
process is the confusion of the typical first year law student as they grapple with the fact
that a certain rule of law may have different applications in different situations, thus there
is no single right answer. Perhaps that is why the issue of judicial discretion as a fact of life
does not bother lawyers; they start their professional careers being told there is no single
right answer. Equally, Dworkin will find many adherents among the ranks of practicing
attorneys who take the position that if all of the facts are known, and the principles and
policies properly applied, there should only be one right answer-their answer.




The close case is proposed as a way to help the court articulate its role
in a sanction decision. In order to avoid the unacceptable variability as-
sociated with judicial bias as a potential source of decisional inconsis-
tency, particularly in close cases a judge must be "conscious of the fact
that he has discretion, of the meaning of discretion, [and] of the various
factors that he must weigh in the context of this discretion. ' 315 These
conscious judicial norms reflect core values of the legal paradigm; a judge
should be reasonable and 316 rational, not arbitrary.317 She should use her
common sense,318 be objective in her considerations,319 and "weigh rele-
vant considerations related to the legal system, both its normative (law)
and institutional dimension. '320 One of these considerations is the norm
of predictability, the prohibition against decisional inconsistency that un-
dermines the values outlined above. When analyzed in light of these core
adjudicative norms, the close case becomes the "hard case," the case that
requires the jurist's best efforts to meet these normative goals and avoid
decisional inconsistency.
The discrete adjudicative norms outlined above do not purport to com-
pletely define the judicial role, nor do they provide a simple formula for
selecting among legitimate legal alternatives. They do focus the jurist on
the conundrum of the close case, and by doing so, enable the jurist to use
the paradigm of the close case as a decisional guide. "Every judge should
consciously formulate for himself a judicial policy for solving the hard
cases," 321 and the close case methodology outlined above is one such ap-
proach. Within the paradigm of the close case, judicial discretion is per-
ceived, whether viewed theoretically or pragmatically, as self-limiting and
self-conscious. Analyzing the theory of judicial discretion as self-limiting
in the close case can help rectify the problem of indeterminacy and pro-
vide guidance to a sitting judge determining the sanctionability under
Rule 11 of a lawyer's conduct or claim. This approach forces the jurist
into the explicitly self-conscious position of having to conceptualize the
degree of certainty she must experience before she sanctions by acknowl-
edging that she is looking at a close case or potentially close case. To put
the point slightly differently, the theory of judicial discretion as inherently
self-limiting when applied to a close case in the Rule 11 context requires
the jurist, whether expressly or implicitly, to address the proposition that
others in the profession, practicing attorneys or judges, as well as lay
members of the larger community which provide a context of legitimacy
for the court, might disagree with her decision to sanction. It forces the
jurist to scrutinize the decision to sanction in order to avoid an overly
idiosyncratic, personalized approach to the definition of sanctionable or
315. BARAK, supra note 52, at 135.
316. Id. at 115.
317. Id. at 118.
318. Id. at 116.
319. Id. at 124-35.
320. Id. at 118.




The importance of the close case as a decisional methodology is to en-
courage judicial dialogue and discourse in those cases in which the judge
acknowledges that she is faced with a number of decisional alternatives,
the most important being to sanction or not to sanction, and that her
choice will by fiat determine what is lawful in the case.323 The close case
analysis, as the self-conscious articulation of the court that it is approach-
ing the limits of its discretion, is the first step toward engaging the courts
in a consciously self-limiting examination of the dimensions of their dis-
cretion. This approach to judicial discretion, using the paradigm of the
close case to create a decisional buffer zone between the court's pragma-
tism and principled or formal adjudication, and between merit-based fee
shifts and sanctions, favors a decisional policy of exclusion which errs in
favor of no sanction in a close case.
One problem with placing this emphasis on the hard or close case is
that the fall back, the easy case, can easily be expanded to encompass all
such decisions. Some commentary argues that the judiciary in fact en-
gages in the very act of redefining a case as an easy case in the decision-
writing process, emphasizing certain facts, drawing characterizations, and,
in numerous other ways, arguing for the rightness of their decision by
presenting the case as determinate in outcome. 324 There are those who
argue that the category of the easy case is itself a misnomer and ignores
the complexity of all legal analysis. 325 If this is true, the preceding discus-
sion has even more force. If there are jurists who think it is not true, they
are still constrained by the acceptable parameters of legal decision mak-
ing to articulate the ease with which they reached their decision.
The problem of the easy case, however, does not undermine the ulti-
mate utility of the close case analysis that forms the basis of this Article.
This analysis is an effective way for the practitioner to home in on the
dimensions of the legal discourse leading up to the sanction decision. If
one thing is clear from the recent revisions to Rule 11, it is that a sanction
motion must now receive full evidentiary consideration and the litigant
must be given an opportunity to engage the court in legal discourse on
the issue of acceptable practices and sanctions. In the past, it has been
difficult for practitioners to talk with the court about the court's discre-
tion, but since this is the essence of a Rule 11 decision, it should be the
core of the legal discourse. The Rule 11 jurisprudence is too unformed to
rely on any more routinized or pro forma consideration of the issue of
sanctions. Additionally, the Supreme Court's opinion in Cooter & Gell
322. See supra notes 239-99 and accompanying text.
323. See BARAK, supra note 52, at 40-41; Rosenberg, supra note 66 (discussing the
court's limited right to be wrong).
324. See REYNOLDS, supra note 52.
325. Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399 (1985); Sanford Levinson,
Comment, What Do Lawyers Know (and What Do They Do With Their Knowledge)?:
Comments on Schauer and Moore, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 441 (1985); James W. Nickel, Com-
ment, Uneasiness About Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 477 (1985).
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can be read to mandate more careful evaluation of the rule during this
developmental stage.
If the rule is to have the long-range positive impact sought by its draft-
ers, this discourse on discretion must become second nature to practition-
ers and jurists alike. In the Rule 11 context, this should certainly be the
norm, since it is through this element of dialogue, the legal discourse of
the advocate and jurist, that the standards will develop with proper con-
sideration of the relevant practice context and the potential negative im-
pact of the over-inclusive application of Rule 11.
